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Abstract
The duty of accommodation has enabled great progress in Canadian human rights law for
persons with disabilities, particularly in the workplace. However, persons with chronic pain
disorders have faced greater challenges in accessing the accommodation duty’s promise of
equality, which is demonstrated through caselaw analysis. To assess the efficacy of the
accommodation of persons with chronic pain disorders, we must answer three questions: (1)
what is the theoretical understanding of disability and chronic pain disorders; (2) how are
chronic pain disorders accommodated practically (using the workplace as our social
illustration); and, (3) what happens after accommodation fails. A hierarchy of disabilities in
terms of legitimacy and access to rights has developed, in which chronic pain disorders fall
lower than “mainstream” disabilities, primarily due to a lack of medical legitimacy. Thus,
persons with chronic pain disorders are subject to differential treatment on the basis of their
disability, which is potentially discriminatory.
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Chapter 1

1

Introduction

Accommodation has become one of the primary legal and social policy tools to achieve
equality and freedom from discrimination for persons with disabilities in the workplace.
Given the wide range of needs and wants of persons with disabilities on account of their
individual impairments, it is likely that accommodation is not equally effective for all
disabilities. Consider this case. After 17 years of employment, a legal secretary sought
medical attention for an asthma-like condition. Her doctor suspected that she had a
condition called multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), which is a chronic pain disorder. It
has an unknown etiology and manifests as a response to exposure to a range of unrelated
chemicals, commonly paints, personal fragrance, and/or cleaning supplies. As such, he
recommended a variety of accommodations, including allowing her to work from home,
providing respiratory protective equipment, and controlling chemical exposure with a glass
barrier around her. The employer implemented some of these accommodations to set up a
fragrance-free policy, provide access to a private washroom, and place air cleaners and
charcoal masks around her. However, these accommodations were, for the most part,
limited in scope to individual changes, rather than the more systematic approach that the
doctor had recommended. The accommodations were individualized because there were
no policy changes or widespread environmental changes, with the exception of the
fragrance-free policy. Even accommodations that are typically systemic, such as allowing
employees to work from home, were only available in a limited capacity to this employee.
After a series of renovations, she was relocated to a different floor but the chemicals and
products left behind by the renovation caused an MCS reaction and she left work on a
short-term disability leave. While she was off, the employer advised that her work
assignment would be changed to include reduced contact with others. Determining her
accommodation needs was not a collaborative effort between the employer and the
employee, but rather a unilateral decision by the employer. She did not return to work but
instead applied for long-term disability benefits, which was denied, and then she was
terminated from her position. She complained to the human rights commission against her
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termination on the grounds that it was discriminatory with respect to her disability. The
investigator for the commission found that the employee had frustrated the employer’s
attempts at accommodating up to the point of undue hardship by refusing to cooperate with
the new work assignment and not providing access to her doctors. As such, the Chief
Commissioner upheld the dismissal as well as finding that she did not even have a physical
disability because the MCS had not been firmly diagnosed and surveillance evidence
conducted by the insurer showed some daily activity that belied her claims of
incapacitation.
The employee appealed this decision. The trial judge overturned this decision and found
that the Chief Commissioner had given inappropriate emphasis to the lack of a firm
diagnosis because the impairment had been confirmed by the doctor: the fact that MCS is
not fully understood by medicine does not bar its status as a disability. Furthermore, the
trial judge found that the lack of cooperation cited as frustrating the employer’s duty to
accommodate was not actually a lack of cooperation. Rather, she was refusing
unreasonable requests to participate in a new position with no examination of how it
actually accommodated her symptoms and to allow the investigator communication with
her doctors without her being present. As such, the trial judge found that the employer did
not reasonably accommodate her.
The employer appealed this decision. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial decision and
reinstated the Commissioner’s finding that the duty of accommodation had been
discharged. The Court of Appeal determined that the accommodations provided had been
sufficient, even if the employer believed that she was not disabled. Instead, the Court of
Appeal deferred to the reasoning of the Commissioner by applying the standard of
reasonableness in judicial review. In doing so, the court avoided engaging with the issue
of whether the employer had satisfied the duty of accommodation and instead allowed the
broad discretion of the Commissioner.

3

This is Brewer v Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP [Brewer].1 This case demonstrates some of
the common problems in dealing with chronic pain disorders in the workplace for
employees, employers, and courts. Employers are sceptical and overly-scrutinize the
employee to the point of discrimination. Employees are frustrated and sometimes
uncooperative because the requests for information and confirmation of disability are so
frequent. Chronic pain disorders are misunderstood and invisible, lack medical legitimacy,
and have an unclear etiology. As such, courts, tribunals, and some arbitrators do not know
how to deal with them. Instead, the mess of Brewer occurs where some decision-makers
recognize the limitations of medical evidence whereas others find that the individual is
uncooperative. This inconsistent and unpredictable approach characterizes the majority of
the caselaw dealing with chronic pain disorders.

1.1

Centrality of accommodation

Accommodation is one of the principal tools used to enable equality and freedom from
discrimination but with varying degrees of success. For complex disabilities that are
chronic, invisible, and misunderstood, with an unclear etiology and lack of objective
evidence, accommodation may not be as successful compared to “mainstream” disabilities.
Chronic pain disorders and mental illnesses clearly fall into this group of complex
disabilities. Mental illnesses, while contentious and subject to high amounts of stigma, have
carved out a place in accommodation and human rights assessments, generally. As a result,
disabilities fall under either a physical or psychological heading. Chronic pain disorders
are not as well-established and as yet medical science has not determined whether it is of
psychological or physical etiology. Additionally, there is very limited legal research
examining how the law handles chronic pain disorders.
Human rights law has rapidly progressed over the past 20 years. Accommodation is a key
part of this progression. Chronic pain disorders represent an area of the law that is still
lacking: accommodation of complex disabilities. Although chronic pain disorders seem to
affect a small portion of the population, recognition of these disorders both in medicine

1

2008 ABCA 435, reversing 2006 ABQB 258.
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and law is growing. Unfortunately, as demonstrated in Brewer, it is apparent that both
medicine and law are failing persons with chronic pain disorders. Medical professionals
struggle with the diagnosis and clearly communicating the limitations of chronic pain
disorders. The law depends on medicine as proof, even where it is not necessary, regardless
of whether medicine can actually answer the legal questions. At some point, medical
research may be able to answer questions of etiology, diagnosis, and prognosis, but not yet.
As such, the law needs to apply human rights principles to be flexible and adaptable and
recognize the limitations of medicine for chronic pain disorders and other disabilities that
struggle with medical legitimacy. A flexible and adaptable approach is, in fact, the only
way for the law to achieve equality and freedom from discrimination, using
accommodation as its main mechanism. However, it is not clear what the approach is for
chronic pain disorders because there is virtually no legal research, despite the recurring
problems in the caselaw with medical evidence, absenteeism, and scrutiny.
Chronic pain disorders present unique obstacles as complex disabilities that lack definitive
medical support and do not easily fit into the conventional process for accommodation.
Thus, this research seeks to assess the efficacy of the accommodation of persons with
chronic pain disorders in Canada. In order to do this, three questions must be answered: (1)
what is the theoretical understanding of disability and chronic pain disorders; (2) how are
chronic pain disorders accommodated practically (using the workplace as our social
illustration); and (3) what are the legal options available after accommodation fails. The
first question is addressed in Chapter 2. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the second question.
The third question is explored in Chapter 5. It is expected that persons with chronic pain
disorders experience less access to their human rights, in particular the benefits of
accommodation, due to the unique barriers presented by these disabilities, which are
discussed throughout. These questions are answered through a combination of caselaw
analysis and consideration of academic sources that examine disability more generally.
Although there is very limited research on chronic pain disorders in the workplace, there
is a growing amount of caselaw. The chronic pain disorders of interest are chronic fatigue
syndrome (CFS), fibromyalgia (FM), and MCS.

5

1.2

Chapter overview

Chapter 2 sets out the theoretical foundation of this research by asking how to define
disability. Given that this is a theoretical question, it is mostly answered using the wealth
of disability literature available. Critical Disability Theory (CDT) is the modern and
primary approach used to understand disability. The main mechanism of CDT is the social
model which understands disability to be a social construct that is separate from
impairment and exists outside of the individual. For example, the impairment of a person
in a wheelchair is the inability to walk, whereas the disability is the lack of ramps into the
workplace. CDT and the social model are the theoretical bases to which this research
ascribes. CDT seeks to attain the goal of substantive equality, wherein every individual has
what he or she needs to perform equally to every other individual, compared to formal
equality, which only requires that each individual is given the same aid regardless of need.
When substantive equality is achieved, it is possible to attain citizenship—full participation
in society. In order to define disability, the models of disability, equality, and citizenship
must be examined.
Not only is disability a complex concept, but it is also something that nearly every person
will experience in some way throughout his or her lifetime, which is demonstrated through
a brief statistical portrait of disability in Canada. With this understanding of disability
generally, it becomes evident why chronic pain disorders require a separate consideration.
There is such a range of needs and wants for different kinds of disabilities. This range
means that the disability rights movement is not unified. Chronic pain disorders stand out
even further than this range for several reasons. First, it is relatively unestablished
compared to other much more understood disabilities. Second, there is a lack of medical
consensus regarding the existence, diagnosis, etiology, and prognosis, as well as a lack of
objective medical evidence. Third, chronic pain disorders are difficult to deal with because
symptoms are fluctuating, chronic, and unpredictable. Fourth, as a result of the above
reasons and the invisibility of the symptoms, these disabilities are subject to a relatively
high amount of scrutiny and disbelief, and, ultimately, stigma. A theoretical understanding
of disability helps to illuminate the separate standing of chronic pain disorders, but a
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practical examination is also warranted. However, there are several steps involved in a
practical examination and these are found in Chapters 3, 4, and 5.
In order to assess how chronic pain disorders are accommodated, the general approach to
accommodation must be understood. Chapter 3 is a foundational chapter that attempts to
answer what is accommodation. First, the purpose and intention of accommodation must
be assessed—this requires an examination of the human rights legislation, including the
Ontario Human Rights Code2 and the Canadian Human Rights Act,3 and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 Second, key caselaw must also be considered,
particularly the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) 1999 decisions British Columbia (Public
Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance) (Meiorin) and
British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of
Human Rights) (Grismer).5 The inclusive vision set out in Meiorin complements the United
Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which Canada ratified in
2010,6 by endorsing institutional accommodation, wherein the workplace and society are
changed to eliminate the systemic problem and establish a more inclusive standard. This is
in comparison to individual accommodation, which only deals with the individual problem
without addressing the systemic issues.7
However, it appears that recent caselaw has narrowed the accommodation duty in Canada.
Since Meiorin and Grismer, the SCC has released a trilogy of cases dealing with disability
and the duty of accommodation: McGill University Health Centre (Montréal General
Hospital) v Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital general de Montréal (McGill University),8
Honda Canada Inc v Keays (Honda Canada),9 and Hydro-Québec v Syndicat des

2

RSO 1985, c H-19.
RSC 1985, c H-6.
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982.
5
[1999] 3 SCR 3; [1999] 3 SCR 868.
6
30 March 2007, GA Res 61/106; Library of Parliament, News Release, Canada and the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (5 December 2012) Parliament of Canada online:
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/ResearchPublications/2012-89-e.htm>.
7
Dianne Pothier, “How Did We Get Here? Setting the Standard for the Duty to Accommodate” (2009) 59
UNB LJ 95 at 105.
8
2007 SCC 4.
9
2008 SCC 39 [Honda Canada].
3
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employés-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro Québec, section local
2000 (SCFP-FTQ) (Hydro-Québec).10 The McGill University decision considered nonculpable absenteeism and automatic termination clauses to uphold termination of an
employee with a chronic illness. In Honda Canada, a wrongful dismissal case of an
employee with CFS, the SCC did not significantly consider human rights principles in the
analysis. Although this is a common failing in wrongful dismissal cases, it is still a
disappointing result. In Hydro-Québec, the SCC restated the undue hardship test, which
sets a limit to accommodation, but did so with weak reasoning and perhaps narrowing of
the accommodation duty. This trilogy of cases provided thin reasoning on disability
meaning that the courts failed to engage with human rights principles by only providing a
cursory application of the accommodation analysis, where it was appropriate. As such,
these cases have not been particularly influential and many arbitrators and tribunals have
largely ignored them. However, these cases are evidence of the struggle by the SCC with
the high standard set for disability in Grismer, Meiorin, and Eldridge v British Columbia
(Attorney General).11 It is likely that tribunals and arbitrators ignore some of these
troubling higher court decisions to apply their expertise for a broader and more nuanced
approach. Having said that, Canada may have a broader approach to accommodation than
that of the US and the EU. The EU’s approach draws from the US but is relatively
undeveloped still. The US initially influenced the Canadian approach to disability, but now
appears to have a narrower approach because of the higher threshold required to qualify as
disabled under the Americans with Disabilities Act.12 With the organizational principles of
the accommodation duty set out, the practical ramifications for accommodation of chronic
pain disorders can be examined.
Chapter 4 examines how chronic pain disorders are accommodated. First, the scene must
be set. Medical literature for CFS, FM, and MCS is examined as well as how these
disabilities are commonly accommodated to understand why these syndromes are different
from other disabilities. A combination of caselaw, particularly from tribunals and
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2008 SCC 43.
[1997] 3 SCR 624.
12
42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq (2011). See also ADA Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §12101 (2011).
11
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arbitrations, and social science literature illustrates the practicalities of accommodation of
chronic pain disorders. Second, a variety of factors that influence accommodation must be
discussed. This includes the human aspect of the process—supportive supervisors and
cooperative employees—which influences the success of the return to work process. It is
likely that the most significant factor for chronic pain disorders is the medical evidence or
rather the lack of objective medical evidence and of medical consensus regarding existence,
diagnosis, etiology, and prognosis. It is expected that medical evidence is one of the most
significant barriers to the accommodation of chronic pain disorders and perhaps other legal
avenues. Without definitive medical evidence, how can employers and courts accept that
the disability has been proved? If disability is not proved, then there is no duty to
accommodate nor can there be compensation for the disability.
Finally, undue hardship factors for the accommodation of chronic pain disorders must be
examined. This includes safety, interference with the collective agreement, financial cost,
and legitimate operational requirements—by far the most significant because of the
extremely common problem of innocent absenteeism for persons with chronic pain
disorders. Additionally, categorizing absenteeism requires more consideration than it
seems. Absenteeism could serve to frustrate the employment contract because attendance
at work is an essential term or it could be a bona fide occupational requirement as it is
reasonably necessary that employees attend work. However, in both cases, human rights
principles should apply so that employers are required to accommodate and tolerate
absenteeism up to the point of undue hardship. Although it is less than perfect, the approach
in Canada is expected to provide better access to rights than that of the US and the EU
because of the more stringent gatekeeper aspects in the latter’s approach wherein the
medical evidentiary problems are not just an obstacle but a barrier.
With these issues, it is likely that persons with chronic pain disorders will need to consider
other options outside of accommodation. However, accommodation is the only option that
enables them to continue to work. Chapter 5 provides an overview of other legal options
after accommodation fails. It is expected that these other options will be plagued with some
of the same issues, particularly the lack of objective medical evidence. This chapter relies
on caselaw and statute. There are two options before dismissal that the person with a
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chronic pain disorder can pursue: long-term disability benefits and workers’ compensation.
Because workers’ compensation can be a strict scheme, it is expected that there will not be
a lot of understanding and benefits for persons with chronic pain disorders. Long-term
disability benefits are essential for persons with chronic pain disorders because of the
frequency with which it is claimed, due to the high level of absenteeism. It is expected that
entitlement to the benefits is difficult to prove because of the medical evidentiary problems.
The process to obtain benefits both at the first request and after denial by the insurer must
be considered. There are also options available after dismissal including complaints to
human rights commissions and common law litigation, namely wrongful dismissal by the
employer. It seems likely that persons with chronic pain disorders will complain of
discrimination and harassment for their disability at human rights commissions. Again,
they may encounter problems proving discrimination because it requires proof of disability.
Persons with chronic pain disorders can also pursue an action against the employer for
wrongful dismissal in common law courts, but it seems likely from Honda Canada Inc v
Keays that human rights principles will not receive much consideration from courts. Thus,
it is expected that accommodation provides the most benefits for persons with chronic pain
disorders because it enables them to continue working.
Finally, the range of caselaw considered above must be analyzed as a whole to ascertain
how the law deals with chronic pain disorders. A more traditional approach fails to
recognize chronic pain disorders as disabilities because of the lack of medical support, both
in terms of evidence and agreement from the medical community. This traditional approach
applies an outdated and narrow understanding of disability that continues to be applied by
some courts, despite expansive human rights principles. On the other hand, a human rights
approach applies these principles as set out by law, calling for an inclusive and adaptive
approach to accommodation and human rights, but it is likely that this is rarely achieved,
perhaps for disabilities generally and especially for chronic pain disorders. The majority of
caselaw is expected to fall into a middle ground or hybrid approach wherein courts and
tribunals recognize some of the issues but do not fully engage with them, instead
inconsistently and inadequately applying human rights principles. Progress has
undoubtedly been made since the advent of the accommodation duty in Canada, but there
is still room to improve. Chronic pain disorders, as a complex disability with unique
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barriers, are one of these areas ripe for improvement. First, however, the unique barriers
and particular challenges must not only be recognized but also understood.

1.3

Goals of this research

This research intends to provide a comprehensive account of how persons with chronic
pain disorders are accommodated in the workplace. It seems that chronic pain disorders
fall lower on a hierarchy of disabilities in terms of legitimacy. 13 This is largely due to the
problems of medical evidence but is also related to the fluctuating and invisible symptoms
and high level of scrutiny. This lack of legitimacy hinders access to the benefits of
accommodation and human rights generally. Thus, chronic pain disorders also fall lower
on a hierarchy of disabilities with regards to access to rights. However, the law must pay
attention to, but not ultimately be ruled by medical legitimacy. The duty of accommodation
only requires proof of impairment, not disability, in order to be activated. Proof of
impairment for chronic pain disorders still depends on subjective medical evidence but
should not bar access to rights. Requiring objective evidence of disability is a standard that
adversely affects persons with chronic pain disorders and, as such, is discriminatory.

Judith Mosoff, “Lost in Translation? The Disability Perspective in Honda v Keays and Hydro-Québec v
Syndicat” (2009) 3 McGill JL & Health 137 at 141.
13
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Chapter 2

2

The Disability Landscape

What is disability? It is a concept that has been subject to many different perspectives and
understandings. Disability should be considered in a range of contexts, including, but not
limited to, health care, transportation, social programs, education, and work. Critical
disability theory (CDT) is the foremost approach to understanding disability, but it is in no
way a unified school of thought. Instead, CDT seems to be a reaction to its forerunner,
which is usually referred to as the biomedical model.1 This model demonstrates a
positivistic understanding of disability that sees disability as an anomaly that needs to be
cured or eliminated, an approach that still exists and can be found in legislation and case
law.2
The main mechanism of CDT is the social model,3 which differentiates between
impairment, or the functional limitation, and disability. The social model understands
disability as existing outside of the individual as a consequence of the interaction of the
individual with the social environment.4 Disability is a social construct separate from the
impairment. This differentiation arises from the World Health Organization’s 1980
definition of disability as “any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability
to perform an activity in the manner or within the range considered normal for a human
being.”5 CDT seeks not merely formal equality, where every individual is given the same
aid, but rather substantive equality, where every individual has what he or she needs to
perform equally to every other individual. Substantive equality is necessary to attain

Marcia H Rioux & Fraser Valentine, “Does Theory Matter? Exploring the Nexus between Disability,
Human Rights, and Public Policy” in Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds, Critical Disability Theory:
Essays in Philosophy, Politics, Policy, and Law (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) 47 at 50-51 [Rioux &
Valentine].
2
See e.g. the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, SO 1997, c 16, Schedule A s 2 [WSIA].
3
The social model has many variations and is known by several different names including the sociopolitical model and the social-political model. It will be referred to as the social model here.
4
Rioux & Valentine, supra note 1.
5
World Health Organization, International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps
(Geneva: WHO, 1980) at 27-29. See the new definition in World Health Organization, International
classification of functioning, disability and health (Geneva: WHO, 2001) at 3 where disability is “an
umbrella term for impairments, activity limitations or participation restrictions” [ICF].
1
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citizenship—the ultimate goal of CDT. Citizenship is about “the capacity to participate
fully in all the institutions of society—not just those that fit the conventional definitions of
the political, but also the social and cultural.”6 It is unclear whether the social model can
attain substantive equality and citizenship, particularly for disabilities that are subject to a
lack of understanding and stigma, like chronic pain disorders. Indeed, the lesser access to
rights experienced by persons with chronic pain disorders suggests that the social model
cannot.
In order to ask and answer any questions about disability, the concept must be defined, but
it cannot be defined in one sentence. Thus, several aspects must be examined, including
statistics, theoretical underpinnings, and the models of disability. In Part I of this chapter,
a statistical portrait of disability is provided in order to understand the significance of
disability in our society. Part II examines the many models of disability to evaluate CDT’s
progress and future. The social model appears to have exhausted itself so there is a call for
either a new model or an integration of old models to provide a more complete and nuanced
understanding of disability; regardless, progress is needed. In Part III, the theoretical
underpinnings of disability are analyzed including the frames through which disability is
understood, models of equality, and citizenship. This theoretical foundation is essential to
understanding and evaluating CDT and the disability movement. Conclusions will be
drawn in Part IV regarding the future of disability, particularly in the case of “nonmainstream” disabilities like chronic pain disorders, which struggle with legitimacy and
discrimination due to the lack of objective medical evidence, invisibility of symptoms, and
fluctuation of symptoms.

2.1 A statistical portrait of disability
Persons with disabilities require consideration in education and training, healthcare and
social assistance, accessibility of public services, and the workplace. Persons with
disabilities form a significant portion of the population. According to the World Health

Richard Devlin & Dianne Pothier, “Introduction” in Pothier & Devlin, supra note 1, 1 at 1 [Devlin &
Pothier].
6
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Organization, over a billion people, which amounts to about 15% of the world’s population,
has some form of disability.7 Among these people, between 110 million and 190 million
adults have significant difficulties in functioning.8 Furthermore, as the population ages, the
rates of disability are increasing with more chronic health conditions in particular.9 In order
to understand the scope of disability in Canada, statistics regarding employment,
participation, disability, barriers, accommodations, and training will be provided as well as
some discussion as to the more problematic disabilities—chronic pain disorders and mental
illnesses. It must be noted that although the sources are reputable and reliable, they often
rely on self-reporting; in the area of disability, it seems likely that some people will not
report either due to lack of knowledge or fear of stigma.
In Canada, 14 per cent, or an estimated 3.8 million people, reported having a disability that
limited some functioning.10 The prevalence of disability rises with age with women
reporting higher rates.11 The Canadian Survey on Disability, conducted in 2012,
determined that the total labour force amounted to 23,187,350 people, of which 2,338,240
were disabled.12 Within this labour force, the overall participation rate was 76.9 per cent
compared to a significantly lower 53.6 per cent participation rate for persons with
disabilities.13 The participation rate reflects the amount of people who were in the labour
force. The per cent that are not participating are not in the labour force—they were not
employed or unemployed, instead they were unwilling or unable to work. In other words,
“444,000 people aged 15 to 64 with disabilities were unemployed or not in the labour force,
and were not permanently retired or completely prevented from working.”14 However, the
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difference between persons without disabilities compared to persons with disabilities
persists in the employment rate and the unemployment rate. Persons without disabilities
had an employment rate of 73.6 per cent, persons with disabilities reported a 47.3 per cent
employment rate.15 In terms of unemployment, a greater proportion of persons with
disabilities were unemployed at 11.8 per cent unemployed, while only 7.1 per cent of
persons without disabilities were unemployed.16 Furthermore, nearly a quarter of employed
persons with disabilities worked in more precarious part-time positions because of their
disability and inability to find a full-time position.17 Barriers to employment for persons
with disabilities are well-documented and so lower employment and participation rates of
persons with disabilities are not surprising but still disappointing.
Statistics Canada also looked at the employment rates for different disability groups
marked as mild, moderate, severe, and very severe. However, more than three-quarters of
persons with disabilities had more than one disability.18 Furthermore, persons with
“developmental, cognitive, and mental health-related disabilities face greater employment
challenges than people with sensory or physical disabilities.”19 As the severity of the
disability increases, the participation and employment rates decreases.20 More severe
disabilities would presumably result in more severe impairments and functional
limitations. Under the category “pain,” which likely includes chronic fatigue syndrome and
fibromyalgia among others, the average participation rate was a mere 52.7 per cent, almost
30 per cent lower than that of persons without disabilities.21 For persons with mild pain
disabilities, the participation rate was 71.5 per cent, but this dropped to 32.3 per cent for
persons with very severe pain disabilities.22 The employment rate for persons with pain
disabilities showed a similar trend as it was 47.3 per cent for all, 65 per cent for those with
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mild pain disabilities, and 25.9 per cent for persons with very severe pain disabilities. These
lower rates of employment and participation are significant considering “about 1.3 per cent
of the adult Canadian population reported having chronic fatigue syndrome…and 1.5 per
cent reported having fibromyalgia;” however, an additional consideration is the high cooccurrence of mental illness with chronic pain disorders.23
Statistics Canada also looked at mental illnesses. The World Health Organization estimated
that 350 million people worldwide are affected by depression.24 The Mental Health
Commission of Canada reported that in any given year, “one in five people in Canada
experiences a mental health problem or illness, with a cost to the economy of well in excess
of $50 billion.”25 Furthermore, only one in three report that they have sought and received
services and treatment for a mental health problem.26 The Centre for Addiction and Mental
Health reported unemployment rates as high as 70-90 per cent for persons with severe
mental illnesses.27 Statistics Canada supported these findings with a 25.7 per cent
employment rate for persons with very severe mental or psychological disabilities
compared to 60.2 per cent for persons with mild mental disabilities.28 The participation rate
was on average 44.7 per cent, but with a significant difference between mild and severe
mental disabilities.29 Persons with mental illness seem to have lower participation and
employment rates than persons with pain disabilities, but this measurement does not take
into account the co-occurrence of the two disabilities.
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Persons with disabilities clearly make up a significant portion of the workforce. What kind
of employment are persons with disabilities actually getting? They are getting lesser paying
employment as the “median total income of persons with disabilities [was] $10,000 less
than median for those without disabilities.”30 The two industries that employed the most
persons with disabilities are retail and health care and social assistance, employing 26.6
per cent and 25 per cent, respectively.31 Industries that require the most physical labour
and training such as mining, utilities, and agriculture employed the lowest proportion of
persons with disabilities.32 This is unsurprising considering that the more common barriers
in the workplace for adults with disabilities were identified as merely the condition of the
person and prevention from taking work-related training courses.33 Having said that,
sometimes accommodations are available, even in more physically demanding roles.
However, a noteworthy amount of modifications required to work were not made by
employers. For example, 173,030 persons with disabilities required job redesign in order
to participate in the labour force, but 43.4% of those persons did not receive a job
redesign.34 It must be noted, however, that job redesign can be quite onerous on the
employer. For potentially less difficult modifications like reduced work hours and human
support, 29 per cent and 55.3 per cent of the required modifications were not made.35 Thus,
the workplace is not always a hospitable place for some persons with disabilities but most
employers are trying to meet their legal obligations to satisfy the duty to accommodate as
indicated by some provision of the requested accommodations. Accommodation may be
hindered because persons with disabilities do not request accommodations due to fear of
discrimination. In fact, 11.5 per cent of persons with disabilities reported experiencing
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discrimination in the workplace.36 This is on top of the 5.6 per cent who received
discouragement from family and/or friends and the 19.5 per cent whose past attempts at
employment were unsuccessful.37
The World Health Organization describes disability as “part of the human condition.
Almost everyone will be temporarily or permanently impaired at some point in life, and
those who survive to old age will experience increasing difficulties in functioning.”38
Persons with disabilities constitute a sizeable portion of our society but are
disproportionately unemployed. This is likely due to barriers and limitations as a
consequence of their own impairments, but also due to lack of social supports and
discrimination, employer failure to provide the required modifications, and insufficient
training, all of which also bar entrance to certain industries, thus limiting opportunities.
With this practical understanding of the scope of disability in Canada and the limitations
of persons with disabilities in the workforce, the theoretical definition of disability can now
be examined.

2.2

Defining disability

Disability has been defined in a variety of ways. CDT defines it using models. A dichotomy
between the two primary models—the biomedical model and the social model—has
developed, but this does not provide a true picture of disability. The influence of both of
these models can be seen in case law and legislation. A more accurate portrayal of disability
requires a more nuanced understanding, one which integrates aspects of the biomedical and
social models as well as others like the functional, economic, and biopsychosocial models.
Having said that, there is such a range of models of disability that it can be overwhelming.39
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In order to understand disability, this part will discuss the biomedical model, the social
model, how disability is defined in legislation and case law, models in between, and the
future of models of disability.

2.2.1

The biomedical model

The biomedical model is the traditional model that demonstrates a positivistic
understanding of disability by depending on medical evidence. Here, disability is the
functional impairment and that is all that is relevant.40 Disability is seen as the consequence
of biological characteristics that must be treated through medical means with the goal of
elimination or cure.41 Disabled people are “that group who experience a significant level
of physical, sensory or mental incapacity which affects their daily life in some way.”42 Due
to the prestige and deference towards medicine, this model does have some credibility.43
Under this model, persons with disabilities are seen as victims or a “sick person” who is
incompetent, blameworthy, vulnerable, weak, and fallible.44 Furthermore, disability is an
individual pathology rather than social, so it exists within the individual.45 The
rehabilitation model is sometimes described as a derivative of the medical model; it focuses
on “diminishing, adapting or concealing disability.”46 Regardless, the rehabilitation model,
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like the biomedical model, fails to give a voice to persons with disabilities and instead
defers only to rehabilitation experts.47
The biomedical model can be seen still in some legislation, such as in the Ontario
Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997, in which the definition of an “occupational
disease” is limited to a disease or medical condition.48 This medicalization of disability
creates eligibility requirements, which can manufacture concerns about fraud and
deception.49 There are, however, some advantages to using the biomedical model as it
provides tangible characteristics to measure and can be used to determine some of the needs
of persons with disabilities.50 This empirical and biological understanding of disability is
necessary sometimes in order to determine the appropriate accommodations for persons
with disabilities. But it does not wholly explain disability. It also generates a view of
persons’ with disabilities limitations as “inherent, naturally and properly excluding her
from participating in mainstream culture.”51 It is particularly problematic when applied to
chronic pain disorders that do not have objective medical proof of existence and are subject
to a lack of medical consensus regarding existence, diagnosis, etiology, and prognosis—
under this model, they do not qualify as disabled.
If we consider the more limited use of the biomedical model in the 19th and 20th centuries,
it becomes clear that the biomedical model can lead the law to exclude those persons who
are not seen as “being able to control and hold property or to exercise independent agency,”
such as “women, children, lunatics, idiots.”52 The modern use of the biomedical model
“individualized disability by treating it as a personal tragedy. It encouraged dependence on
doctors, rehabilitation professionals, and charity. And it stigmatized people with
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disabilities by defining them as something less than normal.”53 Thus, it is clear that the
biomedical model is not appropriate to completely explain disability. Furthermore, any
future use of it must recognize the potential for discrimination and harmful
individualization.

2.2.2

The social model

The social model makes up the other end of the dichotomy of disability. In creating the
social model, the disability rights movement was “rejecting approaches based upon the
restoration of normality and insisting on approaches based upon the celebration of
difference.”54 The social model differentiates between impairment and disability.
Impairment is a functional limitation whereas disability is a “consequence of the social
structure.”55 Furthermore, disability exists outside of the individual, where it is a difference
rather than an anomaly that needs to be cured.56 Thus, instead of biological limitations
creating disability, disability barriers are a result of social conditions.57 These social
conditions include environmental barriers like lack of ramps into buildings and more social
barriers like discriminatory attitudes or stigma. Michael Prince posited that “with various
attitudinal and environmental barriers removed, more than half of working age persons
with disabilities could enter paid employment on a part-time or full-time basis.”58
Accommodation itself flows from the social model, in that accommodation seeks to change
the social environment to reduce the effect of functional limitations.
Proponents of the social model often remove the biomedical understanding of disability
entirely, which creates the potential of “reducing disablement to a political symbol or token
to be moved back and forth.”59 Mike Oliver attempts to defend the social model by arguing

53

Bagenstos, supra note 40 at 6.
Mike Oliver, “Defining Impairment and Disability: Issues at stake” in Elizabeth F Emens & Michael
Ashley Stein, eds, Disability and Equality Law (Farnham, Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing Limited,
2013) 3 at 8 [Oliver].
55
Rioux & Valentine, supra note 1 at 51.
56
Ibid at 51.
57
Stein, “Disability Human Rights”, supra note 51 at 85.
58
Michael J Prince, Absent Citizens: Disability Politics and Policy in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2009) at 25 [Prince].
59
Bickenbach, supra note 40 at 174.
54

21

that pain and impairments belong to the social model of impairment rather than the social
model of disability.60 This is a weak defense as it merely confirms the supposition that the
social model of disability is incomplete to define disability. Michael Ashley Stein argues
that the social model only brings about formal equality through equal treatment not equal
outcome, failing to amount to substantive equality.61 The social model sets out
accommodation as the solution to many obstacles of disability. Stein posits that
“[p]roviding accommodations in the workplace changes existing hierarchies, ultimately
suggesting a lack of inevitability in the structure and conception of particular occupations.
By removing unnecessary barriers to participation, accommodation brings about equality
as conceived by formal justice.”62 Thus, the social model can only achieve formal equality
so its use for human rights is limited.63 Even if Stein’s argument is rejected, the social
model alone does not seem capable of changing the structure of the society to remove
discrimination and barriers for persons with disabilities.64
It is apparent from this discussion of the biomedical and social models that these two
models do not provide a comprehensive definition of disability. Bickenbach argues that
these two models are actually similar in structure as they “both deny the interactional
character of disablement.”65 As such, other models of disability need to be explored.

2.2.3

Disability in the law

The social model has been hugely influential. It can be seen in legislation such as the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter),66 the Ontario Human Rights Code
(OHRC),67 and in the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (CRPD), which Canada has ratified.68 In the preamble of the CRPD, disability
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is specifically recognized as “result[ing] from the interaction between persons with
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers that hinder their full and effective
participation in society on an equal basis with others.”69 However, disability is not
specifically defined in the CRPD.70 Perhaps this omission is in recognition of the social
model perspective that disability is a socially-based functional limitation, separate from
medical definitions and the impairment. As such, a specific definition is unnecessary and
likely to be too limiting. Alternatively, this may be an attempt to avoid the problem of
defining disability in a way that is broad yet meaningful enough that has been faced by
legislatures. The Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) defines disability as “any previous
or existing mental or physical disability and includes disfigurement and previous or
existing dependence on alcohol or a drug.”71 This is a relatively brief definition but it is not
particularly broad or clear. The OHRC provides a far longer definition that includes:
(a) Any degree of physical disability, infirmity, malformation or
disfigurement that is caused by bodily injury, birth defect or illness and,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes diabetes
mellitus, epilepsy, a brain injury, any degree of paralysis, amputation,
lack of physical co-ordination, blindness or visual impediment, deafness
or hearing impediment, muteness or speech impediment, or physical
reliance on a guide dog or other animal or on a wheelchair or other
remedial appliance or device,
(b) A condition of mental impairment or a developmental disability,
(c) A learning disability, or a dysfunction in one or more of the processes
involved in understanding or using symbols or spoken language,
(d) A mental disorder, or
(e) An injury or disability for which benefits were claimed or received
under the insurance plan established under the Workplace Safety and
Insurance Act, 1997.72
This definition is much longer than others and so is likely intended to be broad. The
provisions relevant to disability in the CHRA and the OHRC follow the social model in
the prohibitions of discrimination and harassment and imposition of accommodation and
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equality. However, the actual definitions of disability seem to rely somewhat on a medical
understanding with the use of medical terminology and thus likely requiring medical
evidence. For “mainstream” disabilities, this reliance is probably not problematic, but for
chronic pain disorders and sometimes mental illness, which struggle with medical
legitimacy, this use of medical definitions may be problematic in their recognition as
disabilities.
Courts have also been influenced by the social model, although this has not been explicitly
acknowledged. For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the idea of impairment
without actual impairment to constitute disability when interpreting the Charter.73 Given
that the Charter is binding on other legislation, the definitions of disability above should
be interpreted as broadly as possible, which will enable the social model’s influence. The
social model “clearly displays, in its genesis and evolution, the need to abandon, both in
theory and in practice, normative neutrality.”74 However, the social model does have some
shortcomings, particularly for mental illnesses and chronic pain disorders that are invisible,
chronic, and subject to disagreement from the medical field. 75 The difficulty integrating
these particular disabilities may depend on the context, as they are invisible and limiting in
some contexts and the opposite in others.76 These problems were identified by Harlan Hahn
in 1985,77 but still no significant changes have been made for these invisible disabilities.

2.2.4

Models in between the biomedical model and the social
model

There are numerous models of disability that could be discussed, but this section will focus
on the economic/functional model, radical model, bio-psycho-social model and the human
rights paradigm. These models help to fill in the gaps left by the dichotomy of the
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biomedical model and social model. Having said that, these models may also be incomplete
explanations of disability. However, the ideas in these models will hopefully contribute to
a fuller understanding of disability.
The economic model seems to have developed from a social understanding of the
biomedical and rehabilitation models.78 Under this model, “the ‘problem’ of disablement
has become the problem of the costs of disablement” wherein disability policy seeks to
redistribute and reduce these costs.79 In addition, the economic models depends on “its
conception of normality—namely, a specified repertoire of productive capabilities.”80 The
functional model similarly views disability in terms of the functional capabilities of each
person so that disability exists within the individual.81 Because disability is considered an
individual condition, governments are justified in limiting state action for prevention and
comfort for persons with disabilities.82 The economic model, however, recognizes that
disability is not located entirely within the individual and instead there is a relational
problem depending on social context;83 limitation on state action can be justified with a
cost-benefit analysis instead.
Economic interpretation of issues of disability allows more empirical examination.84 The
model does not just consider monetary costs, it evaluates economic efficiency considering
social costs and social benefits, like productivity and participation. However, evaluation of
these social instances is not easy and, as such, some non-pecuniary losses like pain and
suffering are excluded from schemes that demonstrate an economic understanding of
disability, like many workers’ compensation programs.85 Most problematically, the
economic model leads to use of welfare programs for persons with disabilities rather than
seeking equality and independence. Having said that, there is clearly an economic
component of disability because the improvement of circumstances of persons with
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disabilities requires money. Furthermore, due to limited funding, governments and other
institutions want to fund the most efficient programming for helping the most persons with
disabilities—economic efficiency is a guiding principle.
The radical model was created by AJ Withers. It “defines disability as a social construction
used as an oppressive tool to penalize and stigmatize those of us who deviate from the
(arbitrary) norm.”86 Instead of being an anomaly, disability is part of a spectrum of health.
This model addresses the intersectionality of multiple oppressions such as race, gender,
and sexuality so that persons who are oppressed do not need to be classified into a group;
the labelling process is eliminated.87 This is particularly useful considering the higher rates
of disability among women and certain racial groups like First Nations people and the
higher rates of chronic pain disorders reported by women.88 This model is distinctive in
several ways. First, it does not separate impairment from disability—“[d]isability, which
includes impairment, is a social construct.”89 Second, the radical model takes issue with
capitalist values, “[r]ather than arguing that disabled people can be productive in a
capitalist paradigm.”90 Third, the model posits that all people are interdependent on each
other—for food, transportation, construction of home and clothing, etc.—not
independent.91 Fourth, this model seeks radical access, which “means acknowledging
systemic barriers that exclude people, particularly certain kinds of people with certain kinds
of minds and/or bodies, and working to ensure not only the presence of those who have
been left out, but also their comfort, participation and leadership.”92 Ultimately, Withers
explains that his radical model is “about fighting to redistribute power and resources and
creating accessible spaces and communities.”93
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Although the radical model seems promising, it also seems like a variation of the social
model, despite claims to the contrary. It takes a broader perspective to defining disability
to ultimately argue that the social environment needs to change to accommodate disability
and others outside of the norm. Its most valuable contribution is the recognition of the
intersectionality of multiple oppressed groups and the fact that people often belong to
several of these groups. Although the intersection of minority identities has been discussed
elswhere,94 seldom are solutions provided. Furthermore, typically when multiple oppressed
groups are addressed, it is only across two groups, rather than more than two, and the most
common example is gender and disability.95
The bio-psycho-social model was put forth by the World Health Organization in the
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).96 This model
seeks to “represent a workable compromise between medical and social model.” 97 Under
this model, disability is an umbrella term for functional limitations, participation
restrictions, and impairments to recognize the interaction between the person and the
environment and individual capabilities.98 The interactional understanding of this model is
very helpful, but it does not provide a clear method of how this compromise could be
achieved. Regardless, this more universalist approach should not be dismissed.
The human rights paradigm was suggested by Michael Ashley Stein. This paradigm
“combines the type of civil and political rights provided by antidiscrimination legislation
(also called negative or first-generation rights) with the full spectrum of social, cultural,
and economic measures (also called positive or second-generation rights).”99 This is in line
with what is set out in the UN CRPD. The human rights paradigm is an attempt to combine
aspects of the social model with more positive entitlements for “a holistic and
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comprehensive rights theory.”100 More specifically, this paradigm attempts to address
individuals’ needs and talents rather than comparing them to a norm.101 Stein argues that
this goes beyond the social model “because it is not contingent on the extent that particular
individuals are able to achieve function at a level of either sameness or threshold levels.”
States are thus obligated to ensure that all disabled people have the freedom to work and
contribute to society.102 Personal dignity is the ultimate goal rather than changing
functioning to match the norm.103 The human rights paradigm also has potential for
application to other minority groups.104
The human rights paradigm is ambitious to say the least. The imposition of positive rights
requires the state to provide entitlements that ensure freedom and participation of persons
with disabilities. This seems to be the next step that the disability rights movement needs
to take to actually enforce entitlements and move forward with their agenda. By framing
the ultimate goal as human dignity, Stein sidesteps welfare as a potential source of
entitlement. This paradigm will likely not replace the social model, but the imposition of
positive rights should be added to the social model.

2.2.5

The future of models of disability

The models in between the social model and biomedical model serve to enrich our
understanding of disability by offering different perspectives and mechanisms. These
models provide four contributions that should be adopted by CDT. First, economic
limitations and factors cannot be ignored and should instead be dealt with to justify
spending. Many expensive endeavors that could improve the participation of persons with
disabilities can be justified with a long term economic view: training, transportation, and
accommodation could increase and stabilize the labour force; more consistent preventative
health care could reduce the need for expensive treatments; and better training for all could
reduce discrimination and negative attitudes towards persons with disabilities. Second,
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recognition of the intersectionality of oppressed groups is necessary because many persons
with disabilities are also part of other minority groups like women or racial groups. Third,
the social and biomedical models both fail to recognize the interactional element of persons
with disabilities with their environment and their own capabilities, but recognition of the
relationship of these factors is essential for disabilities. Fourth, the imposition of positive
entitlements could lead to changes in the structure of society by requiring state support for
persons with disabilities beyond their basic needs.
CDT needs to take the “critical” part of its name and apply it to its own theory. The
dichotomy that has developed between the biomedical model and the social model needs
to be eliminated from CDT. Despite the social model’s rejection of the biomedical model,
it depends on the medical diagnoses of impairments to determine the appropriate
accommodation. Judith Mosoff suggests that “[d]isabilities that are poorly understood, or
do not fit neatly into a medical model are considered less legitimate than others” creating
a hierarchy of disabilities.105 Thus, neither the biomedical model nor the social model are
sufficient to describe disability. The social model needs to integrate the four ideas that have
been put forth by other models of disability in order to move beyond its current conception.
This may generate a more comprehensive understanding of disability that does not ignore
other minority groups and some “non-mainstream” disabilities like chronic pain disorders
and mental illnesses.

2.3

Theoretical underpinnings to define disability

Disability is a complex concept. Its definition depends on the context and how other
related concepts are defined. It also depends on the framework or theoretical approach.
Even within the school of thought of CDT, there is great variance regarding the approach
and understanding of related concepts. This part seeks to clarify the theoretical
underpinnings necessary to understand disability. First in this part, a brief discussion of
the disability rights movement highlights the difficulties particular to persons with

Judith Mosoff, “Lost in Translation?: The Disability Perspective in Honda v Keays and Hydro-Québec v
Syndicat” (2009) 3 McGill JL & Health 137 at 141.
105

29

disabilities both as a group and as a theoretical movement. Second, the meaning and
many different models of equality are investigated. Third and finally, the meaning of
citizenship, the ultimate goal of CDT, is explored.

2.3.1

The disability rights movement

The disability rights movement arose from the civil rights movement of the 1960s, along
with some forms of feminism and critical race theory.106 However, persons with disabilities
are different from other minorities like women or racial minorities because of the wide
range of needs and goals of persons with disabilities. The disability rights movement
“includes people with a range of disabilities (and even people with no disability at all),
different life experiences, different material

needs and different

ideological

perspectives.”107 As such, the disability rights movement is by no means a unified
movement; due to the wide range of disabilities, there is also a wide range of goals, some
of which may conflict. However, the movement is united in working towards the goal of
full citizenship. Many persons with disabilities support “opposition to the paternalism of
parents, professionals, and bureaucrats telling people with disabilities what they can and
cannot do.”108 The disability rights movement looks to CDT as its theoretical approach to
achieving the wide range of goals.
CDT, similar to feminism and critical race theory, draws on its jurisprudential predecessor,
American Realism, to reject the traditional definition of disability and liberalism, which
failed to go beyond formal equality to the ultimate goal of substantive equality. 109 This
rejection of the traditional definition may have warranted the “critical” aspect of CDT. The
goal of critical disability theory is not theorization or even understanding, but “the pursuit
of empowerment and substantive, not just formal, equality.”110 In this pursuit, CDT
employs many models to describe the related concepts in defining disability. However,
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Jerome Bickenbach noted that “no one model alone is capable of underwriting an integrated
and coherent disablement policy” and instead these models are “presumptions and
background beliefs that interact with and are shaped by policy and social conditions.”111
There are two highly controversial tools endorsed by many within the disability rights
movement: integration and welfare. Integration calls for limitation of disability-only
services and instead serves persons with disabilities the same way as persons without
disabilities. A common example would be keeping a child with a disability in mainstream
education, rather than special education. Ruth Colker suggests that “integration can be an
important tool in our attempts to attain substantive equality…but I simply do not presume
that integration is the same as equality.”112 Instead, Colker calls for an anti-subordination
approach where the value of integration is actually assessed rather than assumed.113 The
goal of the anti-subordination approach is ending subordination rather than achieving
formal or substantive equality.114 Anti-subordination is a more nuanced and deliberate
approach that may have the same outcome as integration but with confidence that this
outcome has proven to be the best option rather than assumed.
The more controversial of the tools is welfare. Many members of the disability rights
movement oppose charity and welfare on the grounds that “fully equal citizenship requires
‘independence’ from those sorts of interventions.”115 Samuel Bagenstos, an American
scholar who supports integration, suggests that social welfare programs are “important
tools for achieving disability equality”116 because persons with disabilities are the
“deserving poor.”117 The use of welfare is something that appears across discussions of
disability, equality, and citizenship. Although Bagenstos’s argument has merit, it is
problematic, particularly when one of the only goals that members of the disability rights
movement can agree on is independence for persons with disabilities. Needless to say,
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independence seems to be the opposite of welfare. However, disability policy often seems
to run into the issue of what mechanism or tool should be used to attain substantive
equality; often the simpler answer is welfare.
Interestingly, it is Bagenstos who suggests an independence frame as the lens through
which to create a collective identity for persons with disabilities. Through this frame,
“people in all of these groups sought ‘independence’ from the control of professionals,
welfare bureaucracies, and charity. And people in all of these groups sought the opportunity
to succeed or fail according to their own choices.”118 Ultimately, however, Bagenstos
supports a universalist approach to disability rights, which he deems “much more
challenging to the status quo than are the minority-group model and the independence
frame.”119 Hahn originated the minority-group model and he continued to support it
throughout his career. Hahn “lumps the biomedical and economic models together into a
functional limitation model and holds it in opposition to the minority-group analysis of the
social model.”120 The minority-group model is based on three major ideas:
(a) That the primary source of the major problems confronted by persons
with disabilities can be traced to unfavorable attitudes;
(b) That all aspects of the environment are fundamentally shaped by public
policy; and
(c) That policies tend to reflect pervasive social attitudes and values.121
This minority-group model sees persons with disabilities as a separate disadvantaged group
that requires protection from arbitrary limitations on opportunities. Proponents of the
minority-group model usually depend on anti-discrimination laws as the main mechanism
to attain equality.122
Many American scholars seem to ascribe to the minority-group model; the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) is antidiscrimination legislation and is the main legislation enacted
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in the United States to protect persons with disabilities. However, the minority group model
has come under fire. Tobin Siebers, in his discussion of disability identity, posits that a
minority identity perpetuates the suffering that led to its minority status so that this pain
“soon comes to justify feelings of selfishness, resentment, bitterness, and self-pity.”123
Bagenstos argues that this model “makes the law more vulnerable to political attack,
stigmatizes its supposed beneficiaries (just as disability welfare does) and encourages
judges to see their job as vigorously policing the line between those who are in and those
who are out of the protected class.”124 Thus, it is problematic for both theoretical and legal
considerations. Furthermore, antidiscrimination laws do not include positive rights such as
equality measures.125 Positive rights usually require governmental redistribution of
resources such as employment or training.126 Bickenbach argues that the “denial of
opportunities and resources is an issue, not of discrimination, but of distributive
injustice,”127 which the minority-group model does not consider.
The universalist approach, on the other hand, seeks “justice in the distribution of resources
and opportunities.”128 Instead of disability existing as a minority, disability is seen on a
spectrum of needs for all people—the range of “normal” is widened. As such, the
universalist approach looks to constitutional law to draft general legislation ensuring rights
for persons with and without disabilities.129 Specifically, a universalist approach “would
demand that employers design physical and institutional structures…in a way that
reasonably takes account of the largest possible range of physical and mental abilities, and
that they provide reasonable flexibility to all potential employees.”130 Although much has
been gained from the minority-group approach to enhance the rights of persons with
disabilities as a minority, it is a short-term fix. In order to truly change the attitudes
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entrenched in the general population and institutions, both medical and social, society
needs to recognize the facts that disability is not limited to a small group but can affect
anyone and that the issue of disability is not wholly medical.131 The universalist approach
seems to be the most promising way of supporting the rights of persons with disabilities,
while avoiding the limitations of anti-discrimination law and the potentially discriminating
effects of welfare and a minority identity. The universalist approach means to essentially
provide equality to all people, including persons with disabilities. But what is equality?

2.3.2

Understanding equality through the prism of disability

Equality seems like it should be easy to define—it is when everyone is treated the same,
but the same how? Is equality found in equal treatment, opportunity, respect, outcome, or
capacity? Is formal equality enough? Disability has been left out of some theories of
equality likely because the disability rights movement developed later than other civil
rights movements.132 Perhaps, persons with disability are also more problematic than other
historically disadvantaged groups. Ruth O’Brien suggests that persons with disabilities
“have been seen not only as a threat to the workplace hierarchy but also to the principle of
business rationality underlying American capitalism.”133 Persons with disabilities cannot
and should not be measured against “normal” functioning nor should their value be
calculated based on their functioning and employability. Regardless of the past, disability
must now be understood within theories of equality. Equality is a central tenet of disability.
Most disability scholars advocate for substantive equality but the details of how to achieve
it are not always elucidated. This section will discuss the dilemma of difference,
distributive justice briefly, and finally the models of equality.
According to Sandra Fredman, there are four central aims of equality: (1) break the cycle
of disadvantage for minority groups; (2) promote respect for all to eliminate stigma; (3)
“positive affirmation and celebration of identity within community,” and; (4) achieving
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full participation in society.134 There are three types of law that can be used for persons
with disabilities and these include welfare legislation, anti-discrimination law, and rightsbased legislation.135 Welfare legislation leads to a conflict between paternalism and
empowerment by attempting to rehabilitate disability.136 Anti-discrimination law is
“generally asymmetrical in nature, meaning that it only protects persons with disabilities
and persons who experience discrimination on the ground of disability from
discrimination.”137 Anti-discrimination law, in particular, struggles with the dilemma of
difference: when should differences be considered and when should they be ignored.138
Depending on the context and nature of the disability, a disability may or may not have
significance. By recognizing differences, society may be able to address specific needs
better, but it also provides opportunity for discrimination by emphasizing distinctness.139
On the other hand, ignoring disability means that the rights and needs of persons with
disabilities may not be met. Yet, CDT posits that disabilities cannot be ignored and that in
order to achieve substantive equality, the disability must be considered to “both identify
the systemic nature of inequality and pursue solutions tailored to the goals of full inclusion
and participation.”140 Thus, it is a dilemma. Rights-based laws may create entitlements for
persons with disabilities, but often do not include an enforcement mechanism.141 Despite
this, rights-based laws may be the only way to actually achieve substantive equality for
persons with disability because of the short-comings of welfare and anti-discrimination
legislation.
Equality for persons with disabilities requires some sort of distributive justice;
“disablement policy is in large part policy regarding the economic problem of ‘spreading’
the costs of disablement so that they do not all fall on the shoulders of individuals with
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disabilities.”142 There are two main types of distributive justice that are relevant: welfare
maximization, a descendent of utilitarianism, and egalitarianism. Utilitarianism seeks to
help those who can most benefit whereas egalitarianism seeks to help those who are worse
off.143 Welfare maximization provides entitlements to persons with disabilities, but only
those entitlements. These entitlements may not actually be linked to disability and may not
deal with the “inequities of social organization” that include too costly training, stigma,
and discrimination.144 Ravi Malhotra provided a transformed Rawlsian framework for
distributive justice in which justice or fairness must be prioritized over efficiency and
welfare, and knowledge of all contracting parties’ identities, including the existence of
disability, should be known.145 The models of equality seem to support egalitarian
approaches but also seem to recognize the difference of disability and prioritize justice over
efficiency and welfare.
Bickenbach suggests that only a few differences among people must actually be
considered, “they are differences that make us unequal. Disablement is just such a
difference.”146 He posits that equality can serve as a unifying normative basis for
disablement policy to enable the goals of respect, accommodation, and participation with
the necessary fundamental entitlements.147 However, only some of the many different
models of equality can achieve these goals. Equality of respect assumes that everyone is
the same and deserves the same respect.148 The equal treatment model assumes that
equality is sameness and that likes be treated alike, but this leaves persons with disabilities
at a disadvantage because they are “unalike” the norm. 149 Both of these models are
essentially formal equality models and cannot achieve substantive equality for persons with
disabilities.
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Other models are more promising. Equal opportunity requires an egalitarian redistribution
of resources to enable participation while assuming that this is valuable because it allows
competition, without actually ensuring that persons with disabilities will be competitive.150
Equality of opportunity can be distilled further into fair competition and equality of
prospects. Fair competition attempts “to ensure that social inequalities follow directly from
differences in ability, talent, and motivation (the so-called natural inequalities),”151 which
is not particularly sensitive to the needs of persons with disabilities. Equality of prospects,
on the other hand, uses state intervention, namely redistribution, to prohibit unfair social
inequalities flowing from these natural inequalities. Bickenbach questions whether any
type of egalitarianism can solve equality without a clear idea about the desired result, 152
particularly when some interpretations of this type of equality read in meritocratic
principles.153 Rioux and Valentine clearly prefer the equal outcome model which “takes
into account the conditions and means of participation that may vary for each individual,
entailing particular accommodation to enable that participation.”154 However, this model,
as they have presented it, does not seem to call for any positive action from the government
except for accommodation. Finally, equality of capability seeks to achieve the goal of
positive freedom for all, wherein each person has functionings that he or she can do and
capabilities, the set of functionings, so that “the set of a person’s capabilities constitute his
or her actual freedom of choice over alternative lives that he or she can lead.”155 In other
words, each person is equally capable of making choices in terms of participation in
society. There is no clear winner for which model best provides equality for persons with
disabilities, but arguments could be made for equal outcome and equality of capacity.
The most successful models of equality share some similarities: they demand an egalitarian
redistribution of resources that takes into account each person’s needs and means so that
every person has what he or she needs to choose a way to participate. These models also
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usually require some positive entitlements, likely from rights-based legislation rather than
anti-discrimination law. These entitlements are strongly related to citizenship.

2.3.3

Citizenship

Citizenship is the ultimate goal of the disability rights movement and of CDT. Citizenship
is “a practice that locates individuals in the larger community,” but “persons with
disabilities are disabled citizens on both the formal and substantive levels.”156 Prince
suggests that “absent citizens” are “not those struggling on the social margins but those
living in the ‘mainstream,’ a place taken for granted as supportive and caring, thus
obscuring the privileges and power relations in broader social systems.”157 Prince posits
that there are five elements of citizenship: “discourse of citizenship, legal and equality
rights, democratic and political rights, fiscal and social entitlements, and economic
integration,” and that employment is a building block for achieving full citizenship.158
Lynne Davis conceived of citizenship as a way of “conceptualizing the relationship
between the individual and the social, especially the state…it provides a basis for the way
in which individuals can understand their relationship to the generalized Other.”159 Rioux
and Valentine suggest three dimensions of citizenship including, “rights and
responsibilities, access, and belonging.”160
Rioux and Valentine propose that there are three types of entitlement that arise from
different conceptions of disability and equality models: citizenship, charitable privilege,
and civil disability. Civil disability sets out a “social responsibility to protect individuals
with disabilities, both legally and socially, [which] flows from the presumption that
disablement is a consequence of an individual’s largely unchanging pathology.”161 This
type of entitlement only seeks equal treatment and thus leaves persons with disabilities out
of the mainstream as “unalike” the norm. Civil disability seems to be the traditional
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approach to disability which is paternalistic in terms of laws, programs, services, and
politics. Charitable privilege is based on benevolence and paternalism wherein equality of
opportunity is sought. Prince rejected this kind of approach where persons with disabilities
are considered the “worthy poor” because it places them as objects of charity at the cost of
basic citizenship rights.162 Finally, citizenship seems to aspire to equal outcome or equal
capacity. Citizenship requires some understanding of disability through the social model.
In order for persons with disabilities to exercise their rights, they need to understand
citizenship with its civil and political rights.163

2.3.4

Moving forward

With an understanding of the theoretical framework and development of the disability
rights movement, the theoretical underpinnings required to define disability were clarified.
It is apparent from this discussion that a nuanced approach that assesses the specific needs
of persons with disabilities is the most successful. This is the anti-subordination approach.
A universalist understanding of disability must be adopted in order to move forward with
disability rights, rather than the limited minority-group approach and use of welfare. With
this universalist approach, positive entitlements from constitutional law and human rights
legislation must be provided, rather than through anti-discrimination law or welfare
legislation. This will make the ultimate goal of citizenship more reachable, particularly
with an egalitarian distribution of resources that takes into account each person’s means
and needs to enable full participation, either through equal outcome or equal capacity.

2.4

Conclusion

It is evident that disability is a complex concept. Persons with disabilities make up a
sizeable portion of the Canadian population, yet they still have lower employment and
participation rates, particularly for mental illness. Persons with disabilities deserve to have
dignity, which can be gained through employment and the removal of arbitrary socially
constructed barriers. The disability rights movement seeks to achieve this dignity through
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equality and citizenship, but has often struggled with establishing a collective identity.
Moving forward, the disability rights movement may benefit from the widespread adoption
of several concepts. Welfare programming should be rejected as it undermines the dignity
of its receivers. The anti-subordination approach can provide a more nuanced and
deliberate approach to determining programming, rather than assuming integration. A
universalist approach should be adopted over the insufficient independence frame and the
limited minority-group approach to understand persons with disabilities as part of society
within the range of normal. This could lead to more substantive equality, which can be
achieved through rights based laws rather than anti-discrimination and welfare legislation
for an egalitarian approach to equality like equal outcome and equal capacity. Full
citizenship may be in reach then, even for “non-mainstream” disabilities like chronic pain
disorders.
This universalist, egalitarian, and anti-subordination approach to equality can only be
effective with a more comprehensive understanding of disability. This means that the
dichotomy that has developed between the biomedical and social model must be
eliminated. Instead, a more nuanced and comprehensive model should be developed or
several additions should be made to the social model. The additions include: consideration
of economic efficiency and limitations in inputting programming for persons with
disabilities; recognition of the intersectionality of minority identities; inclusion of the
interactional element between the individual, the individual’s capabilities, and the
environment; and imposition of positive entitlements for all people, including persons with
disabilities. Having said all of this, Bickenbach noted that these models of disability are
not shaping policy and social conditions, instead these models were created to explain the
presumptions and beliefs that lead to society’s perception of disability and its reality.164 So
although this is the approach that we should take moving forward, it cannot create change
on its own. Instead, this approach can be used to justify recognition of disability issues
from the courts and the legislature, recognition which could create change. Chronic pain
disorders that are, at times, undervalued, dismissed, scrutinized, and discriminated against,
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would greatly benefit from recognition of the these disability issues as “non-mainstream”
disabilities that struggle for access to what is now the norm for other disabilities.

41

Chapter 3

3

Organizing Principles of Accommodation of Disabilities

What is accommodation? It is a legal duty, a tool, and a human right. Accommodation “is
meant to be a win-win situation that retains a skilled worker, reduces productivity losses,
builds workplace diversity and social integrity, and honours the individual workers’ right
to an earned livelihood and social contribution.”1 Employers have a duty to accommodate
employees up to the point of undue hardship. Accommodation is a tool used by various
civil rights movements to attain substantive equality for individuals. It is also a statutory
ground of human rights in Canada. The Ontario Human Rights Code (OHRC)2 purpose is
as follows:
to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to provide for equal
rights and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law, and
having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding and mutual
respect for the dignity and worth of every person so that each person feels
a part of the community and able to contribute fully to the development and
well-being of the community and the Province.3
The Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA) sets out a similar purpose with the “principle
that all individuals should have an opportunity equal with other individuals to make for
themselves the lives that they are able and wish to have and to have their needs
accommodated.”4 This dignity and equality is intended for all people, including minorities
such as racialized groups, women, and persons with disabilities. Accommodation is one
way to achieve this purpose.
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The accommodation duty exists in some form around the world. In Canada, the
accommodation duty is set out in both the OHRC5 and the CHRA,6 as well as in the right
to equality found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter).7 It is also
found in human rights legislation across Canada. The Charter only applies to government
actions whereas human rights legislation has a broader application. These duties have
formally existed in Canada since the 1980s. Canada is also subject to more recently enacted
responsibilities to persons with disabilities stemming from the United Nations’ Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), which Canada has ratified.8 The
European Union (EU) has also ratified the CRPD.9 The CRPD was strongly influenced by
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)10 which ascribes to a similar theoretical
approach to Canada. The EU, Canada, and the US are shifting to the social model of
disability, which differentiates between impairment—the functional limitation—and
disability. Disability is a social construct that exists outside of the individual as a
consequence of the interaction of the individual with the social environment.11 Although
Canada, the US, and the EU have a similar understanding of disability and impose a duty
to accommodate, they differ in the practical application. Having said that, the practical
implications of the accommodation duty are not always clear at face value. In Canada,
courts and, far more importantly, tribunals and arbitrators are responsible for interpreting
the details of the accommodation duty while upholding the stated purpose of furthering
dignity and equality.
In order to evaluate the accommodation of persons with disabilities in the Canadian
workplace, the current practical application must be examined. In Part I, a brief history of
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the accommodation duty in Canada and some related aspects in the US are elucidated. This
part provides an understanding of the foundation of the accommodation duty, including the
intention of the duty. Part II examines what accommodation is, in particular the framework,
purpose, and use. Part III clarifies the meaning of undue hardship. This is the most
controversial aspect of the accommodation duty in Canada; the majority of the
disagreement in courts and tribunals revolves around determining undue hardship in each
case. In Part IV, the accommodation duty in Canada is compared with that of the US and
the EU, as well as what is set out in the CRPD. This comparison serves to evaluate
Canada’s approach. The duty to accommodate is an essential tool in the progress of human
rights generally and for persons with disabilities; however, it is not a perfect tool because
it depends on a broad application with the goals of equality and dignity at the forefront.
Where accommodation has been interpreted narrowly in Canada and, to a far greater extent,
in the US, its impact has been severely hampered.

3.1 A brief history of accommodation
Both Canada and the US developed the duty of accommodation with the goals of dignity
and equality. Despite similar theoretical foundations, accommodation differs between
Canada and the US. In order to understand the current approach to accommodation, a brief
history of how the duty developed in both Canada and the US is set out here.

3.1.1

Legal inception of accommodation

In the early 1970s, US courts were struggling with interpreting provisions of the Civil
Rights Act 196412 and guidelines that had been provided by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission that dealt with accommodation.13 Griggs v Duke Power Co. is a
breakthrough US Supreme Court from 1971 ruling on indirect discrimination and
substantive equality, which was later cited approvingly in Supreme Court of Canada (SCC)
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42 U.S.C.S. 2000-e(j) (2011).
See Reid v Memphis Publishing Co, 468 F.2d 346 (US CA 6th Cir. 1972); Riley v Bendix Corp, 464 F.2d
1113 (US CA 6th Cir. 1972); Trans World Airlines Inc v Hardison, 432 US 63 (1976).
13
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decisions.14 It is the first case dealing with workplace discrimination, in this case against
black employees, wherein the US Supreme Court held that qualifications required for
employment must be reasonably related to the job, thus barring arbitrary barriers to
employment that discriminate, regardless of any intent to discriminate.15 Canada, on the
other hand, has a relatively short history of accommodation both in regards to legislation
and jurisprudence. With the enactment of the Charter in 1982, persons with disabilities
received constitutional protection for the first time.16 Canada was the first country to
protect the rights of persons with disabilities in the Constitution. Shortly after, in November
1984, the Royal Commission report on Equality in Employment,17 chaired by Justice
Abella, recommended that some US concepts be brought into Canadian law. 18 Thus, in
1985, the SCC drew on these US cases to import the duty of accommodation into Canadian
Law when interpreting the OHRC for religious discrimination. In O’Malley v Simpson
Sears Ltd (O’Malley),19 the SCC understood the US approach as “where it is shown that a
working rule has caused discrimination, it is incumbent upon the employer to make a
reasonable effort to accommodate the religious needs of the employee, short of undue
hardship to the employer in the conduct of his business.”20
The SCC also imported the distinction between direct discrimination and adverse effect
discrimination. Direct discrimination is found where a practice or rule is discriminatory on
a prohibited ground on its face and so it can be struck down if it cannot be statutorily
justified.21 Adverse effect discrimination, on the other hand, “arises where an employer for
genuine business reasons adopts a rule or standard which is on its face neutral, and which

401 US 424 (1971); see O’Malley v Simpson Sears Ltd, [1985] 2 SCR 536 [O’Malley] and Central
Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta, [1990] 2 SCR 489 [Central Alberta Dairy Pool].
15
See R Belton, The Crusade for Equality in the Workplace: The Griggs v. Duke Power Story (Lawrence,
Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2014).
16
Michael Lynk, “Disability and Work: The Transformation of the Legal Status of Employees with
Disabilities in Canada” in R Echlin & C Paliare, eds, Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures 2007:
Employment Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) 189 at 192 [Lynk, “Disability and Work”]
17
Canada, Royal Commission on Equality in Employment, Equality in Employment by Justice Rosalie
Silberman Abella (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984).
18
Lynk, “Disability and Work” supra note 16 at 205.
19
O’Malley, supra note 14.
20
Ibid at para 20.
21
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will apply equally to all employees, but which has a discriminatory effect upon a prohibited
ground” to impose a condition that disproportionately affects an individual or group of
employees.22 In dealing with adverse effect discrimination, the condition is not struck down
but instead some accommodation must be provided by the employer.23 This duty to
accommodate is limited by undue hardship: where the employer’s business would be
unduly interfered with or the accommodation would create an expense to the employer, it
may amount to undue hardship.24 Shortly after, the SCC in Bhinder v Canadian National
Railway (Bhinder) determined that the CHRA set out a bona fide occupational requirement
(BFOR) defence.25 Where a working condition is proven to be a BFOR or reasonably
necessary for the operation of the business, then it is not considered discriminatory and so
the duty to accommodate is not even triggered.26 From the beginning, courts and
legislatures have sought to balance the rights and needs of the employee and the employer.

3.1.2

Developing the duty to accommodate

With the duty to accommodate set out, the courts and tribunals now had to deal with the
details of the practical application. In Andrews v Law Society (British Columbia),27 the
SCC expanded the definition of discrimination in the Charter to encompass the idea of
substantive equality as the ideal wherein to prove discrimination, the standard must have a
“differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law” and that
this impact is discriminatory.28 With this in mind, the SCC rejected the approach in
O’Malley and Bhinder in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v Alberta (Central Alberta Dairy
Pool)29 in 1990 and articulated a new discrimination test. In this test, first, it must be
determined whether the discrimination was direct or adverse effect. If it was direct, then
the discrimination can only be justified as a BFOR; if the discrimination was adverse effect,

22

Ibid at para 18.
Ibid at para 20.
24
Ibid at para 23.
25
Bhinder v Canadian National Railway, [1985] 2 SCR 561 at para 16. The SCC also confirmed that antidiscrimination legislation applies to both direct and adverse effect discrimination.
26
Ibid at para 13. The dissent argued that the duty to accommodate should be incorporated into the BFOR
whereupon the impact of the requirement on the individual should be assessed at paras 33-34.
27
[1989] 1 SCR 143.
28
Ibid at para 28; see also Lynk, “Disability and Work” supra note 16 at 207.
29
Central Alberta Dairy Pool, supra note 14.
23

46

then the rule will be upheld generally and accommodated individually up to the point of
undue hardship.30 Although this test was more expansive than the prior approach, “its
application was unduly hampered by its complicated structure.”31 The SCC also set out a
non-exhaustive list of factors that should be considered when determining undue hardship:
“financial cost, disruption of a collective agreement, problems of morale of other
employees, interchangeability of work force and facilities” as well as size of the operation
and safety.32
In the same year, the US enacted the ADA, which deals specifically with issues affecting
persons with disabilities. The ADA “explicitly endorses equal opportunities for individuals
with disabilities.”33 The ADA sought to create “universal accessibility in the social and
physical environment,”34 but instead was interpreted so narrowly and conservatively by
requiring a certain gradation of limitation to qualify as disabled that people who would be
considered disabled in Canada were excluded in the US.35 In a trilogy of cases in 1999,36
the US Supreme Court “concluded that the plaintiffs were not ‘individuals with disabilities’
because the determination of whether they were ‘substantially limited’ should be made
after a court considered the effect of mitigating measures such as medication, assistive
technology, accommodations, or modifications on the individual.”37 Although disability
rights advocates criticized this approach, the US Supreme Court further limited the
application of the ADA by requiring substantive limitation to include only severe
restriction of centrally important activities to daily life.38 Thus, the gatekeeper aspect in the
US approach was to qualify as a person with a disability, which was a narrow test, whereas
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in Canada, there were lesser limitations including proving discrimination, establishing a
BFOR, and undue hardship, but no qualifying requirement to bring a claim. Canadians had
to prove disability to succeed in the claim, but not as a prerequisite to bringing a claim.
Despite formalizing disability rights in federal legislation, the US accommodation duty
provided less access because of the rigid application and limitations, whereas Canada had
more flexibility in the development and application of the duty to accommodate.

3.1.3

A unified approach: the Meiorin test

In Canada, around the same time, the SCC diverged even more from the US approach. In
1999, the SCC decided two major cases: Law v Canada (Minister of Employment &
Immigration) (Law)39 and British Columbia (Public Service Employee Relations
Commission) v BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance) (Meiorin).40 In Law, the SCC articulated a
complex test for determining a prima facie breach of the Charter’s equality provision.41 In
Meiorin, the SCC set out a new discrimination test. The SCC rejected prior tests completely
and removed the distinction between direct and adverse effect discrimination because it
was “difficult to justify.”42 The SCC criticized the prior approach as it may “legitimize
systemic discrimination”43 and accommodation was limited to a formal model of
equality.44 The new unified approach contains three steps, wherein the employer may
defend the impugned rule by establishing on a balance of probabilities:
(1) That the employer adopted the standard for a purpose rationally
connected to the performance of the job;
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(2) That the employer adopted the particular standard in an honest and good
faith belief that it was necessary to the fulfilment of that legitimate
work-related purpose; and
(3) That the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that
legitimate work-related purpose. To show that the standard is
reasonably necessary, it must be demonstrated that it is impossible to
accommodate individual employees sharing the characteristics of the
claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.
The first two steps deal with the BFOR requirement and the accommodation duty is found
in the third step, limited by undue hardship. This approach was confirmed in British
Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) v British Columbia (Council of Human
Rights) (Grismer).45 Grismer is one of the most important disability in the workplace cases
decided by the SCC because of its creative application of the Meiorin test. Here, despite
having a condition that affected his eyesight, the claimant continued to drive well at work
and on public roads with the use of special glasses. However, he was refused individual
assessment and was not allowed to receive a license, thus was unable to complete his job
duties. The blanket prohibition against licenses for persons with this eyesight condition
barred individual assessment, despite the fact that an absolute ban was not reasonably
necessary, as required by the third step of the Meiorin test. The SCC found that the British
Columbia government discriminated against the claimant because it was unable to meet
the test for reasonable necessity or undue hardship as set out in the Meiorin test. The
impugned standard was not justified. Given that this was a government policy, not a
workplace one, the reach of accommodation was extended to apply beyond the workplace.
Grismer demonstrated a flexible and sensitive approach to accommodation with a social
model influence by considering which functional limitations could or could not be
accommodated.
Although the Meiorin test was positively received, the details of the accommodation duty
still required clarification. Courts have made decisions using this test to establish High
Law, which have been at times “overly cautious and logically inconsistent” whereas others
have been “aspirational.”46 Tribunals and boards have been responsible for the heavy lifting
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in translating the Courts’ principles into operational rules, creating Low Law.47 In assessing
the efficacy of the duty of accommodation, Low law is essential because the greater
expertise, experience, and flexibility in decision-making and solutions enables the
evolution of the duty. The duty to accommodate in Canada has been broadly interpreted to
create a “two-way relationship. To comply with the duty, an employer must be prepared to
adjust its workplace to the particular requirements of the employee’s disability.”48
Furthermore, it is apparent that “the US and Canada have distinctly separate judicial
response to anti-discrimination law.”49

3.2

The current duty of accommodation in Canada

With the Meiorin test in hand, Canadian courts, academics, and tribunals were now
responsible for determining the application of the duty to accommodate. The application
of the Meiorin test itself also depends on a finding of discrimination. For disability-based
employment discrimination, three things must be proved: (1) existence of a distinction; (2)
this distinction is based on a disability or perceived disability; and (3) the distinction
interferes with the right to full and equal human rights and freedoms.50 Some thought was
required to understand the framework of the test—should accommodation be considered a
standalone concept or does it properly belong integrated in the BFOR discrimination test?
The correct understanding is necessary in order to satisfy the purpose of the test and of
accommodation. The practical implications of the framework and purpose sets out the
responsibilities of the employee and employer in determining accommodation. Although
the “rise of human rights obligations, and, in particular, the emergence of the duty to
accommodate, has become the most significant workplace law development in recent
times,”51 this has not been a perfect transition.
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3.2.1

The purpose of accommodation

The decisions of Meiorin and Grismer raised the hopes and expectations of the disability
rights movement. These cases set out a vision of an inclusive workplace where “human
rights legislation would be interpreted liberally and purposively, to achieve its substantive
equality goals.”52 However, there are concerns that “efforts are being made to return us to
a minimalist aversion of accommodation.”53 This is despite the fact that “the Charter
supports a unified approach to equality which emphasizes accommodation before any
reasonably necessary limits are considered.”54 The duty to accommodate, as set out in the
Meiorin test, includes both substantive and procedural aspects.55 However, the law is not
settled on this issue at this time. Some recent rulings have stated that a procedural duty
exists whereas other legal forums have rejected the idea.56 For example, the Federal Court
recently held that, once it is determined that substantive equality is not possible, then there
is no procedural right to accommodation, under the CHRA or the Meiorin test.57 The
substantive dimensions require substantive equality goals, which necessitate “changes at
all levels of society: individual behaviour, perceptions, and attitudes; ideas and ideology;
community and culture; institutions and institutional practices; and, deeper structures of
social and economic power.”58 In other words, the substantive dimension of
accommodation—substantive equality—requires an institutional change. Arguably,
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Justice McLachlin in Meiorin was endorsing an institutional change by challenging the
standard rather than the individual complaint.59
Thus, “Meiorin reveals another understanding of the purpose of human rights legislation,
namely the elimination of the ‘systemic discrimination’ which occurs through the
application of exclusionary standards that fail to take into account the real characteristics
of a group.”60 This is in fact what provides the promise of accommodation to amount to
more than formal equality for individuals. So in reality, there are actually two forms of
accommodation:

“institutional

policy

change

accommodation

and

individual

accommodation.”61 The former entails dealing with the systemic problem to change the
workplace and society and hopefully establish a more inclusive standard, whereas the latter
involves an ad hoc individual accommodation that deals with the standard after the fact in
a way that may still exclude the individual in other aspects.62 Another way of thinking
about it is the “distinction between the duty of non-discrimination and the responsibility to
promote equality,”63 for individual and institutional policy change accommodation,
respectively. In terms of the practical application, this means that the duty to accommodate
requires two steps: “First, an employer must consider whether the standard itself can be
changed so as to be more inclusive and promote substantive equality in the workplace.
Second, if this is not possible, or if the standard is fully justifiable…then substantial efforts
toward individual accommodation are still required.”64 Thus, employers must first consider
institutional policy accommodation and, only if that is not possible, then individual
accommodation.
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The CRPD “guarantees rights to accessibility, access to justice, independent living and
community inclusion, education, employment, and an adequate standard of living,”65 all of
which falls under institutional policy accommodation to some extent. As such, the duty to
accommodate persons with disabilities must include two parts: changing the institution and
the individual. However, “[p]rogress towards a systemic approach has been modest” since
Meiorin, and instead accommodation remains focused on the individual.66 For the most
part, the legal process for dealing with accommodation deals with procedural issues and
fails to engage with the substantive aspect of accommodation.67 The accommodation duty
is dealt with mostly on a complaint-driven basis. This is despite evidence from public
reviews of human rights enforcement in the early 2000s that “concluded that the complaintdriven model was an outdated and ineffective way of addressing forms of discrimination
that are systemic.”68 Thus, Canadians with disabilities are left to “negotiate accessibility
on their own, resulting in a largely inaccessible social and physical Canadian
environment.”69 However, there is hope for the future. The Accessibility for Ontarians with
Disabilities Act 200570 requires Ontario to be fully accessible for accommodation,
employment, the physical environment, and goods and services by January 1, 2025.71
Accommodation amounting to genuine inclusiveness is thus set out by the SCC in Meiorin
and Grismer and the CRPD.72 The duty of accommodation itself flows from the right to
equal treatment articulated in section 15 of the Charter. The duty is also enshrined in
human rights legislation like the OHRC and the CHRA so that it is also a statutory right.
Gillian Demeyere argues that this statutory right “can be conceived as a purely contractual
right arising from the work-for-wages exchange at the core of the contract of employment
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or collective agreement.”73 As such, the duty to accommodate can be understood as a longstanding contractual right in the employer-employee relationship that has recently been
subsumed in human rights law. Demeyere then views the duty of accommodation as
“simply the duty to refrain from setting and relying on occupational requirements that are
not reasonably necessary to the performance of the work. It is a negative duty: a duty not
to do something. The accommodation itself may take the form of a positive act.” 74 This
perspective offers support for the existence of the duty to accommodate and enables the
imposition of the duty to complement rather than conflict with contractual principles of
employment.75

3.2.2

The framework of the Meiorin test and how accommodation
fits

The above discussion, similar to many academic sources, examines accommodation as an
independent duty, however, the duty to accommodate is part of the third step of the Meiorin
test. Dianne Pothier argues that the “duty to accommodate cannot be properly understood
as a stand-alone concept. It should be seen as subsumed within the overarching concept of
reasonable necessity as a critical part of the test for a BFOR. It is also inextricably bound
up with the qualification of undue hardship.”76 In practice, the first two steps of the tests
are minor considerations with the third step constituting the “make or break part.” 77 Yet,
application of the full Meiorin test means that the employer could fail the test in a prior
step where the standard is not rationally connected to the performance of the job or
reasonably necessary to the fulfillment of the job. The employer could also fail in the first
part of the third step if it is unable to prove that the standard is reasonably necessary, before
any consideration of accommodation.78
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Thus, the “concepts of reasonable necessity, duty to accommodate, and the defence of
undue hardship are all inextricably linked. None can be properly understood in isolation.
None is a stand-alone concept. They are substantially interrelated.”79 If an employee can
perform the core responsibilities of the job with accommodation short of undue hardship,
then a standard that conflicts with the accommodation is not reasonably necessary and is
not a BFOR. Conversely, if no accommodation short of undue hardship will enable the
completion of these core tasks, then the standard is reasonably necessary and is a BFOR.80
Accommodation, with or without consideration of reasonable necessity and BFOR, is a
common subject in human rights complaints and labour arbitrations. As such, the Meiorin
test has been considered and interpreted abundantly by tribunals and arbitrators. Despite
the fact that “[h]uman rights obligations and the accommodation duty have a universal
application to all workplaces,”81 when assessing employment law, in particular wrongful
dismissal claims, courts have rarely taken the Meiorin test and the duty to accommodate
into consideration.82 One of the most recent cases in which the SCC dealt with a person
with a disability who needed accommodation was Honda Canada Inc v Keays (Honda
Canada).83 The employee, Keays, sued for wrongful dismissal. After a one year leave on
account of his chronic fatigue syndrome, he returned to work and was placed in a disability
program that allowed employees to take absences from work with a doctor’s notes. The
employer questioned the legitimacy of the doctor’s notes and asked for the employee to
meet with a medical specialist to determine how his disability could be accommodated.
The employee refused to do so without details of the consultation and the employer stated
that his employment would be terminated if he continued to refuse, a plan which they
implemented. The SCC stated, “[t]his appeal raises a number of important issues related to
the proper allocation of damages in wrongful dismissal cases,” thus overlooking
accommodation as an issue.84 When discussing punitive damages, the court disregarded
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human rights concerns with the “view that the [OHRC] provides a comprehensive scheme
for the treatment of claims of discrimination and Bhadauria85 established that a breach of
the [OHRC] cannot constitute an actionable wrong.”86

3.2.3

Responsibilities of the employee and employer flowing from
the duty of accommodation

The employer and employee both have responsibilities flowing from the duty to
accommodate. The employer has both procedural and substantive obligations: it must
assess the circumstances to meet the procedural duty and it must not “dismiss someone
without establishing that it could not accommodate the disability of that person without
undue hardship.”87 Thus, “the onus is on the employer to establish that it has met procedural
and substantive duties to accommodate employees with a disability to the point of undue
hardship, rather than the employee having to establish that the employer has breached the
[OHRC].”88 This procedural duty involves “conducting an independent assessment of an
employee’s accommodation needs and whether the employee has the capacity to resume
work. Accepting the conclusions of another organization or agency without making an
independent determination can amount to a breach of the duty.”89 However, the Federal
Court recently held that where it is determined that substantive accommodation is not
possible, there is no procedural right.90 The employer must continue to reassess the
accommodation and the needs of the employee because of the changing nature of
disability.91 This assessment and reassessment may necessitate that the employer learn
about the disability in order to be better informed about the condition and limit stereotyping
and assumptions.92 The employer should keep communication open and may need to warn
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the employee about problems, particularly if an issue like absenteeism could result in
dismissal.93
The substantive obligations under the duty to accommodate requires employers to
accommodate up to the point of undue hardship. This may require re-bundling the position,
providing training, transfer to an open position, or other accommodations depending on the
needs and abilities of the person with the disability and the employer.94 The Ontario Human
Rights Commission (Commission) publishes a policy and guidelines on accommodation
which requires the employer to “obtain expert opinion or advice where needed,” “take an
active role” in investigating, “grant accommodation requests in a timely manner,” and
“bear the cost of any required medical information or documentation.”95 Although these
guidelines receive deference, they are not binding.96 Unions have similar responsibilities.
A union may be responsible for discrimination where it imposed the discriminatory rule or
where it interferes with the employer’s efforts to accommodate.97 However, unions differ
in that their focus is primarily on any impact on other employees—where the
accommodation effects other employees significantly, this may constitute undue
hardship.98 The Commission requires unions to “share joint responsibility with the
employer to facilitate accommodation.”99 The union’s duty to accommodate arises when
its “involvement is required to make accommodation possible and no other reasonable
alternative resolution of the matter has been found or could reasonably have been
found.”100
The employee also has some responsibilities. The employee cannot be passive throughout
the process, but must instead contribute to determining the best accommodation and
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cooperate.101 The Commission’s requirements for the person with a disability revolve
around informing and co-operating with the employer.102 According to Michael Lynk, the
employee has four responsibilities:
(1) they must actively co-operate with the employer in locating potential
accommodations,
(2) if offered a reasonable accommodation, they must provide a persuasive
reason as to why the proposal cannot be accepted,
(3) they are required to accept a reasonable accommodation offer that
satisfies the employer’s operation needs if their legitimate concerns
have been sufficiently addressed, and
(4) if they decline to accept a reasonable accommodation, the employer’s
accommodation duty is normally extinguished.103
Thus, the employee must be an active participant in the accommodation process.
Even where employers, unions, and employees satisfy their responsibilities flowing from
the duty to accommodate, sometimes the accommodation itself cannot be provided. Where
the accommodation amounts to undue hardship, the duty to accommodate will be satisfied.
In regards to undue hardship, “[w]hile the general rule is easy to state, the outer boundaries
of accommodation are much harder to identify.”104

3.3

Undue hardship

Rarely is there any argument regarding whether the individual has a disability under the
meaning in the Human Rights Code or even entitlement to accommodation.105 Instead the
area of disagreement usually lies in establishing undue hardship. The contention in this
aspect seems to fall into two parts: the determination of the standard as a BFOR and
establishing that the required accommodation constitutes undue hardship.106 Once again, it
is apparent that reasonable necessity, accommodation, and undue hardship are
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interrelated.107 Tribunals and arbitrations are responsible for clarifying and applying the
broad principles articulated by higher courts and, as such, Low Law is essential to
understanding accommodation and undue hardship. First, the major High Law cases are
delineated. This will be followed by the articulation of the application of the High Law
principles in Low Law tribunals and arbitrations.

3.3.1

High Law: what do the higher courts say about undue
hardship?

Undue hardship is determined on a case-by-case basis for which there is no definite and
exhaustive list of factors to consider. The SCC in Meiorin held that there may be a defence
to the duty to accommodate if the employer can “establish that it cannot accommodate the
claimant and others adversely affected by the standard without experiencing undue
hardship.”108 The SCC drew on its earlier description in Renaud wherein the “use of the
term ‘undue’ infers that some hardship is acceptable; it is only ‘undue’ hardship that
satisfies this test.”109 The SCC also referred to the list of factors that should be considered
when assessing the duty to accommodate and undue hardship delineated in Central Alberta
Dairy Pool and specifically mentioned financial cost, interchangeability of workforce and
facilities, and interference with rights of other employees.110 Other factors listed in Central
Alberta Dairy Pool included problems of morale of other employees, size of the operation,
and safety.111 This list of factors was non-exhaustive and instead they “should be applied
with common sense and flexibility in the context of the factual situation presented in each
case.”112 Having said that, not all of these factors have been given as much weight as others
by courts and tribunals.113
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In assessing accommodation and undue hardship, courts and tribunals should consider:
whether there was any investigation of alternative approaches; if the standard was
necessary; and, if other parties have satisfied their obligations flowing from the duty to
accommodate.114 Standards for assessing undue hardship are not articulated in legislation,
but instead come from jurisprudence alone where the “specific objective is to eliminate
exclusion that is arbitrary and based on preconceived ideas concerning personal
characteristics which, when the duty to accommodate is taken into account, do not affect a
person’s ability to do a job.”115 As per step three of the Meiorin test: “it must be
demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the
characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.”116
Since Meiorin, the SCC has released a trilogy of cases on the topic of the duty to
accommodate up to the point of undue hardship:117 McGill University Health Centre
(Montréal General Hospital) v Syndicat des employés de l’Hôpital general de Montréal
(McGill University),118 Honda Canada,119 and Hydro-Québec v Syndicat des employés-e-s
de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro Québec, section local 2000 (SCFPFTQ) (Hydro-Québec).120 In all three of these cases, the employees struggled with
absenteeism and chronic illnesses, which the employers attempted to accommodate but
ultimately terminated the employees. The absenteeism was so excessive that termination
may have been legitimate, but the SCC offered weak reasoning to justify it. Rather, the
SCC provided an insufficient analysis of the accommodation duty that failed to engage
with the key issues. Honda Canada is particularly egregious as the SCC did not provide
any accommodation analysis or consideration of human rights principles, but focused on
the common law cause of action of wrongful dismissal. Accommodation was denied in
each case, yet it should have been a major focus as employers owe the duty of
accommodation to each and every employee prior to consideration of termination and
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wrongful dismissal. Each of these cases fall short of what was set out in Meiorin and the
creative and promising application of the test in Grismer, both of which were earlier SCC
decisions. The SCC is not only struggling with the high standard it set out, but also failing
to provide clear and useful reasoning. This is particularly disappointing given that there
were clear opportunities for an accommodation analysis in each of these cases, which
would have elevated the reasoning.
In Honda Canada, the SCC did not engage in any significant discussion of human rights
or disability discrimination. The SCC spoke at length regarding automatic termination
clauses and non-culpable absenteeism in the context of undue hardship and accommodation
in McGill University. The SCC continued its stance that accommodation is not “absolute
nor unlimited” with undue hardship as the impediment.121 The duty to accommodate
“balances an employer’s legitimate expectation that employees will perform the work they
are paid to do with the legitimate expectations of employees with disabilities that those
disabilities will not cause arbitrary disadvantage.”122 However, employers cannot use
collective agreements or automatic termination clauses to contract out of the duty to
accommodate, but the specified periods in the agreements can be used as evidence of undue
hardship, when they are exceeded.123 Indeed, once the requirements of the collective
agreement and the duty of accommodation have been met, the employer can dismiss the
employee on the basis of innocent absenteeism.
In Hydro-Québec, the SCC restated the test for undue hardship:
The test is not whether it was impossible for the employer to accommodate
the employee’s characteristics. The employer does not have a duty to
change working conditions in a fundamental way, but does have a duty, if
it can do so without undue hardship, to arrange the employee’s workplace
or duties to enable the employee to do his or her work.124
Thus, the test for undue hardship is not total unfitness for work in the
foreseeable future. If the characteristics of an illness are such that the proper
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operation of the business is hampered excessively or if an employee with
such an illness remains unable to work for the reasonably foreseeable future
even though the employer has tried to accommodate him or her, the
employer will have satisfied the test.125
The employer’s duty to accommodate ends where the employee is no longer
able to fulfill the basic obligations associated with the employment
relationship for the foreseeable future.126
Furthermore, the SCC suggested that, due to the case-by-case analysis required, rigid rules
for determining undue hardship should be avoided. Where the employer can offer more
accommodation—if it is a larger or more flexible operation—then the employer must do
so.127 Where the employee will be unable to work for the reasonably foreseeable future,
the decision to dismiss “must necessarily be based on an assessment of the entire
situation.”128 The requirement of balancing needs is also articulated as enabling the rule
that employers must respect the rights of employees to be compatible with the rule that
employees must do their work.129 This test seems like it could be narrowing the approach
set out in Meiorin as well as declining the flexible and creative approach in Grismer. It
appears that Hydro-Québec’s restatement of undue hardship is the main authority; tribunals
and courts since then have depended on it.130 However, these cases have been criticized as
“call[ing] into question the expansive vision of human rights where employees with
disabilities are concerned.”131 Despite the apparent disability discrimination in these three
cases, the SCC did not engage with human rights law as the primary focus. Instead, the
reasoning in these cases is weak and, as such, has been largely ignored by tribunals, with
the exception of the test for undue hardship in Hydro-Québec. Thus, the influence of this
trilogy of cases may be limited; however, the fact that the SCC struggles with this high
standard for dealing with disability indicates that the duty of accommodation may not be
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fully realized. In other words, despite progress with the duty of accommodation, there is
still a long way to go.

3.3.2

Low Law: what do tribunals and arbitrators say about undue
hardship?

Tribunals and arbitrators are responsible for the heavy lifting with regards to determining
how to apply the broad principles set out by higher courts. Because the duty of
accommodation flows from human rights principles found in the Charter and human rights
codes across the provinces, the duty is Canada-wide. The majority of low law decisions on
undue hardship in the workplace comes from labour arbitrations and human rights
complaints. In their discretion tribunals and arbitrators may choose different
understandings of the law than that set out by higher courts. This has allowed tribunals and
arbitrators to ignore the weak reasoning of Hydro-Québec, McGill University, and Honda
Canada. Having said that, they do draw on aspects of significant caselaw from the higher
courts.
When determining accommodation and undue hardship, reference is almost always made
to Meiorin and Hydro-Québec. Although the tests could be understood differently, usually
both cases are referred to together, which indicates that they are not considered
substantively different.132 This is despite the possible narrowing of the test in HydroQuébec. Undue hardship must be “proven by the employer on a case by case basis.” 133 It
does not depend on whether the disability is temporary or permanent; a permanent
disability does not “automatically translat[e] into undue hardship—even where the
disability restricts the employee from performing a core function of the job.”134
Furthermore, the employer cannot prematurely decide that the duty of accommodation has
been met.135 Where the employer has not even attempted to “investigate; assess; engage;
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propose alternative work duties or processes; and effect efforts and results directed to
making an accommodation happen,”136 then it is difficult to argue that the point of undue
hardship has been reached.137
Regardless, there are limits to the duty of accommodation, which usually fall under the
factors listed in Central Alberta Dairy Pool.138 The factors that more readily amount to
undue hardship are safety, disruption of a collective agreement, financial cost albeit at a
high threshold, and legitimate operational requirements of the organization whereas morale
of other employees, interchangeability, and size of the operation are usually given less
weight.139 However, a “mere apprehension that undue hardship would result is not a proper
reason…to obviate the analysis.”140 When assessing undue hardship, the employer must
consider the entire history of the interaction; it must be “based on an assessment of the
entire situation,” rather than a “compartmentalized approach.”141
Health and safety has been given the most weight.142 In assessing undue hardship where
safety is a factor, “it is necessary to consider both the magnitude of the risk and the identity
of those who bear it as elements of hardship.”143 However, the risk must be more than a
hypothetical risk.144 Additionally, in order to satisfy the accommodation duty, the employer
“may have to permit a tolerable range of risk.”145 Presumably, safety will be a more
convincing ground of undue hardship in workplaces that offer more risk. The disruption of
a collective agreement is also an important factor in assessing undue hardship. The
collective agreement is treated with a fair amount of deference. As such, an employer can
only interfere with the agreement where a search for a suitable accommodation does not
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yield a result.146 The employer may have to modify jobs, reallocate tasks, or even transfer
the employee with some impact on coworkers.147 Financial cost may also be a factor with
some weight but in order to constitute undue hardship, it needs to be substantial.148
Tribunals follow the high threshold confirmed in Via Rail Canada Inc v Canadian
Transportation Agency,149 in which costs must be extraordinary to amount to the point of
undue hardship. In this case, the SCC put forth the question, “[w]hat monetary value can
be assigned to dignity” to set this high threshold because it “will always seem demonstrably
cheaper to maintain the status quo and not eliminate a discriminatory barrier.”150 Several
other factors may impact the cost, including: size of the workplace, timing of the cost, any
sharing of expense, and the possibility of external resources.151
The final factor that has been given weight is legitimate operational requirements of the
organization, but the threshold to establish undue hardship remains high.152 However, this
is not a factor that has been explicitly set out in case law; rather it a useful heading under
which a variety of considerations can be grouped. Most notably, absenteeism falls under
this factor. Tribunals seem to follow Hydro-Québec wherein if the employee is unable to
work for the reasonably foreseeable future even with accommodation, then the test for
undue hardship is satisfied.153 Absenteeism is a contentious issue because it is very difficult
to accommodate. With the decision in Hydro-Québec, it has garnered more consideration
in the lower courts, particularly because it is a common problem for persons with
disabilities. Additionally, although the employer must be flexible, it “does not have to
create a new job, or one that is not productive, or one that has core duties removed, or one
that changes working conditions in a fundamental way.”154
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The high threshold for finding undue hardship requires a nuanced and understanding
approach from employers, tribunals, and courts. Each case must be assessed individually
on its own facts. This undoubtedly provides opportunities to further the rights of persons
with disabilities, but it is also a time-consuming process, particularly when it is reported
that disability discrimination complaints “have been the most common ground of
discrimination complaints received by every human rights commission across Canada year
after year.”155

3.4

How does Canada compare?

The duty to accommodate exists in other jurisdictions outside of Canada. Canada imported
various concepts of accommodation and disability discrimination from the US.156 The UN
CRPD and EU legislation also draws from the US approach, particularly the ADA.157 The
social model has strongly influenced the ADA,158 CRPD, and the approaches in the EU
and Canada159 because the “concept of reasonable accommodation is grounded in the social
model of disability… [which] recognizes that the interaction between an impairment and
society can result in disabled individuals being exposed to disadvantage, and the goal of
any reasonable accommodation is to eliminate or reduce the disadvantages resulting from
such interaction.”160 Having said that, each approach has flaws that have hindered its ability
to improve the rights of persons with disabilities. A comparison across the three approaches
presented—Canada, the US, and the EU—highlights the strengths and weaknesses of each.
These approaches are substantively comparable, but differ in terms of process: Canada is
regulated provincially with federal principles, the US is regulated federally, and the EU
sets out regulations that are then adapted by each Member State.
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3.4.1

The US approach

When the ADA was enacted in the US to apply nationally, “disability rights advocates
thought they had won a major victory,”161 however it was interpreted and applied so
narrowly that the threshold for qualifying as disabled served as a gatekeeper and barrier for
access to rights for persons with disabilities.162 The individual had to prove that he or she
not only had a disability (or was regarded as having one) but also had to have a limitation
on a major life activity as a result.163 As such, the ADA Amendments Act of 2008164
(ADAAA) was enacted to expand the definition of disability. 165 With the ADAAA, the
standard to qualify as having a disability is not as demanding.166 Despite the fact that the
ADAAA has expanded this requirement, qualifying as a person with a disability in the US
still seems to be gatekeeper for access to rights. The threshold in Canada is comparatively
easy to qualify as a person with a disability; it is not usually an issue.
Once the person has qualified as disabled, then the general rule against discrimination
applies. Under this rule, a failure to make reasonable accommodation, unless it would
impose undue hardship, amounts to discrimination.167 It acts like a negative duty wherein
the employer must prevent discrimination with positive acts, rather than a positive duty
which requires provision of aid. Accommodation is “‘any change’ in the work environment
or in the way things are customarily done that enables a disabled individual to enjoy equal
employment opportunities.”168 Thus, accommodation may require the employer to:
restructure the position, reallocate non-essential tasks, change work schedule, reassign to
a vacant position but only as a last resort, and permit unpaid leave. 169 There is no specific
time limit for leave under the ADAAA or ADA, but generally “requests for indefinite leave
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are inherently unreasonable.”170 The accommodation must be reasonable, which implies
that “an employer is only obliged to take action that does not result in excessive costs,
difficulties, or problems.”171 Undue hardship serves the same function in the US as in
Canada: it is the limit of accommodation. However, in the US, under the ADAAA, finding
undue hardship requires consideration of financial factors such as the cost of the
accommodation, the financial resources of the employer, and the type of operation of the
employer.172 In determining an accommodation, it must be “reasonable in the sense both
of efficacious and of proportional to costs,” and undue hardship looks at excessive costs
“in relation either to the benefits of the accommodation or to the employer’s financial
survival or health.”173 Financial considerations are the focus rather than human rights like
in Canada’s approach. This may be because the ADA is not actually focused on human
rights, but instead revolves around civil rights and anti-discrimination, which are more
individualized approaches.174 Additionally, the development of both the ADA and
ADAAA has been subject to compromise and pressure from businesses.175

3.4.2

The CRPD and the EU approach

The CRPD was enacted in 2007 and both Canada and the EU signed at that time, whereas
the US did not sign until 2009. Canada and the EU have both ratified the CRPD but the US
has yet to do so.176 The US’s reluctance is in spite of the fact that the ADA was the basis
of the CRPD, yet Congress opposed the CRPD because of “a possible sacrifice of elements
of US sovereignty.”177 This concern over sovereignty may be a reaction to some of the
directive language in the CRPD that imposes responsibilities and duties on all the ratifying
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members, in ways that may go beyond the ADA and ADAAA. The CRPD defines
reasonable accommodation as “necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments
not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to
ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”178 Article 27 of the CRPD sets out positive
duties in regards to employment such as enable access to programmes, promote
opportunities, and employ persons with disabilities in the public sector. Thus, reasonable
accommodation as set out by the CRPD requires satisfaction of the right to equality and
non-discrimination, which necessitates positive measures to achieve substantive
equality.179 The CRPD “establishes the principle of inclusion as the key to equality for
people with disabilities, and imposes positive obligations on governments to take steps to
achieve it.”180
The EU has ratified the CRPD and, as such, “EU Member States can be held accountable
for breaches of international treaties to which they have acceded, even where the breach
results from any acts or omission required by EU law.”181 This means that the EU must
implement the CRPD.182 Having said that, the EU had already adopted the Employment
Equality Directive183 (Directive) in 2000 that sets out a requirement for reasonable
accommodation in Article 5 that was influenced by the ADA. 184 Unlike the ADA, the
Directive is relatively brief and does not provide details or lengthy guidance. 185 The
Directive is responsible for introducing accommodation to most of the Member States.186
The Member States were responsible for transposing Article 5 into their legal systems, but
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there is some variance in how they did so.187 An accommodation is an adjustment but a
reasonable accommodation is limited to those that are not excessive in terms of costs or
hassle. It must also be effective.188 Both the US and EU have a reasonableness requirement
and the limitation of undue hardship, or disproportionate burden in the EU; the former has
proven easier to establish.189 A disproportionate burden is determined by looking at the
cost of the accommodation, the financial resources of the organization, and availability of
public funding.190

3.4.3

Canada stands apart

It is apparent that the approaches to disability discrimination and accommodation differ
between Canada, the US, and the EU. Despite the fact that the EU and Canada both drew
on the US approach, arguably Canada is the outlier whereas the EU and the US are more
similar. The EU and the US place a lot of weight on financial costs in determining (1) the
reasonableness of the accommodation and (2) existence of undue hardship or
disproportionate burden, whereas Canada has set a high financial threshold only in regards
to undue hardship.
Arguably, none of them meet the inclusive vision set out in the CRPD for accommodation.
Although the US has tried to expand the definition of disability, people still struggle to
qualify as disabled. Additionally, due to the high weight accorded to financial
considerations, the US approach may tend towards the employer’s needs, rather than
balancing them with the employee’s. The EU, having followed the US approach, also
focuses on financial considerations, but does not seem to be quite as limited in terms of
qualifying as disabled. Not only does the legislation in the EU lack detail with regards to
application and implementation, but it is also relatively new, so more development is
needed. Canada attempts to provide a more balanced approach with a focus on human
rights rather than financial considerations. However, despite the inclusive vision of
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Meiorin, the complaint-driven system and emphasis on individual accommodation rather
than institutional results in an individualized application of the accommodation duty, which
fails to satisfy the CRPD’s imposition of positive obligations for institutional change.
Despite these shortfalls, Canada, the US, and the EU each have potential for institutional
change if the obligations and thresholds for accommodation are interpreted broadly.

3.5

Conclusion

The Canadian duty to accommodate has progressed rapidly over the past 30 years. The
stated aim of accommodation is for substantive equality as a human right. This right flows
from the Charter and in human rights codes across Canada. Thus, it is a Canada-wide duty.
Meiorin presented the promise of an inclusive workplace that could achieve substantive
equality; however, Canada has not quite fulfilled that promise. Meiorin set out the BFOR
test that contains the accommodation duty in the third step. First, the employee must prove
prima facie discrimination. Second, the employer must try to justify the impugned standard
as reasonably necessary. If it is not, then it will be struck down, but if the standard is
reasonably necessary then accommodation must be considered. There are two types of
accommodation: institutional and individualized. The employer and employee both have
obligations to actively try to determine the best accommodation. The CRPD requires a
systemic approach to accommodation to remove the discrimination institutionally rather
than on an individual-basis. However, in Canada, the approach after Meiorin seems to be
individualized, based on individual complaints and an “after-the-fact” consideration of
accommodation rather than starting from an inclusive position. This is where Canada could
improve to satisfy the obligations under the CRPD.
If the accommodation cannot be provided, the employer must prove that it would constitute
undue hardship. The current approach to determining undue hardship draws on Meiorin
and Hydro-Québec, both in courts and tribunals. Meiorin set out that, “it must be
demonstrated that it is impossible to accommodate individual employees sharing the
characteristics of the claimant without imposing undue hardship upon the employer.”191
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Meiorin, supra note 40 at para 54.
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The SCC in Hydro-Québec restated undue hardship as “not whether it was impossible for
the employer to accommodate the employee’s characteristics” but “where the employee is
no longer able to fulfill the basic obligations associated with the employment relationship
for the foreseeable future” and “the proper operation of the business is hampered
excessively.”192 This restatement of the test of undue hardship gives more weight to the
undue hardship factors of safety, legitimate operational requirements, excessive financial
costs, and interference with the collective agreement.
Canada’s approach to accommodation differs from that in the US and EU. By framing it
as a human rights issue and moving the focus from financial consideration, Canada offers
the potential for an inclusive approach with substantive equality. Additionally, Canada may
more readily be able to impose a positive duty on governments and employers to provide
institutional accommodation and live up to the promise of Meiorin. Having said that, the
shortcomings in the Canadian approach may contribute to the lesser access to
accommodation and equality experienced by persons with chronic pain disorders.
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Hydro-Québec, supra note 120 at paras 16, 19, & 18.
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Chapter 4

4

Accommodation of Chronic Pain Disorders in the
Canadian Workplace
Then my body failed me and everything fell apart.1

What are chronic pain disorders? Chronic pain disorders qualify as a disability in Canada
as per the statutory definition found in human rights legislation across Canada, including
the Ontario Human Rights Code (OHRC)2 and the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA),3
as well as the ratified UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).4
This status as a disability stands regardless of whether it is considered a physical or mental
disability—a debate that has not been settled, which is discussed later. Furthermore,
persons with chronic pain disorders are entitled to the benefits of accommodation in the
workplace, flowing from the right to equality set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms (Charter)5 and the right to accommodation articulated in human rights
legislation across Canada.6 However, chronic pain disorders cannot always be considered
under the umbrella of disability because the “lived experience of chronic illness…is often
qualitatively different from that of disability.”7 Chronic illnesses differ from “mainstream”
disabilities because of the fluctuation of symptoms, meaning that individuals have good
days and bad days. The symptoms can fluctuate in impact and severity, which requires
frequent re-assessment and alteration of the accommodation needs. By considering chronic
pain disorders under the umbrella of disability, the law and the medical field overlook this
significant difference.

Julie Devaney, “Narrative Preface: Julie’s Story” in Sharon-Dale Stone, Valorie A Crooks, and Michelle
Owens, eds, Working Bodies: Chronic Illness in the Canadian Workplace (Montréal & Kingston: McGillQueen’s University Press: 2014) 89 at 89.
2
RSO 1990, c H 19 s 10(1) [OHRC].
3
RSC 1985, c H 6 s 25 [CHRA]
4
30 March 2007, GA Res 61/106 at Preamble e and Article 2 [CRPD].
5
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982 s 15.
6
See e.g., OHRC, supra note 2 at s 17; CHRA, supra note 3 at s 5, 15.
7
Sharon-Dale Stone, Valorie A Crooks, & Michelle Owen, “Introduction” in Stone, Crooks, & Owens,
supra note 1, 1 at 3 [Stone].
1
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Chronic pain disorders, like all disabilities, have unique features and, as such, encounter
different barriers than other disabilities. Qualifying as a person with a disability is required
to obtain accommodation, but persons with chronic pain disorders struggle to prove the
medical legitimacy of their conditions because of the particular reliance on subjective
evidence and lack of definitive diagnosis. What makes accommodation of individuals with
chronic pain disorders unique and challenging is the episodic and unpredictable nature of
absences and productivity. As such, these particular problems with medical legitimacy and
absenteeism may require a different approach than that of other disabilities. By recognizing
the different needs of the wide range of persons with disabilities, the goal of substantive
equality through individualized tailoring is within reach.
Accommodation is meant to alleviate disadvantages that result from the interaction
between an impairment and the social environment, which should mean that the existence
of an impairment, regardless of the source or diagnosis, is sufficient to trigger the duty to
accommodate.8 This is a particularly important distinction for disabilities that struggle with
medical legitimacy, such as chronic pain disorders. The chronic pain disorders of interest
are chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS), fibromyalgia (FM), and multiple chemical sensitivity
(MCS). Additionally, literature and case law dealing with mental illness in the workplace
are used to draw implications for chronic pain disorders because of the similar issues in
terms of accommodation including stigma and prejudice, invisible symptoms, chronic
prognosis, and problems with medical legitimacy. There is a marked lack of research on
the accommodation of chronic pain disorders from a legal perspective, but enough caselaw,
particularly from tribunals and arbitrations, has developed to warrant an investigation.9
The duty to accommodate has enabled great progress in Canadian human rights law for
persons with disabilities, particularly in the workplace. However, persons with chronic pain
disorders have faced unique challenges in accessing the accommodation duty’s promise of

8

Lisa Waddington, From Rome to Nice in a Wheelchair: The Development of a European Disability Policy
(Groningen, Amsterdam: Europa Law Publishing, 2006) at 22.
9
Caselaw was found through various legal search engines with a focus on labour arbitrations and human
rights tribunals (and judicial review of those rulings), but with no limitations with regards to date or
jurisdiction across Canada.
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equality. Part I provides relevant medical literature on CFS, FM, and MCS as well as an
examination of how they are commonly accommodated and why they are different from
other disabilities. In Part II, the factors that influence accommodation of chronic pain
disorders are discussed, including supportive supervisors, cooperative employees,
acceptance of medical information, and a supported return to work. Part III examines undue
hardship factors for the accommodation of chronic pain disorders, including, most
significantly, innocent absenteeism. In Part IV, Canada’s approach to accommodating
chronic pain disorders is compared with that of the US and the European Union (EU),
wherein shortcomings and strengths in Canada’s approach will be elucidated. It is expected
that Canada has a more flexible approach given its broader interpretation of disability, but
the lack of objective medical evidence is likely an obstacle for the US, the EU, and Canada.

4.1 What are chronic pain disorders?
The chronic pain disorders of interest are CFS, FM, and MCS. In order to understand why
chronic pain disorders pose different problems than other disabilities, the medical literature
and common methods of accommodation are discussed. CFS, FM, and MCS have different
symptoms and functional limitations in the workplace; however, they share common
problems in accommodation.

4.1.1

Chronic Fatigue Syndrome & Fibromyalgia

Despite the fact that CFS and FM are considered different syndromes by the medical
community, the terms have been used interchangeably on account of the similarities in
symptoms and functional limitations. Further confusing the matter is the frequent diagnosis
of both syndromes in the same individual. CFS has been described as feeling “like having
flu all the time with no certainty of recovery.”10 It is also referred to as myalgic
encephalopathy, although there is some disagreement as to whether these are the same

Jo Marchant, “It was like being buried alive’: battle to recover from chronic fatigue syndrome” The
Guardian (15 February 2016) online: The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com> [Marchant].
10
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condition.11 In the 1970s, it was known as “mass hysteria” and in the 1980s, it was called
“yuppie flu.”12 It is evident from these flippant terms that CFS was not regarded as a
legitimate or serious condition, a perspective that served, and continues to serve, as the
basis for the dismissive attitude towards CFS demonstrated by courts, tribunals, and
medical practitioners. This attitude results in further derogation and poor understanding.
Although CFS is taken more seriously now, it is still subject to scepticism with regards to
its seriousness, diagnosis, and existence from both the medical and legal communities.13
CFS is characterized by “persistent fatigue, pain, sleep difficulties, and cognitive
impairments.”14 There is no specific curative treatment nor a treatment to improve
symptoms.15 There is also no biological or single diagnostic test for CFS,16 instead it is a
diagnosis of exclusion.17 In order to be diagnosed with CFS, the individual must self-report
chronic fatigue for at least six months that can be a new or definite onset, but not a result
of ongoing exertion, not substantially alleviated by rest and results in substantial functional
limitations.18 The individual must also have four or more of the following symptoms
concurrently present for at least six months: impaired memory or concentration, sore throat,
tender lymph nodes, muscle pain, multiple joint pain, headaches, unrefreshing sleep, and
post-exertional malaise.19
CFS often co-occurs “with other so-called functional illnesses such as fibromyalgia,
multiple chemical sensitivities, irritable bowel syndrome, and temporomandibular joint
disorder.”20 Despite the fact that some objective abnormalities have been found in the

11

Sometimes these two names are used interchangeably whereas sometimes the conditions are
distinguished; see RA Underhill, “Myalgic encephalomyelitis, chronic fatigue syndrome: An infectious
disease” (2015) 85 Medical Hypotheses 765 and Marchant, ibid.
12
Marchant, ibid.
13
Institute of Medicine, “Beyond Myalgic Encephalomyelitis/Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: Redefining an
Illness” (2015) 180:7 Military Medicine 721 at 721.
14
Niloofar Afari & Dedra Buchwald, “Chronic Fatigue Syndrome: A Review” (2003) 160:2 American J
Psychiatry 221 at 221 [Afari].
15
Caralee Caplan, “Chronic fatigue syndrome or just plain tired?” (1998) 159:5 CMAJ 519 at 521
[Caplan].
16
Ibid at 519.
17
Afari, supra note 14 at 230.
18
Caplan, supra note 15 at 519.
19
Ibid.
20
Afari, supra note 14 at 222.
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central nervous system, immune system, and neuroendocrine regulation of persons with
CFS, there is debate regarding whether CFS is a psychological or physical disorder in the
medical literature,21 which is further confused by the increased prevalence of mood
disorders, particularly depression, for persons with CFS.22 For now, treatment of CFS
attempts to alleviate symptoms and improve functioning.23
FM can look like CFS to an outside perspective or even to medical professionals, who often
diagnosis both syndromes in the same individual, but it is considered a separate syndrome.
FM has been described as the “medicalization of misery”24 and is characterized by
widespread musculoskeletal pain that is “diffuse, fluctuating and with neuropathic features
among some patients.”25 It was formerly called fibrositis syndrome.26 Associated
symptoms include fatigue; nonrestorative sleep and sleep disturbances; cognitive
dysfunction including poor working memory, spatial memory alterations, and verbal
fluency; mood disorder especially depression and anxiety problems; somatic symptoms
like irritable bowel syndrome and migraines; and, sexual dysfunction. 27 Persons with FM
have increased sensitivity to pressure and light touch, “which causes allodynia (perceived
pain to non-noxious stimuli) and hyperalgesia (disproportionate pain to painful stimuli).”28
Although these symptoms are similar to CFS, the difference seems to lie in the primary
symptoms: CFS is characterized by fatigue whereas FM is distinguished by widespread
musculoskeletal pain. Both syndromes are subject to a multitude of criticism regarding
their existence and diagnosis, but there is a lack of investigation of the progress of research

See Morton E Tavel, “Somatic Symptom Disorders Without Known Physical Causes: One Disease with
Many Names?” (2015) 128:10 American J Medicine 1054, which suggests that both FM and CFS are
manifestations of the same somatic disorder wherein the “physical” symptoms are psychological in origin.
This distinction seems to be quite polarizing in the medical and psychology fields; the research supports
that these disabilities are physical or psychological, but rarely considers whether they could be both.
22
Afari, supra note 14 at 230 & 225.
23
Ibid at 230.
24
Steven Chinn, William Caldwell, & Karine Gritsenko, “Fibromyalgia Pathogenesis and Treatment
Options Update” (2016) 20:25 Curr Pain Headache Rep 1 at 1 [Chinn].
25
Mary-Ann Fitzcharles, Peter A Ste-Marie, & John X Pereira, “Fibromyalgia: evolving concepts over the
past 2 decades” (2013) 185: 13 CMAJ E645 at E646 [Fitzcharles, “Fibromyalgia”].
26
Chinn, supra note 24 at 1.
27
Mary-Ann Fitzcharles et al, “2012 Canadian Guidelines for the Diagnosis and Management of
Fibromyalgia Syndrome” (2016), online: National Guidelines <http://www.fmguidelines.ca> at 1.1.2
[Fitzcharles, “2012 Canadian Guidelines”].
28
Chinn, supra note 24 at 2.
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in the medical field. Instead, researchers seem rather intractable as they support only one
side of the various debates (real or not, psychological or physical, etc.) without assessing
any middle ground or overlap.29
For FM, “symptoms are subjective, assessment is dependent entirely on patient report, no
objective or laboratory test exists to confirm the diagnosis, and there is an absence of a
gold standard of treatment.”30 FM is diagnosed through a scoring system where the
individual must report at least moderately severe widespread pain for at least 3 months.31
This scoring system is preferred over the previous diagnostic tender points test for greater
sensitivity to symptoms. Similar to CFS, the cause of FM is unknown and it is also subject
to debate regarding whether it is a psychological or physical condition or perhaps
occupying the area in between medicine and psychology. 32 It is described as “a bitterly
controversial condition. It pits patients, pharmaceutical companies, some specialty
physicians, professional organizations, and governmental agencies…against the large
majority of physicians, sociologists, and medical historians in what we call the
‘fibromyalgia wars.’”33 This controversy is evident in the caselaw. Some studies suggest
that the “course of FM after onset indicate that the signs and symptoms usually stabilize
within the first year of the syndrome and remain largely unchanged over time.”34 Despite
this stabilization, the unpredictable character of the symptoms and fluctuation of
impairment hinders individuals’ control over the symptoms.35
For persons with CFS, FM, or CFS and FM, their performance at work can be impacted by
their disability. This is problematic when the impairment is “difficult to reconcile with a

See e.g. Lauren Wierwill, “Fibromyalgia: Diagnosing and managing a complex syndrome” (2012) 24 J
American Academy Nurse Practitioners 184 [Wierwill]; Masato Murakami & Woesook Kim,
Psychosomatic Aspects of Fibromyalgia" in Kyung Bong Koh, ed, Somatization and Psychosomatic
Symptoms (New York: Springer Science+Business Media, 2013) 165.
30
Fitzcharles, “2012 Canadian Guidelines” supra note 27 at Introduction.
31
Chinn, supra note 24 at 2.
32
Joseph Bernstein, “Not the Last Word: Fibromyalgia is Real” (2015) 474 Clin Orthop Relat Res 304 at
305; M Hotopf & S Wessely, “Is fibromyalgia a distinct clinical entity? Historical and epidemiological
evidence” (1999) 13 Baillieres Best Pract Res Clin Rheumatol 427.
33
Frederick Wolfe, “Fibromyalgia Wars” (2009) 36:4 J Rheumatology 671 at 671.
34
Wierwill, supra note 29 at 184.
35
Paivi Juuso, et al, “The Workplace Experiences of Women with Fibromyalgia” online (2016),
Musculoskeletal Care <http://www.wileyonlinelibrary.com> at 1 [Juuso].
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mostly healthy looking individual.”36 It is important to note the value of employment for
persons with CFS and FM, as some studies have found that, when employed, persons with
these disabilities have better health and quality of life.37 However, for persons with CFS
and FM, “[t]heir body had become an obstacle to continuing to work.”38 An employee with
CFS, FM, or CFS and FM will probably call in sick often, come in late due to fatigue and
sleep problems, suffer from memory or concentration problems, and experience various
physical fatigue and limitations. These symptoms will be chronic, fluctuating, and
invisible—all of which make accommodation more difficult. The most common
accommodations, by a large margin, for employees with CFS and FM are short-term and
long-term disability leaves.39 Other accommodations can include modified workspace,40
ergonomic furniture,41 reduced hours, transferring position,42 minimized physical duties,
and reassignment.43 Cognitive and psychological accommodations could also be provided
such as mentoring, changes to the social climate, alternative break schedules, working from
home, and relaxation of workplace policies around sick time use and shift rotations.44
The medical field has clearly struggled with defining these two syndromes, resulting in not
only a lack of consensus but also a lack of legitimacy to diagnoses of CFS and FM. Having
said that, the medical field has made some progress. Although the lack of consensus
remains, more research on treatment, the presentation of symptoms, and etiology have been
conducted to slowly add some legitimacy by providing more definitive ways to diagnose
and understand the syndromes.45 The law has a history of deferring to the medical field for

Fitzcharles, “Fibromyalgia” supra note 25 at E650.
Ibid at E650.
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[Dofasco].
41
Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1151 [Sketchley].
42
City of Ottawa v Civic Institute of Professional Personnel, 2010 CanLii 70011 (Ont LA) at 1 [City of
Ottawa].
43
Panacci, supra note 39; Sketchley, supra note 41.
44
Rosemary Lysaght & Terry Krupa, “Employers’ Perspectives on Workplace Accommodation of Chronic
Health Conditions” in Stone, Crooks, & Owens, supra note 1, 91 at 108 [Lysaght].
45
See e.g. Chinn, supra note 24.
36
37

79

definitions and proof of disabilities. With well-established and accepted disabilities, this is
not usually problematic. However, for chronic pain disorders, the law depended on the
medical field when it had no answers. As such, when CFS and FM were first claimed in
courts in the late 1980s and early 1990s, claimants faced blatant scepticism and disbelief.
The Alberta Queen’s Bench noted in 1994,
[F]ibromyalgia or chronic pain syndrome, as it is often called, has been the
subject of litigation only in the recent past. It is as if all previous motor
vehicle accident plaintiffs were fortunate enough never to have contracted
this apparent debilitating condition whereas many of the recent plaintiffs
did. It is a late 1980s/1990s condition that some courts have welcomed as a
new medical condition worthy of expensive damages…I am satisfied that
fibromyalgia has become a court-driven ailment that has mushroomed into
big business for plaintiffs.46
This flippant and sceptical attitude is evident in much of the early caselaw dealing with
CFS and FM, which were often referred to interchangeably. 47 Courts and tribunals were
hindered by questions of whether the disability was proved through subjective evidence,48
if the individual was malingering,49 whether it was totally disabling,50 and if causation was
established to prove liability.51 One of the main factors in these questions was the lack of
medical research at the time. Often courts and tribunals attempted to determine the validity
of CFS and FM as medical conditions, but, given the lack of research at the time, the
findings were inconclusive, confused, or in the negative. However, these findings were
made without acknowledging the limitations of the medical field. Nowhere is this more
evident than in one of the leading cases at the time, Mackie v Wolfe, in which the court
decided that FM and CFS (referred to as one condition) was really a personality disorder
that could not then be a compensable physical condition because it was pre-existing and
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Mackie v Wolfe (1994), 41 Alta LR (3d) 28 (CA) at paras 213 & 220 [Mackie].
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psychological in nature.52 The court made this decision despite a variety of medical
evidence supporting different findings. Although it is necessary for courts to make findings
of fact, this particular finding seems to go beyond questions of law or fact and instead
straying into areas clearly outside the court’s expertise to make decisions of questions of
medicine.

4.1.2

Multiple Chemical Sensitivity

MCS is “characterized by recurrent symptoms, referable to multiple organ systems,
occurring in response to demonstrable exposure to many chemically unrelated compounds
at doses far below those established to cause harmful effects in the general population.”53
It is also known as environmental sensitivities, environmental allergies, sick building
syndrome,54 and idiopathic environmental intolerance to those who consider it to be a
psychiatric condition.55 MCS was the last of the three chronic pain disorders discussed here
to be claimed at court, beginning instead from the mid 1990s. For the most part, courts
were even less welcoming to MCS than FM and CFS. Claims for MCS as a disability were
often quickly dismissed for lacking objective evidence and failing to establish the degree
of disability alleged.56 The cause of the symptoms was disputed and sometimes attributed
to other more accepted sources such as asthma or allergies.57 Arguably, even now, MCS is
the least accepted of the three chronic pain disorders discussed.
In order to be diagnosed with MCS, six criteria must be met:
1) The symptoms are reproducible with [repeated chemical] exposure.
2) The condition is chronic
3) Low levels of exposure [lower than previously or commonly tolerated]
result in manifestations of the syndrome.
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4) The symptoms improve or resolve when the incitants are removed.
5) Responses occur to multiple chemically unrelated substances.
6) Symptoms involve multiple organ systems.58
These symptoms can include muscle and joint pain, fatigue, headache, dizziness,
confusion, and breathing problems.59 Problems with concentration, mood, and memory are
also common.60 Common chemicals that cause this response include “car exhaust,
perfumes, pesticides, paint, new carpeting, air pollution, cigarette smoke, or hair spray.”61
Similar to CFS and FM, there is no single test and no effective cure as well as a debate
regarding whether it is a psychological or physical condition. There are high rates of cooccurrence of CFS, FM, migraines, asthma,62 and psychiatric disorders, particularly
depression and anxiety.63
The most common accommodation for MCS is a scent-free policy, but employers also
change cleaning supplies, provide air cleaners and masks, transfer positions or workspaces,
and allow leave from work.64 It is more common for the accommodations of MCS to be
institutional, meaning there are changes to the workplace to deal with the systemic
problem, in the hopes of a more inclusive environment and ultimately substantive
equality.65 Whereas for CFS and FM, the accommodations are individualized, meaning that
employers change something in the workplace after it is established only for the one
individual.66 Institutional accommodation provides potential for a more inclusive
workplace; however, its success depends on coworkers’ cooperation, which is in no way
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guaranteed and instead seems to be quite problematic with regards to cooperation and
morale of coworkers. This requirement for institutional accommodation may contribute to
the lesser acceptance of MCS compared to CFS and FM, despite the fact that MCS seems
to be more easily attributed to physiological processes, given that it is a response to a
physical stimulus and it is similar to allergies.

4.1.3

Commonalities among CFS, FM, and MCS

Despite being distinct syndromes, CFS, FM, and MCS have some overlapping symptoms
and thus some similar issues with regards to accommodation and employment.
Canadian Rates in 201467
Total
Male
Female

CFS
1.4%
1.0%
1.7%

FM
1.7%
0.6%
2.8%

MCS
2.4%
1.3%
3.5%

Table 1: Rates of CFS, FM, and MCS in Canada in 2014 from Statistics Canada
data.
As we can see from Table 1, the rates of CFS, FM, and MCS are not particularly high, but,
to put it in perspective, CFS, FM, and MCS are more common than more well-known
disabilities like Hodgkin lymphoma68 and bipolar disorder.69 Despite only making up a
small portion of the population, this is not a reason to dismiss these syndromes. A study of
the functional impairments for people with any of these syndromes reported that “[m]ost
(68.8%) had stopped work, and on average this had occurred 3 years after symptom
onset.”70
There are several factors that are common to CFS, FM, and MCS. First, all three of these
syndromes are reported by more women, as we can see in Table 1. It is possible that they
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are just more common for women or perhaps women are more willing to report pain.
Regardless, significantly more women report these syndromes and, as such,
accommodation of chronic pain disorders is a somewhat gendered issue. Second, these
disabilities are invisible, meaning that there are no physical, external, or obvious signs of
disability or illness. This invisibility may hinder individuals with these disabilities
identifying as disabled, which means they may not disclose their symptoms; if they do
identify as disabled, then they have the choice whether to disclose.71 Third, these
disabilities are chronic. They have fluctuating symptoms resulting in the person “being
both healthy and sick at the same time,”72 which also makes accommodation difficult
because the limitations and capabilities of the individual are unpredictable. Fourth, the
medical legitimacy of each of these syndromes is hotly contended, both for individuals
who are suspected of faking or malingering and with respect to the syndromes generally in
terms of the existence, prognosis, and diagnosis due to the lack of definitive and objective
tests and reliance on subjective self-reporting.
These factors lead to the fifth factor—the high level of scrutiny associated with these
disabilities. Because they are invisible and struggle for legitimacy, individuals may face
scrutiny and then stigma because of disbelief from coworkers, supervisors, and medical
professionals. Additionally, CFS, FM, and MCS are strongly associated with mental
illness, which are well known as the most stigmatized of disabilities.73 It is unclear whether
any of these disabilities are psychological or physical conditions; the law should not be
responsible for this determination. However, due to the high co-occurrence of mental
illness, CFS, FM, and MCS, are connected with mental illness. Persons with chronic pain
disorders already experience a high degree of scrutiny in establishing proof of their
disability. This association with mental illness suggests a high likelihood for persons with
chronic pain disorders to also be subject to stigma and prejudice, similar to persons with
mental illnesses.
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For most disabilities, it seems that they fall into either side of a spectrum: they can be
accommodated or they cannot and the person cannot work. Persons with chronic pain
disorders do not fall neatly into either group, and instead require many attempts at
accommodation with no clear indication of whether they can or cannot work. Thus, it is
apparent that CFS, FM, and MCS pose unique problems in the workplace, distinct from
disabilities generally.

4.2

Factors that influence accommodation

There are several factors that influence accommodation in the workplace. Because chronic
pain disorders are complex disabilities, consideration of these non-legal factors is essential
to understanding the circumstances of accommodating these disabilities. These factors
include the attitudes of the supervisor and employer, the cooperation of the employee, the
medical information, and return to work procedures.

4.2.1

Attitudes of the supervisor and employer

Supervisors are the leaders in the workplace; they set the tone of the work environment.
They also reflect the employers’ attitudes and have to work with the attitudes of the union,
if the workplace is unionized. Supervisors can foster a climate of respect and trust in the
workplace, but they must also balance this with their duties to the employer to maintain the
bottom line of the operation.74 When they can, supervisors should attempt to create a
supportive environment by encouraging open communication about health-related
concerns, balancing employees’ needs with each other, and clarifying policies or avenues
for requesting accommodation.75
Employers are not required to have anti-discrimination policies, but they are bound by
human rights legislation in Ontario. Anti-discrimination policies are recommended and it
is within the power of human rights commissions to order a public interest remedy that
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requires the employer to establish a policy that addresses anti-discrimination on the ground
of disability.76 Larger operations are more likely to have policies and procedures, as well
as a human resources department, whereas smaller workplace may not and, as a result, may
lack the knowledge or resources to establish a policy or to create a supportive workplace
environment.77 A collective agreement can serve a similar purpose, when unions negotiate
for rights and procedures dealing with accommodation of persons with disabilities.78
Regardless of whether the organization has a policy, the employer must provide
accommodation in a timely manner, otherwise this is a breach of the duty to
accommodate.79
Where the employer and supervisor understand the disability, they are better able to
provide accommodation; this is particularly the case with disabilities that are not wellunderstood, such as chronic pain disorders. As part of their duties, supervisors “may need
to interpret medical restrictions, document job demands, brainstorm possible
accommodations, order special supplies, create modified duty positions, temper production
demands, alter workstations, adjust work schedules, monitor adherence to medical
restrictions, engage co-workers to provide assistance, communicate with providers and
insurers, and monitor the effectiveness of job accommodations over time.”80 In order to
satisfy these obligations, the supervisor likely needs to understand the disability and its
functional limitations. Thus, the employer and supervisor may be required to learn about
the disability to satisfy the duty to accommodate.81 Where the employer and supervisor do
not make this effort for accommodating persons with chronic pain disorders, it may also
be discriminatory because the inaccurate assumptions made on limited knowledge may
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result in differential treatment of these persons compared to other persons with disabilities
and persons without disabilities.82
The support of supervisors and the employer is important due to the potential for
harassment because “[r]esentment is a particular problem for workers who manage
invisible impairments.”83 A 2007 study found that harassment was common for persons
with MCS, who “endured eye rolling, disgusted looks, verbal abuse, increased use of
perfume, perfume spraying outside their doors, being ‘tested’ in various ways…, laughter
when they wore masks and ostracism.”84 Furthermore, “[t]he fact that a greater portion of
unemployed than employed people in this study had endured workplace harassment raises
the question whether that harassment is not in fact a causal factor in job loss.”85 Where the
supervisor and employer are supportive and have policies in place to prevent
discrimination, it seems likely that the rate of harassment will be reduced and that the
individual will have a more positive attitude towards work.86

4.2.2

The cooperation of the employee

Despite the common suspicion that the employee is faking a chronic pain disorder, many
persons with chronic pain disorders view work as “important and even a source of joy.”87
In Metsala v Falconbridge Limited, Kidd Creek Division, the employee with CFS on leave
phoned repeatedly to inquire about coming back to work and, when she did return, she
worked to the point of exhaustion so that she could satisfy her duties. 88 This is merely an
example of the desire to work that is common to many persons with chronic pain disorders
to gain self-value, life satisfaction, and an income.89 However, maintaining employment is
often only possible with accommodation for persons with chronic pain disorders. The
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individual must (1) have a disability and (2) disclose the disability in order to request
accommodation. Once that is done, the onus falls on the employer to provide
accommodate. However, where persons with chronic pain disorders do not understand this
process to request accommodation, then they may not obtain accommodation. Because
chronic pain disorders are invisible, they must be disclosed to activate the employer’s duty
to accommodate; without disclosure, the employer cannot be expected to anticipate the
need for accommodation.90 However, disclosure may publicly identify the individual as
disabled, thus interfering with privacy concerns, and may not actually result in
accommodation if hindered by discrimination or limited by undue hardship.91 Thus,
employees may avoid disclosure out of fear of discrimination, particularly those in more
precarious employment.92 Where employees know about their human rights, they may be
better able to navigate the complex processes including return to work procedures,
workers’ compensation, and any appeal processes.93 However, due to the chronic and
invisible nature of chronic pain disorders, employees may be unsuccessful in many of these
procedures because of the difficulty in proving medical legitimacy of the claim.94
Where “a sense of belonging, reciprocity, and empathy characterizes workplace
relationships,” accommodation is usually most successful.95 If co-workers and supervisors
like the individual, it is more likely that they will be willing to help.96 This is the
unfortunate reality for accommodation, despite the fact that the individual’s personality is
irrelevant to the accommodation duty and resulting legal obligations of the employer. In
the case of chronic pain disorders where absenteeism and emotional problems are common,
more adversarial relationships may develop, particularly if the legitimacy of a leave or
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accommodation is questioned by co-workers.97 Employees with chronic pain disorders
may contribute to these problems by “refusing offered accommodation, exceeding
physician recommended restrictions, and refusing treatment, as well as failing to provide
necessary medical information, avoiding meetings or failing to call in if they are unable to
attend work.”98 Employers as well as courts and tribunals may view this uncooperative
behaviour as frustrating the employer’s attempts to accommodate, thus ending the
employer’s duty to accommodate.99 Although an employee’s failure to mitigate or
participate in the process of accommodation may be grounds for ending the employer’s
duty to accommodate, the personality of the individual with a chronic pain disorder and
relationships with co-workers has no relevance or standing in the fulfilment of the
accommodation duty.

4.2.3

Medical information

Chronic pain disorders are problematic in terms of medical information, not least because
of the disagreements in the medical field over the existence, etiology, and diagnosis. In
addition, a self-management ideology has developed wherein persons with chronic pain
disorders are encouraged to manage their own symptoms at work, but this places the burden
on individuals without recognizing the imbalance of power between employee and
employer and the unequal distribution of resources for managing illness such as health
care. Furthermore, this ideology “focuses on individual change, and so it does not offer
options for changing social environments,” such as accommodation, so accommodation is
not requested.100 When it is requested, the employer may struggle to find the “balance
between sufficient investigation of disability and employee harassment.” 101 Investigation
may be primarily due to suspicion102 or it may be an attempt by the employer to ascertain

Ramona L Paetzold et al, “Perceptions of People with Disabilities: When is Accommodation Fair?”
(2008) 20 Basic & Applied Social Psychology 27 at 28.
98
Kristman, supra note 75 at 125.
99
Brewer, supra note 64 at para 10; Honda Canada Inc v Keays, 2008 SCC 39 at paras 4-6, 71 [Honda
Canada]; Dofasco, supra note 40 at para 96.
100
Oldfield, supra note 87 at 37, 37-43.
101
Kelly Williams-Whitt, “Impediments to Disability Accommodation” (2007) 62:3 RI 405 at 417, 413
[Williams-Whitt].
102
See Honda Canada, supra note 99 at 4-6.
97

89

how best the employee can be accommodated,103 which may be reasonable given the
misunderstood and subjective nature of chronic pain disorders.
Courts and tribunals have inconsistently recognized that a “distinction should be drawn
between the question of whether a disability exists and the question of whether medical
science has a label for it or has determined its cause.”104 This is an essential concept when
considering the accommodation of chronic pain disorders which are so contentious with
regards to medical legitimacy. Instead, there are two hurdles to establishing medical
legitimacy for accommodation: (1) providing accommodation for the impairment without
a definitive diagnosis—both (a) accepting subjective evidence and (b) accepting
impairment without a diagnosis—and (2) accepting and accommodating the disability
without determining whether it is of physical or psychiatric etiology. First, employers and
courts and tribunals have seized onto the lack of objective medical evidence. In Re Joseph
Brant Memorial Hospital and ONA (Joseph Brant Memorial Hospital),105 a nurse had been
off work for several years, the first two for which she received long term disability benefits
(LTD). Once the two-year time period for LTD benefits concluded, she was denied further
benefits on the grounds that there was no objective evidence that she was unable to work
elsewhere. The arbitrator, Michael Bendel, made three points regarding medical evidence:
[1] Fibromyalgia and other conditions for which there exists no objective
medical test are not, ipso facto, ineligible for compensation…
[2] Medical evidence that is based on a claimant’s self-reports and other
non-objective medical evidence can therefore be sufficient to prove a
disability claim…
[3] in the absence of objective medical evidence of disability, the credibility
of the claimant is very much in issue.106
He maintained that this was not new ground, but instead followed what was set out in
Martin v Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board), in which chronic pain was accepted
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as a disability.107 Arbitrator Bendel further stated that the requirement for objective
evidence is an additional criterion that was unilaterally imposed on the employee. 108 The
arbitrator found that the employee was credible and thus, accepted the subjective medical
evidence as proving her functional limitations from a variety of disabilities including FM.
This is a relatively new decision from 2014. The arbitrator demonstrated a flexible and
inclusive application of disability by recognizing the problems of subjective medical
evidence while accepting its necessary use for disabilities which cannot be proven through
objective evidence. This is a promising decision, particularly given that it was followed in
another arbitration in 2015.109 However, despite this progress, tribunals, arbitrators, and
especially courts continue to struggle with accepting subjective evidence.
An additional problem is that sometimes the chronic pain disorder is not definitively
diagnosed: instead the doctor confirms the impairment and functional limitation and says
that it might be a chronic pain disorder. This was the case in Brewer v Fraser Milner
Casgrain LLP, in which a legal secretary asked for accommodation for what her doctor
suspected was MCS. The employer implemented a scent free policy, assigned her a private
washroom, altered her work hours to avoid crowds, and placed air cleaners in her
workspace. She was reassigned to a different floor that had recently been renovated, which
caused an episode of MCS for which she left work on short term disability. While on leave,
she refused to try another position and was terminated. The Alberta Human Rights
Commission found that the employer was justified in rejecting the employee’s claim that
she had a physical disability from her doctor’s suspicions of MCS, without a definitive
diagnosis.110 The Chief Commissioner stated that “[a]lthough MCS is a controversial
disability issue it is important to note none of the reports submitted by Janice Brewer’s
physicians actually came up with a firm MCS diagnosis. Without such a diagnosis the
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respondents were in my view justified in rejecting her contention that she had a physical
disability of this nature.”111 This was in spite of the fact that the doctor confirmed her
impairments—but not the diagnostic label—and recommended various accommodations
in the workplace. The Alberta Queen’s Bench held that this distinction was unreasonable
because she had an impairment regardless of the label or cause,112 but this was overturned
by the Alberta Court of Appeal which upheld the Commission’s decision.113 In upholding
this decision and declining to distinguish between the impairment and the diagnosis, the
Human Rights Commission and the Court of Appeal demonstrated a traditional approach
to understanding disability that fails to be flexible, inclusive, or adaptive. This approach
fails to recognize disabilities that are difficult to diagnose and replicates that which was
initially applied to mental illness. As mental illnesses have become more understood, the
potentially unclear diagnoses have become less problematic for the legal system.
Hopefully, that is the route that recognition of chronic pain disorders will take as well.
The second distinction that courts and tribunals struggle with is whether chronic pain
disorders are psychological or physical, because the employer argues whether it qualifies
as a disability. Although this is an important question for the medical community to
determine the appropriate treatment, diagnosis, and prognosis, this is not a legal question.
Arbitrator Paula Knopf stated, “[w]here there is no dispute about the fact that a person is
disabled [or has an impairment], entitlement to the protections of the Human Rights Code
does not require scientific certainty about either the nature of the condition or the cause.”114
The question of whether the condition is psychological or physical is irrelevant to
accommodation because the impairment still exists.115 The presentation of symptoms,
which have been confirmed by a medical professional, requires the employer to attempt to
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alleviate the resulting limitations—i.e. accommodate up to the point of undue hardship,
regardless of the diagnosis or etiology.

4.2.4

Return to work

Going on leave is the most common accommodation for persons with chronic pain
disorders, particularly CFS and FM. As such, returning to work is also common because
the leave cannot be indefinite and people want to earn a living. Where supervisors are
supportive, the economic climate is healthy, and working conditions are conducive to
accommodation, the return to work is more likely to be successful.116 Where this is not the
case, the return to work is more likely to be unsuccessful. Due to the problems before the
employee went on leave, such as frequent and unpredictable absenteeism, the employee
may face resentment and a lack of support from co-workers.117 Before the employee returns
or even after, the employer may pressure the employee to accept medical retirement or
quit.118 This pressure may come in the form of offering an unattractive position with no
alternative but termination or refusing to provide a gradual return to work.119 The employer
may make no attempt to accommodate the employee’s return to work and instead wait out
the minimum time allotted before termination is acceptable.120 The employee may
experience financial pressure from the insurer’s decision to end long-term disability
benefits.121 The employer may intend to help but not know how to provide accommodation
for return to work and may then request more medical information or clarification.122
Having said that, there are employers who make every effort but the employee with a
chronic pain disorder is unwilling or unable to return to work.123 Where this happens, the
employer’s duty to accommodate is satisfied.
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4.3
Undue hardship in the accommodation of chronic
pain disorders
Typically, when accommodating disabilities, there are two outcomes: the disability can and
is accommodated or the disability cannot be accommodated. Chronic pain disorders do not
easily fall into either of these outcomes. Instead, the individual with a chronic pain disorder
usually goes on leave as the accommodation, sometimes without attempts at any other
accommodations and sometimes having tried other accommodations like shortened hours,
ergonomic office equipment, and rebundling of duties. It may not be clear whether the
disability can or cannot be accommodated, even after various accommodations have been
attempted and the employment contract has ended. In going through this process of trial
and error of accommodations, undue hardship may be reached. Safety, cost, morale of other
employees, and disruption of the collective agreement are brought up in caselaw as factors
that potentially amount to undue hardship. But, by a very large margin, the problem of
innocent absenteeism is the most frequent problem in accommodating persons with a
chronic pain disorder, and the most likely factor that constitutes undue hardship.

4.3.1

Safety, cost, morale of other employees, and disruption of
the collective agreement

The SCC set out a non-exhaustive list of undue hardship factors in Central Alberta Dairy
Pool v Alberta to include safety, size of the operation, financial cost, interchangeability of
the workforce and facilities, interference with rights of other employees, and morale of
other employees.124 Legitimate operational requirements has been added as another factor
in the undue hardship assessment, but has not been directly recognized. Arbitrators and
tribunals give the most weight to safety as an undue hardship factor.125 With regards to
chronic pain disorders, if safety is argued as an undue hardship factor, it is usually in
reference to the safety of the person with a chronic pain disorder, particularly persons with
MCS. For example, In Toronto District School Board v OSSTF, District 12 (Toronto
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District School Board), a teacher with MCS was attempting to return to work after a lengthy
leave but she felt that various scented products at the school “were causing injuries to her
health” and submitted various reports of health and safety concerns. 126 Ultimately, the
employer is this case could not argue safety as an undue hardship factor because it had
failed to fully accommodate her, as per the accommodation plan that had been generated
through earlier arbitrations. However, it seems that in cases of severe MCS, the safety of
the individual with MCS should be a factor of serious consideration because most
workplaces cannot guarantee a completely scent-free environment, thus creating more than
a hypothetical risk.
In order for financial costs to amount to undue hardship, the cost must go beyond “mere
efficiency. It goes without saying that in weighing the competing interests on a balance
sheet, the costs of restructuring or retrofitting are financially calculable, while the benefits
of eliminating discrimination tend not to be.”127 As such, in order for costs to amount to
undue hardship, they must be quite significant. Accommodating chronic pain disorders can
require reduced hours, reassignment, ergonomic furniture, working from home, and
transferring position or workspaces. Although these accommodations do incur some cost,
unless the operation is very small and already in jeopardy, it seems unlikely that these
changes will put the majority of workplaces in financial peril. It is more likely that an
extensive period of leave will be costlier in that it may require compensation to the
replacement employee, disability insurance payments, and various other administrative
costs. However, this does not seem to be a significant cost, particularly since it would be
spread over many years, rather than at one time. Additionally, employers may experience
a number of benefits from retaining employees with chronic pain disorders including
increased productivity due to a consistent workforce, reduced sick leave compensation,
lower disability insurance premiums, and reduced need for recruitment, hiring, and
training.128
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Undue hardship flowing from the morale of other employees has not been given significant
weight by tribunals and arbitrators.129 Despite the common perception that the
accommodations of chronic pain disorders are unfair and the resulting resentment,130 the
individual with a chronic pain disorder has a legal right to accommodation that is quasiconstitutional as a human right. Thus, while the morale of other employees is a problem, it
is not “a legitimate consideration in an undue hardship analysis.”131 Morale is unlikely to
be accepted as amounting to undue hardship, but resentment from coworkers is a problem
in the workplace that employers should try to alleviate.
Disruption of the collective agreement is a factor that is given some weight. Breaching the
collective agreement is only permitted when there is no other suitable accommodation.132
With regards to accommodating persons with chronic pain disorders, transferring or
rebundling of the duties may disrupt the collective agreement by interfering with other
employees’ seniority rights or other rights in that other employees may be prioritized
lower133 or have to pick up the slack. Unions and employers struggle with balancing the
rights of the individual with other employees. Due to these concerns, the employer may
delay transfer134 or require the employee to compete for a position,135 both of which are
potentially discriminatory and contrary to the duty to accommodate.

4.3.2

Innocent absenteeism

The fluctuating symptoms of chronic pain disorders result in ever-changing
accommodation needs,136 which also makes the accommodation process difficult and time-
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consuming. There is no greater threat to the ideal accommodation of chronic pain disorders
than absenteeism, despite the fact that the most common accommodation for chronic pain
disorders is a leave of absence. However, the duty of accommodation has expanded the
obligations of the employer with regards to termination for absenteeism:
In traditional employment law, an employer had just cause to terminate an
employee for innocent absenteeism, when two standards were met: (1) the
employee’s past record of absenteeism was excessive; and, (2) there was no
reasonable prognosis for improvement…The arrival of the accommodation
duty has expanded and transformed the test in the labour arbitration arena.
Now…the employer must also establish two further criteria: (3) the
employee had been warned that her absenteeism was excessive, and that
failure to improve could result in dismissal; and (4) if the absenteeism is the
result of a disability then accommodation efforts to the point of undue
hardship have to be extended to the employee.137
Thus, absenteeism can justify termination, but on what grounds? Does absenteeism cause
frustration of contract, as is frequently claimed; is attendance at work a bona fide
occupational requirement (BFOR); or does absenteeism amount to undue hardship and
under what factor? Absenteeism falls under legitimate operational requirements as an
undue hardship factor.
Absenteeism could cause frustration of contract because the employee is “simply unable
to perform” and so the termination is based on incapacity and cannot constitute
discrimination.138 The absenteeism violates the essential term of the employment
contract—to do work—so that the employer can treat the contract as at an end.139
Termination on the grounds of frustration of contract must be modified by human rights
principles that require accommodation.140 Having said that, in USWA v Weyerhaeuser, the
employer’s actions in dismissing employees due to absenteeism was considered
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discriminatory because it was not done in good faith. This decision was characterized as
using a frustration of contract approach to terminating the contract.141 This suggests that,
despite the required importation of human rights principles, assessing absenteeism under a
contract law framework using frustration of contract minimizes human rights obligations
and increases the potential for discrimination.
Framing the problem as a BFOR requires more from the employer with regards to human
rights obligations. Attendance at work can be considered a BFOR, wherein “it is reasonably
necessary that an employee actually show up for work. That is the most basic of job
requirements. Some level of absenteeism is consistent with continued job status, but at
some point undue hardship is reached establishing a BFOR.”142 Where a disability
precludes a return to work, this may amount to undue hardship. Furthermore,
“[d]etermining how much absence from work is incompatible with one’s status as
employee is clearly a BFOR issue. Some absence from work for health reasons is to be
expected for most, if not all employees, without detracting from their basic qualifications
for their jobs.”143 However, what is less clear is when absenteeism is excessive and when
it amounts to undue hardship. Absenteeism may amount to undue hardship under the factor
legitimate operational requirements, which has been recognized in caselaw, “albeit not in
a clearly stated or defined way.”144 Under the undue hardship factor of legitimate
operational requirements, “[e]mployers do not have to create new positions or provide
unproductive work for accommodated employees. Moreover, the accommodation itself
must reflect the legitimate needs of the workplace.”145
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In order to clarify when absenteeism is considered excessive, several examples from
caselaw can be examined. In Hydro-Québec v Syndicat des employés-e-s de techniques
professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro Québec, section local 2000 (SCFP-FTQ) (HydroQuébec), the employee missed 960 days of work over the seven and a half years of her
employment due to her various chronic illnesses including a personality disorder,
depression, and physical ailments, despite various accommodations provided.146 In Health
Sciences Association of Alberta v David Thompson Health Region, the employee was
dismissed after 7 years off work with no proof that she could return to work in the future
due to her FM and CFS.147 Similarly, in Scheuneman v Canada (Attorney General), the
employee was dismissed after 8 years of leave without pay when it was clear that it was
unlikely that he would be able to work in the foreseeable future on account of his CFS.148
Several aspects of absenteeism were made clear in these cases. First, “the purpose of leave
without pay is to provide a temporary respite, allowing the employee to maintain continuity
in employment. The purpose is not to keep an employee indefinitely, despite the fact that
he or she can no longer work for the employer.”149 As such, a leave cannot continue
indefinitely, but can only be permitted where there is some reason to believe that the
employee could return to work. This possibility of return to work does not have to be
definite and the employer may have to allow some time for determination of whether a
return is possible. Second, the absenteeism must be assessed globally, taking into account
the entire situation.150 Thus, absenteeism and time off on leave are included in the
assessment from the beginning to the end of the absenteeism issues. Third, “human rights
legislation does not preclude the right to terminate for non-culpable absenteeism.”151 In
some situations, particularly after absenteeism becomes excessive and amounts to undue
hardship, the employer is not obliged to maintain employment by human rights legislation.
Human rights legislation seeks to protect persons with disabilities from discriminatory
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treatment, not from reasonable termination when they cannot perform their job. Fourth, in
all of these cases, there was no proof or reason to believe that the employee could work
consistently in the reasonably foreseeable future. This inability to return to work was a
significant factor in the termination. In fact, this may be a determinative factor in
termination of the employee because it marks the end of both the duty to accommodate and
human rights protection. It seems that once the employee cannot return to work in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the employer is entitled to terminate.
Despite these findings, there is no clear line for when absenteeism becomes excessive. It
would be inappropriate to compare absenteeism to the average attendance in the workplace
because “[t]here is no reason to assume any connection between below average attendance
records and undue hardship.”152 Instead, a qualitative judgment must be made regarding
what level of absenteeism would disrupt the operation of the business excessively.153 From
the caselaw, it appears that absenteeism becomes excessive somewhere between two and
seven years. Employers and unions should negotiate automatic termination clauses to
clearly set out a standard in the workplace and avoid human rights challenges. However,
the employees that are most vulnerable to these automatic termination clauses are those
with disabilities, particularly ones that are prone to absenteeism like chronic pain
disorders.154 This, in itself, is a case of adverse effects discrimination.155 Although
dismissal for absenteeism is not automatically discriminatory, where a discriminatory
standard that mandates termination at a certain point applies, then it is discriminatory. For
example, a two-year limit on a leave of absence is quite common, but this may be
discriminatory for persons with chronic pain disorders who then experience different
treatment on the basis of their disabilities, compared both with people without disabilities
and people with other disabilities. Having said that, the leave cannot be indeterminate. In
order to balance the rights of employer and employee, the leave cannot be excessive.
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It is apparent that employers must tolerate excessive absenteeism before it constitutes
undue hardship, but each case must be assessed individually to determine when
absenteeism is excessive, taking into account a variety of factors including the size of the
workplace, the operation of the business, and, most importantly, the ability of the employee
to work in the reasonably foreseeable future. This is a particularly difficult determination
for persons with chronic pain disorders because the nature of the disability means that it
may be unclear when the person can return to work, whether he or she will be able to return
to work, and if the person will require accommodation to return. The “goal of
accommodation is to ensure that an employee who is able to work can do so;”156 however,
for persons with chronic pain disorders, it is often unclear whether or not they are able to
work, with or without accommodation.

4.4

How does Canada compare?

The accommodation of chronic pain disorders in Canada is still developing. Similarly, the
approaches to chronic pain disorders in the US and the EU are also in development.
However, the approaches across Canada, the US, and the EU differ for accommodating
disability generally, resulting in differing treatment of chronic pain disorders. The primary
difference lies in the gatekeeper aspect that both the US and the EU have, that Canada does
not.
In the US, under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)157 and the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008,158 the individual has to prove that he or she not only has a
disability with objective proof but also that there is a limitation on a major life activity as
a result.159 Thus, qualifying as a person with a disability is a gatekeeper for access to the
protections of the ADA. This gatekeeper has served as a barrier for persons with chronic
pain disorders to accommodation. Instead, there is “[i]nconsistent treatment... [that] results
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in intolerable uncertainty” in the US.160 For persons with chronic pain disorders, there are
two major evidentiary problems. First, not only is there a lack of objective proof of
disability, the proof that does exist is based on subjective self-reporting and is not easily
documented.161 The second problem is related to the requirement for limitation on a major
life activity. Persons with chronic pain disorders have fluctuating and unpredictable
symptoms, as such, they will likely find it difficult to prove this level of interference on a
major life activity due to a lack of objective evidence and limited, potentially conflicting
subjective evidence.162 In practice, this results in two hurdles: (1) "these individual's
attorneys must plead fibromyalgia successfully as a disability in order to survive motions
to dismiss and motions for judgment on the pleadings;" and (2) "attorneys must develop
sufficient evidence in discovery to survive motions for summary judgment."163 Most cases
fail on the first problem.164 Arguments against including chronic pain disorders as
disabilities under the ADA seem to revolve around disbelief in the syndromes and fear of
abuse of the benefits due to the lack of objective evidence.165
It seems that the majority of cases in the US have failed to prove disability with sufficient
evidence for chronic pain disorders. The evidence put forth by claimants must establish the
three elements of an ADA disability claim: physical or mental impairment, substantial
limitation, and major life activity.166 Similar to Canada, the subjective self-reporting
common with chronic pain disorders is problematic. US courts have found that the
subjective self-reported evidence is insufficient alone, but it can become sufficient where
corroborated by a physician, repeatedly.167 Additionally, this evidence must prove that the
disability exists to a degree that it is substantial; due to the lack of objective evidence, this
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is a common ground for denial of the claim.168 The evidence must also be linked to the
chronic pain disorder, not another condition or impairment.169 This is different from
Canada, where all the conditions can be claimed together with no real distinction for which
condition results in the impairment, as long as the condition is proved. The chronic pain
disorder must also be chronic or long-term, not temporary.170 Finally, the tasks that are
impaired must be of central importance to daily life,171 which is far above the Canadian
requirement that there is a functional limitation to invoke accommodation.
Despite this uncertainty in courts dealing with accommodation of persons with chronic
pain disorders, the Job Accommodation Network, a service of the US Department of
Labor’s Office of Disability Employment Policy has released a fact sheet series that deals
with chronic pain. The fact sheet on FM recommends a variety of accommodations to deal
with concentration issues, depression and anxiety, fatigue/weakness, fine motor
impairment, gross motor impairment, migraine headaches, respiratory difficulties, skin
irritations, sleep disorder, and temperature sensitivity.172 The fact sheet on chronic pain
offers practical accommodations for activities of daily living, depression and anxiety,
fatigue/weakness, and muscle pain and stiffness.173 No recommendations were made in
terms of how to provide medical proof or how to deal with absenteeism, which are the two
most common issues with chronic pain disorders. As such, this suggests that these fact
sheets are not meant to truly deal with the problems of accommodation, but instead offer
superficial guidance without resolving the true problems. Thus, the uncertainty continues.
In the EU, there may be less uncertainty but it does not serve to help persons with chronic
pain disorders. Instead, there is a question regarding “whether pain—and in particular
chronic pain—will be continued to generally be understood as a mere symptom of an
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underlying disease or eventually be acknowledged as a disease in its own right.”174 A report
published by the Council of Europe recommended that chronic pain should be included “as
an essential part of the policy making on chronic diseases and to consider pain as a health
state to be treated as a chronic disease in its own right.”175 This is supported by a report
one year later finding that chronic pain is a common condition with high costs to healthcare
systems across Europe.176 Not only is it costly, but persons with pain are subject to a lack
of understanding from healthcare professionals and limited treatment.177 Despite this
evidence and associations like Pain Alliance Europe178 and European Network of
Fibromyalgia Associations,179 it appears that not only does the EU legal system fail to
accept chronic pain disorders as disabilities, but the medical system characterizes FM as a
“non-disease.”180 Thus, persons with chronic pain, in the form of chronic pain disorders or
otherwise, likely are not considered disabled in the EU at all. In the EU, similar to the US,
qualification as a person with a disability is required in order to access any protections and
rights, like accommodation. UK caselaw similarly demonstrates confusion regarding how
to deal with claims of chronic pain disorders due to the conflicting medical opinions, which
often results in denial of the claims.181
The lack of objective medical evidence is a barrier to acceptance of chronic pain disorders.
The problems of medical legitimacy obstruct accommodation of chronic pain disorders in
the US, the EU, and Canada. However, because Canada does not have a high threshold to
qualify as disabled, there is at least potential for better access to the benefits of
accommodation. In Canada, employers, courts, and tribunals have difficulty determining
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how to accommodate, particularly with absenteeism, rather than being caught by the
question of whether the person with chronic pain disorders is disabled.

4.5

Conclusion

It appears that there has been progress with regards to the acceptance of chronic pain
disorders in law. The first claims for chronic pain disorders in courts were usually
dismissed due to the sceptical and disbelieving attitudes of the courts. Chronic pain
disorders were not accepted as disabilities due to (1) the lack of credibility after being
damaged by surveillance evidence, without recognizing the inherent limitations of such
evidence, and (2) the court’s findings on medical etiology and evidence that barred
recovery by understanding chronic pain disorders as outside the boundaries for recovery.182
This seems to be similar to the current approaches in the US and the EU, in which
qualifying as a person with a disability is the gatekeeper to access to benefits, but persons
with chronic pain disorders struggle to qualify because of the lack of objective medical
evidence.
Fast forward to the modern era of accommodation, after British Columbia (Public Service
Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance) (Meiorin),183 and there
has been clear progress since those early days with the imposition of human rights
principles, including the duty of accommodation. However, the current approach to
accommodation of chronic pain disorders is in no way perfect, or even ideal. Instead, courts
have inconsistently recognized the inherent limitations and unique challenges of chronic
pain disorders. For example, in Brewer, the Alberta Queen’s Bench recognized that chronic
pain disorders may not be able to produce objective medical evidence or definitive
diagnoses and that these limitations should not justify discrimination or bar claims.184 This
was a promising decision that showed a nuanced understanding of chronic pain disorders.
Yet the Alberta Court of Appeal overturned this decision, failed to distinguish between
impairment and diagnosis, and ultimately justified the discriminatory conduct of the
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employer. The Court of Appeal’s decision adhered to a more traditional approach and
failed to apply human rights principles in any way, let alone the flexible and adaptable
approach advocated in Meiorin.
This inconsistent application of human rights principles characterizes the current approach,
which is a hybrid between the traditional approach and a human rights approach. Chronic
pain disorders are difficult to accommodate because, unlike “mainstream” disabilities, it is
not clear whether the individual with a chronic pain disorder can or cannot be
accommodated, even after several attempts at accommodation. Furthermore, even when an
accommodation succeeds, the needs of the individual must be regularly assessed because
of the fluctuation of symptoms common for chronic pain disorders. In the face of these
issues, the easiest, and thus most common, accommodation provided is a leave of absence.
However, the inconsistent application of human rights principles is also demonstrated in
cases dealing with absenteeism due to chronic pain disorders. Despite the required
imposition of human rights principles into contract and employment law, framing
termination for absenteeism as frustration of contract results in a lack of consideration of
human rights. This is in comparison to the BFOR and undue hardship approach, which is
set out in the Meiorin test—a human rights test for discrimination. Yet, even within this
test, courts fail to satisfy human rights principles by inconsistently recognizing the unique
challenges of chronic pain disorders. Thus, the current approach fails to live up to human
rights principles.
In Canada, there are two major problems with regards to accommodation of chronic pain
disorders in particular: (1) medical legitimacy and (2) absenteeism. Medical legitimacy is
a problem in the US and the EU as well because it undermines the status of chronic pain
disorders as disabilities. Not only is there a lack of objective evidence and reliance on
subjective self-reporting, but also invisibility of symptoms and resulting scrutiny and
stigma. Further compounding the problem are the chronic and fluctuating symptoms, which
make it more difficult to accommodate as well as providing periods of seeming wellness
that casts doubt on the veracity of the claim of disability. The legal system cannot clarify
the medical legitimacy; that is a task for the medical field. However, the legal system can
draw clearer boundaries for dependence on medical proof—only proof of impairment is

106

necessary and the fact that it is subjective does not discount it. In fact, excluding disabilities
because there is no objective evidence, when objective evidence is not actually required, is
discriminatory. The lack of definitive diagnosis and unknown cause have no bearing on the
legal right and duty to accommodate.
With regards to absenteeism, there is no easy answer, nor should there be. The facts of each
case must be assessed to determine when absenteeism is excessive. There may be
disagreement from medical professionals in terms of the ability of the person to work and
whether the person can return to work in the reasonably foreseeable future. The approach
that best balances the rights of the employer and the employee is to understand attendance
at work as a BFOR with some allowance for sickness or disability. Only when absenteeism
is excessive does it constitute undue hardship. Again, the determination of whether
absenteeism is excessive depends on the facts. Due to the uncertain and fluctuating nature
of chronic pain disorders, absenteeism may only be excessive after an extensive amount of
accommodation and time. Greater awareness of the nature of chronic pain disorders on the
employer’s part may enable more successful accommodation because the employee feels
more supported and may receive more of what is needed. Having said that, a nuanced
understanding of chronic pain disorders is inconsistently applied.
There is hope still, however, for a more principled human rights approach if we look to
recent arbitration decisions. In these decisions starting from 2010, the arbitrators
recognized the unique challenges of chronic pain disorders to apply a flexible and adaptable
approach to accommodation and disability claims. In Re City of Toronto and CUPE, Local
79 (C08-05-8938),185 the arbitrator understood the inherent limitations of surveillance
evidence in that it cannot prove capabilities for employment by demonstrating unrelated
activity, particularly for invisible disabilities. In Toronto District School Board,186
arbitrator Knopf demonstrated a sensitive and nuanced approach to understanding the
grievor's MCS. In so doing, she was able to balance the rights and needs of the employer
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and the employee. Finally, in Joseph Brant Memorial Hospital,187 the arbitrator specifically
set out that certain disabilities including FM can be accepted as a disability with subjective
medical evidence where the claimant is credible. Some disabilities cannot be proved with
objective evidence and a lack of such evidence cannot be grounds for denial of the claim
because that would be discriminatory. These arbitration decisions demonstrate a flexible
and adaptable application of human rights principles in a way that recognizes the unique
challenges of chronic pain disorders while balancing the needs of both employer and
employee. These decisions set out the ideal approach that should be followed by other
decision makers. It is unclear at this time whether these arbitration decisions mark progress
in the law's understanding and approach to chronic pain disorders or whether they are
merely flukes. To satisfy human rights principles, however, only these arbitrators’
approach will do. However, the influence of these decisions may be limited as they only
occurred in Ontario in unionized workplaces.
It is evident that chronic pain disorders are complex disabilities that are difficult to
accommodate. Due to this complexity, and especially the problem of medical legitimacy,
a hierarchy of disability has emerged, wherein chronic pain disorders falls lower than other
disabilities, which are perceived as more “legitimate.”188 Similarly, mental illnesses fall
lower on the hierarchy as well due to the associated stigma. Failing to recognize the
problems inherent with chronic pain disorders and instead treating persons with chronic
pain disorders the same as persons with other disabilities may result in adverse effects
discrimination for persons with chronic pain disorders.
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Chapter 5

5

Legal Options When Accommodation Fails for Persons
with Chronic Pain Disorders

What happens after accommodation fails? So much effort has gone into determining the
limits of accommodation—reasonable necessity amounting to a bona fide occupational
requirement or undue hardship—that it calls into question what legal options exist once
the duty of accommodation is satisfied. Persons with chronic pain disorders are difficult to
accommodate due to frequent absenteeism issues, chronic and fluctuating symptoms, and
unclear needs, and, as such, reaching the limits of accommodation seems more likely than
other disabilities that are more readily and easily accommodated. In other words, it seems
more likely that persons with chronic pain disorders will not be accommodated, but may
not be considered totally disabled. Thus, an examination of the legal options available
besides accommodation helps to provide a broader picture of the experience of persons
with chronic pain disorders. However, similar to accommodation, these alternate legal
avenues struggle with the subjective diagnosis and unclear etiology of chronic pain
disorders. Although there are other legal options besides accommodation for persons with
chronic pain disorders, accommodation is the only option that enables them to remain in
the workplace. The value of work for persons with chronic pain disorders cannot be
overstated: not only does working provide financial means, but it also appears to help
people with chronic pain disorders avoid deterioration of their symptoms and improve life
satisfaction.1
This chapter examines the legal options available besides accommodation for persons with
chronic pain disorders in Canada in an effort to examine the whole experience of these
people. The chronic pain disorders of interest are chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS),
fibromyalgia (FM), and multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS). Part I looks at options that
are available before dismissal, while the individual is still employed. The two possibilities
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that are discussed are long-term disability (LTD) benefits and workers’ compensation. In
Part II, the options that individuals may pursue after dismissal are examined. These include
claims to human rights commissions, most likely discrimination and harassment, and
common law litigation, in particular wrongful dismissal against the employer. Part III
analyzes caselaw dealing with accommodation and the above options to assess how courts,
tribunals, and arbitrators deal with chronic pain disorders. It seems that decisions fall into
a spectrum where, on one end, a traditional approach does not accept chronic pain disorders
as disabilities because of a lack of objective evidence and, on the other end, a human rights
approach calls for extensive and adaptive obligations on the part of employers to satisfy
the quasi-constitutional right to accommodation. The majority of caselaw falls into the
middle ground, a hybrid of the two prior approaches, which recognizes some of the issues
but fails to fully engage with them. Persons with chronic pain disorders face unique barriers
that hinder full access to human rights and accommodation, particularly lack of objective
medical evidence, fluctuating symptoms, and unknown etiology. These barriers also
obstruct the other options that may be available to them, including LTD, workers’
compensation, claims of discrimination, and wrongful dismissal causes of action. As such,
chronic pain disorders are not only considered less legitimate, but persons with these
disabilities experience less access to their human rights, including accommodation, and
other options for compensation.

5.1 Options before dismissal
The ideal option to pursue for employees with chronic pain disorders while they are still
employed is, of course, accommodation. Where that option is not available, the duty to
accommodate has been exhausted, or perhaps in tandem with accommodation, LTD and
workers’ compensation may be pursued.

5.1.1
5.1.1.1

Long-term disability
Claiming LTD benefits

LTD leave is the most common accommodation but, in order to receive LTD benefits, it
can require a separate process and be subject to different rules than other accommodations.
This is due to the fact that other accommodations are usually provided directly by the
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employer, such as ergonomic work equipment and modified duties, whereas LTD benefits
are typically provided by an insurer, who applies its own rules and practices. LTD benefits
are provided to employees with disabilities monthly, “provided the insured meets the
applicable policy definition of disability and is not otherwise precluded from receiving
benefits due to the operation of any applicable exclusion to receiving benefits.”2 This is
dependent on what is set out in the policy and the regular payments of premiums by the
employer to the insurer.
The typical structure of LTD policies allows 24 months of benefit payments where the
employee is unable to perform the essential duties of his or her own job—this is referred
to as “own occupation” disability because the employee is considered disabled in his or her
own job.3 After these 24 months, most policies shift to require that the employee be
disabled for any occupation “for which he is reasonably suited by reason of his education,
training, and experience,” which is referred to as “any occupation” disability. 4 In other
words, after two years of LTD benefits, the employee must demonstrate total disability to
continue receiving benefits. There is no universal test for total disability, but the general
idea is that the employee “can take on only trivial or inconsequential work, or work for
which he is over-qualified, or work for which he is completely unsuited by background.”5
The employee bears the onus of proof to establish the requirements for LTD. Proof must
cover: “(i) the date disability started; (ii) the cause of disability; and (iii) how serious the
disability is.”6 The proof is usually medical evidence from a medical practitioner.
However, “[f]or the most part, long-term disability policies do not require proof of
disability by way of objective medical evidence (i.e., x-ray films, CT scans, etc.). Having
said that, it is easier for the [insurer] to dispute the existence of a disability if there is no
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objective evidence to prove that the [employee] is disabled.”7 Where the employee is
credible and the medical evidence is supportive, then a claim for LTD benefits is more
likely to be successful.8 Medical evidence can be provided by a medical professional who
is accredited by the relevant organization—the family physician is frequently called upon,
but specialists for the particular disability may also provide evidence. Insurers may try to
weaken these claims with surveillance evidence and conflicting medical evidence.
Claims for LTD benefits differ depending on whether the workplace is unionized or nonunionized. Where the workplace is unionized, claims for LTD benefits are conducted in
accordance with the collective agreement and are usually limited to internal processes,
primarily grievance arbitrations.9 Whether a grievance goes forward depends on the union,
not the individual employee. In non-unionized workplaces, the employee can launch a
complaint with the relevant human rights commission or seek recourse at court, but does
so without support from a union or employer.10 Courts do not have jurisdiction in matters
arising out of a collective agreement.11 Additionally, in Ontario, arbitrators have
jurisdiction to apply the Human Rights Code to assess discrimination claims.12 Thus,
unionized employees can only claim or appeal denials of claims through the collective
agreement and grievances. In non-unionized workplaces, the employee can pursue an
action in court against the insurer.13
It may be more beneficial for the employee to resolve an LTD claim prior to engaging in
litigation. Disability management in the workplace attempts “minimizing the impact of
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impairment on the individual’s capacity to participate competitively in the work
environment, and maximizing the health of the employees to prevent disability, or further
deterioration when a disability exists.”14 Disability management can be used to prevent the
employee going on LTD leave and help the employee return to work more successfully. It
may also be used to guide employees through the processes for short and long-term
disability leaves. However, for complex disabilities like chronic pain disorders, disability
management may fall short of its goals. Instead, persons with chronic pain disorders may
quickly ascend the levels of the disability management program to be in the most
scrutinized and serious level of disability on account of their frequent absenteeism and
fluctuating symptoms, making them closest to termination.
This was the case in Honda Canada Inc v Keays (Honda Canada), in which an employee
with CFS returned to work after his LTD benefits were denied by the insurer and was
placed in the Honda Disability Program.15 This program “permits disabled employees to
take absences without the invocation of Honda’s attendance policy by confirming that the
absence from work is related to the disability.”16 The allowance of absences was intended
to be an accommodation; however, Honda also required that the employee get a doctor’s
note validating each absence, which employees with more well-understood and established
disabilities did not have to do.17 When these doctor’s notes were scrutinized, Honda then
requested that the employee meet with other medical specialists to understand his condition
with the threat of termination if he did not comply. 18 It is apparent that the nature of his
disability caused a quick progression through the disability management program wherein
termination was the inevitable outcome. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) did not
engage in any discourse regarding the discrimination demonstrated in the differential
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treatment of this employee in the disability management program compared to persons with
more “mainstream” disabilities.
Chronic pain disorders present other problems, as well, in terms of LTD. First, there is the
problem of medical proof of the disability. The employee must first provide medical
evidence, then the insurer or employer “must prove on a balance of probabilities that the
disability has ceased or decreased such that it no longer constitutes a disability.” 19 The
employer and insurer often argue that the medical evidence does not support the claim
because it is based on a subjective report of the symptoms.20 Whether the subjective
evidence is accepted seems to hinge on the credibility of the employee and possibly the
credibility of witnesses who corroborate the day-to-day living conditions and ability to
work.21 Although the subjective nature of the medical evidence is still discussed, arbitrators
in particular have found it sufficient to prove disability where the claimant is credible.22
Courts have also shown a willingness to accept subjective evidence for disabilities that
cannot be proved objectively, but this is rare.23
A second issue in LTD claims for persons with chronic pain disorders is the time limit
typically imposed. LTD benefits are usually only permitted for two years, then the
employee must prove that he or she is totally disabled for any occupation. However, due
to the fluctuating and chronic symptoms and lack of consensus in the medical field with
regard to diagnosis and treatment, persons with chronic pain disorders may not be able to
prove total disability. Additionally, they may struggle to prove an ability to return to work
in the reasonably foreseeable future for the same reasons. Although some studies suggest
that the “course of FM after onset indicate that the signs and symptoms usually stabilize
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within the first year of the syndrome and remain largely unchanged over time,”24 the
unpredictable and fluctuating impairment hinders individuals’ control over the
symptoms.25 As such, the time limits for disability benefits can be problematic. In
Sketchley v Canada (Attorney General), while the employee was on leave without pay, the
disability insurer declined to extend the leave beyond two years, whereupon she felt that
she was forced to apply for medical retirement.26 The employee claimed that she had only
wanted to extend the leave for one more year, in light of some evidence from her doctor
that indicated that she would know whether she could return to work by that time.27 By
adhering to firm time limits for LTD leave and benefits, persons with chronic pain disorders
may be prematurely excluded from the workplace and benefits with regards to their
symptoms. Instead, persons with chronic pain disorders may be forced to return to the
workplace too soon or medically retire unnecessarily. This is, of course, differential
treatment on the basis of disability, which is discriminatory. Considering just how common
LTD leave is for persons with chronic pain disorders, resolving some of these issues with
the limited time periods and medical proof is essential.

5.1.1.2

Disputing denial of LTD benefits by insurers

Persons insured under disability insurance contracts can pursue an action for breach of
contract against the insurer for damages28 as well as punitive and aggravated damages
when LTD benefits are denied by the insurer under the group disability insurance contract
through their workplace. Aggravated damages are those given for mental distress arising
out of a breach of contract, based on the parties’ expectations of peace of mind.29 Where
the disability insurer unfairly denies benefits, then aggravated damages may be awarded
for the insured’s mental distress in the face of financial pressure, loss of work, and
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exacerbation of the disability.30 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are not meant to
compensate the wronged party. Instead, punitive damages are only awarded in exceptional
cases to address the goals of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation, where the insurer
has acted in bad faith.31 To seek punitive and aggravated damages, the insurer must have
acted wrongfully in some way by causing mental distress or in bad faith.
In order to succeed in this action, the insured person must first prove that he or she had a
disability that satisfied the requirements of the insurance LTD contract to provide
entitlement to benefits. Persons with chronic pain disorders tend to have difficulty at the
two-year mark, when most LTD contracts change from requiring total disability for “own”
occupation to “any” occupation. It is also common for insurers to depend on surveillance
evidence to deny chronic pain disorders, despite the fact that they are invisible disabilities
and prone to fluctuation of symptoms, meaning that persons with these disabilities could
look completely fine at any time.32 As such, surveillance evidence is irrelevant to proof of
total disability or ability to work. Insurers also deny claims for LTD by persons with
chronic pain disorders because of the lack of objective medical evidence, but some courts
do not accept this as a basis for denial.33
If the insured person is able to prove entitlement to the benefits, then the insurer must pay
them out. The insured can also claim aggravated and punitive damages for the way that the
insurer denied entitlement. In Fidler v Sun Life Assurance Co of Canada [Fidler], the
insurer denied the insured LTD benefits for more than five years for her CFS and FM. 34
Fidler is the key case for aggravated damages in actions for breach of contract against
insurers. Generally, damages for mental distress from a breach of contract are barred,
except where the contract is a “peace of mind” contract: insurance contracts are accepted
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as such.35 The test for aggravated damages requires satisfaction of two steps: “(1) that an
object of the contract was to secure a psychological benefit that brings mental distress upon
breach within the reasonable contemplation of the parties; and (2) that the degree of mental
suffering caused by the breach was of a degree sufficient to warrant compensation.”36 The
loss arises from the breach itself, so there is no requirement for an independent actionable
wrong.37 The SCC awarded aggravated damages in Fidler because of the psychological
consequences of the insurer’s breach.38
Punitive damages, on the other hand, require an independent actionable wrong because it
is given in recognition of conduct that goes beyond what was within contemplation of the
contracting parties. The SCC did not award punitive damages in Fidler because the
insured’s conduct was not exceptionally malicious and “an insurer will not necessarily be
in breach of the duty of good faith by incorrectly denying a claim that is eventually
conceded, or judicially determined, to be legitimate.”39 The insurer has the right to
investigate a claim. Where persons with disabilities pursue punitive damages against the
LTD insurer, usually the independent actionable wrong is breach of the duty of good faith.
This duty requires the insurer “to act promptly and fairly when investigating, assessing and
attempting to resolve claims made by its insureds.”40 The key case for punitive damages
in Canada is Whiten v Pilot Insurance Co, in which the insurer denied a claim for fire
damage at the insured’s house by alleging arson, contrary to all proof and expert opinions
in a hostile and confrontational manner, to force settlement for less than what it was
worth.41 Punitive damages are only awarded in exceptional cases for “malicious,
oppressive and high-handed” misconduct that “offends the court’s sense of decency”42
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where other penalties are “inadequate to accomplish the objectives of retribution,
deterrence, and denunciation.”43 Additionally, the “financial or other vulnerability of the
plaintiff, and the consequent abuse of power by the defendant, is highly relevant where
there is a power imbalance.”44
Despite this consideration of other vulnerability, there was very little discussion of the
vulnerability associated with chronic pain disorders—greater scrutiny, negative attitudes
from co-workers, and fluctuation of symptoms. The lack of objective medical evidence
was considered and, in many cases, the courts recognized that chronic pain disorders often
cannot produce objective proof and that this should not be a barrier to claims.45 However,
this lack of objective proof was used to justify the scrutiny that led to the denial of
benefits—the insurer had reason to doubt the claim.46 Generally, punitive damages are
awarded far more rarely. This is due in part to the fact that punitive damages require more
exceptional circumstances, but may also be related to the fact that courts justify insurer’s
conduct because of the inconclusive nature of chronic pain disorders.47 Aggravated
damages, on the other hand, are much more readily awarded. Courts seem willing to
recognize the vulnerabilities of chronic pain disorders when considering aggravated
damages as stress seem to be relatively easily accepted as proof of mental distress to justify
aggravated damages.48 Having said that, Fidler, despite revolving around chronic pain
disorders, did not significantly address the issues particular to these disabilities.

5.1.2

Workers’ compensation

Workers’ compensation are provincially administrated programs that seek to protect
employees “from the financial hardships associated with work-related injuries and
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occupational disease.”49 As such, only injuries “arising out of and in the course of
employment” are compensable under workers’ compensation.50 Although each province
has its own legislation, only Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia are examined as
representative of the general process and the specific problems in pursuing workers’
compensation for chronic pain disorders because the majority of the decisions are found in
these provinces. Most employees are able to make a claim for worker’s compensation, but
must start the process as soon as possible after the occurrence, or, in the case of an
occupational disease, after the employee discovers that he or she suffers from the disease.51
By pursuing benefits under workers’ compensation, the employee is waiving the right to
other actions against the employer because these benefits are in lieu of that right. 52 The
benefits that an employee may receive from workers’ compensation include loss of
earnings, loss of retirement income, and non-economic loss for permanent impairment.53
Employees who try to claim workers’ compensation for chronic pain disorders seem to
encounter three problems revolving around proof: (1) the time delay in claiming for the
chronic pain disorder; (2) proving the degree of disability to require compensation; and (3)
proving causation or material contribution of the compensable injury to the development
of the chronic pain disorder. The first problem occurs when there is a delay or difficulty
diagnosing the chronic pain disorder after it has developed—this can be a process over
several years. It can impact the claim by detracting from the directness of causation.54 The
more time between the compensable injury and the chronic pain disorder claim, the more
likely that other factors have arisen in the meantime to reduce the contribution of the initial
injury.55 The second problem revolves around insufficient or conflicting medical evidence,
which is a common obstacle for chronic pain disorders.
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The third problem can be a significant hindrance to workers’ compensation claims for
chronic pain disorders. With regards to these kinds of disabilities, “in order to establish
entitlement, it is not necessary to show that the workplace injury was the sole contributing
factor, or even the predominant contributor. The workplace injury need only be a cause of
the disability, providing that it makes more than a de minimus contribution.”56 Having said
that, there is a “well-established general rule against ‘stacking’ entitlement for [chronic
pain disorders] with other impairments;” only where the chronic pain disorder is a separate
and distinct component of the disability can it constitute a separate entitlement.57 When
proving that the compensable injury caused or contributed to the chronic pain disorder,
workers’ compensation boards sometimes decline to award benefits because the medical
information is deemed insufficient to prove the causal link58 or the chronic pain disorder is
attributed to factors outside of work.59 Where the worker has a positive work history prior
to the accident,60 no pre-existing condition,61 and a “preponderance of medical opinion” in
support of the causality,62 then the claim for the material contribution of the injury to the
development of the chronic pain disorder is stronger.
In Ontario, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board adheres to various operational
policies in making decisions, including the Chronic Pain Disability Operational Policy,
which sets out five eligibility criteria:
1. A work-related injury occurred.
2. Chronic pain is caused by the injury.
3. The pain persists 6 or more months beyond the usual healing time of the
injury.
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4. The degree of pain is inconsistent with organic findings.
5. The chronic pain impairs earning capacity.63
Proof of these criteria can be subjective or objective. Both CFS and FM fall under the
description of chronic pain disability,64 thus enabling a more flexible approach to
establishing causation of the chronic pain disability. MCS does not fall under this policy.
Employees who claim workers’ compensation for MCS seem to be less successful in
proving causation because the Board finds medical information insufficient and debates
what kind of disability it is (psychological, toxicity, or gastro-intestinal).65 Despite the fact
that both Alberta and British Columbia also have policies dealing with chronic pain claims
in a similar manner,66 neither of the Boards refer to these policies and both are less willing
to accept medical evidence that supports a causal claim. Instead, the Alberta and British
Columbia Boards find that the information is insufficient or the disability is due to outside
and unrelated conditions.67
Workers’ compensation is an option that persons with chronic pain disorders can pursue if
an injury at work contributed to the development of the chronic pain disorder. The Ontario
Board shows a greater willingness to recognize the contribution of the compensable injury
and to accept the medical evidence. However, this is only the case for FM and CFS, not
MCS. Thus, not all workers’ compensation boards across Canada deal with chronic pain
disorders in the same way, nor are all chronic pain disorders treated the same. Additionally,
a workers’ compensation claim can only result in money; the Boards do not have authority
to order accommodation or reinstatement. However, employees can claim workers’
compensation as well as pursuing other options like LTD benefits and accommodation
through other processes

63

Ontario, The Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, Document 15-04-03 Chronic Pain Disability
Operational Policy (Toronto, 15 February 2013) at 1-2 [Chronic Pain Policy].
64
Ibid at 2 & 7.
65
Decision No 2485/10, 2013 ONWSIAT 2628 at paras 13 & 16 [Decision No 2485/10]; also see Decision
No 2013-00753, 2013 CanLii 36991 (BC WCAT) at para 26 for similar problems at the BC Board.
66
Alberta, Workers’ Compensation Board, Policy 03-02 Part II: Application 7: Chronic Pain/Chronic Pain
Syndrome (Edmonton, 26 November 1996); British Columbia, Workers’ Compensation Board, Practice
Directive #C3-1 (Vancouver, 1 January 2003).
67
Decision No 2006-1244, supra note 59 at para 38; Decision No 2009-173, supra note 54 at para 13;
Decision No WCAT-2012-02257, 2012 CanLii 54375 (BC WCAT) at para 58 [Decision No WCAT-201202257].

121

5.2

Options after dismissal

After the employee is dismissed, accommodation is no longer an option, nor are LTD
benefits. The employee may be able to pursue workers’ compensation if the initial
compensable injury occurred while employed. After dismissal, the employee may instead
seek damages for the termination by pursuing a claim at the relevant human rights
commission or through common law litigation. An employee can make a complaint at the
human rights commission before dismissal, but it is more commonly done after dismissal.

5.2.1

Human rights claims

Where “a person believes that any of his or her rights under [the Ontario Human Rights
Code] have been infringed, the person may apply to the Tribunal for an order” for
compensation, restitution, or any other appropriate remedy.68 Persons with chronic pain
disorders who have been dismissed because of their disability (or suspect that is the case)
may file a complaint of discrimination or harassment in employment. 69 Human rights
commissions and tribunals have the authority “to determine all questions of fact or law that
arise in any application before it.”70 Having said that, where the workplace is unionized, a
human rights complaint by a former employee may be dismissed because it should be dealt
with under the collective agreement given that arbitrators can apply human rights
legislation71 and have exclusive jurisdiction over matters arising from the collective
agreement.72 The complaint may progress “where the employee also alleges that the union
has acted discriminatorily.”73 Claims under human rights codes can result in reinstatement
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to the position with compensation for lost wages and benefits under arbitrators or human
rights tribunals and commissions.74 The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal has discretion to
make an “order directing any party to the application to do anything that, in the opinion of
the Tribunal, the party ought to do to promote compliance with this Act.”75
With regards to chronic pain disorders, the most common complaint is discrimination in
employment based on disability either by failing to accommodate or termination because
of disability. Harassment does not seem to be commonly claimed, despite the likelihood
that harassment has occurred, given the frequently reported resentment from co-workers
and supervisors.76 In order to successfully prove discrimination, the individual with a
chronic pain disorder must “establish on a balance of probabilities, a link between a
respondent’s alleged actions and a prohibited ground of discrimination under [human rights
legislation].”77 The complainant must convince the Tribunal that there was prima facie
discrimination by the employer.78 In order to establish prima facie discrimination, the
individual must establish (1) the existence of a disability that the employer knew or ought
to have known; (2) some adverse effect on employment; and (3) that the disability was a
factor in the adverse treatment.79
Persons with chronic pain disorders encounter evidentiary problems from employers and
at human rights tribunals. Some employers refuse to accept medical evidence, even where
it is reasonable and consistent and in response to the employer’s own request for more
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information.80 The medical evidence may not definitively prove disability, either due to
the subjective nature of chronic pain disorders81 or because of an employee’s unwillingness
to cooperate.82 The employer points to this lack of cooperation as a reason for its failure to
accommodate, which is sometimes accepted by tribunals and courts during judicial review
of the lower decision.83 Employees are usually considered blameworthy when they do not
cooperate with the employer’s (1) requests for more medical information,84 and (2)
attempts developing or providing accommodation.85
Tribunals also grapple with the problem of proof. The medical evidence may fail to meet
the evidential threshold to prove a disability, which is required to prove discrimination
against a disability.86 Employees encounter difficulties at tribunals proving the existence
of a chronic pain disorder because of the nature of the disability; however, courts and
tribunals are improving at recognizing the subjective nature of chronic pain disorders and
its accompanying evidentiary problems, albeit inconsistently.87 Despite these obstacles,
employees do succeed in proving discrimination.88 On the whole, however, human rights
tribunals fall short of the analysis required by failing to engage in the unique challenges of
chronic pain disorders with limited reasoning.
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5.2.2

Common law litigation: wrongful dismissal

The whole ambit of common law causes of action may be open to the individual with a
chronic pain disorder, depending on the situation. However, the usual action pursued by
employees with chronic pain disorders is wrongful dismissal against the employer.
Employees who feel that they have been wrongfully dismissed or dismissed without cause
have several options. They can pursue wrongful dismissal as a common law cause of action
or they can complain to the Ministry of Labour by writing to an inspector as per Part III of
the Canada Labour Code (CLC)89 for federal employees and under the relevant provincial
legislation for provincial employees.90 Neither of these options are available for unionized
employees, who are limited to acting under the collective agreement. To be unjust or
wrongful, the employer must have ended the employment relationship without reasonable
notice, pay in lieu of notice, or cause. Under the CLC, the inspector will first try to help
settle the complaint and then, if unsuccessful, the inspector will prepare a report that may
be referred to an adjudicator.91 The Ontario Employment Standards Act provides a similar
process wherein the complainant must file a complaint and it will be investigated by an
employment standard officer who may attempt to settle.92 In both federal and provincial
complaints, the decision maker has the power to pay compensation, reinstate the person to
the position, or do any other thing to “remedy or counteract any consequence of the
dismissal.”93
A complaint under labour statutes is likely less expensive compared to the common law
cause of action; additionally, the common law civil action generally cannot result in
specific performance of the employment contract, thus the court cannot return the
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employee to the position.94 However, the employee cannot pursue both the common law
cause of action and the statutory one.95 In order to begin a civil action for wrongful
dismissal, the employee must follow the rules of civil procedure and issue an originating
document.96 Generally, wrongful dismissal claims are settled informally by counsel or
through the mediation process.97 Remedies for a wrongful dismissal civil action are
typically meant to compensate the employee as if he or she had been employed. 98 With
regards to chronic pain disorders, the remedies that are sought include compensation and
aggravated and punitive damages for the method of dismissal. Compensation includes all
the entitlements they would have received if they had continued to work during the notice
period including “bonuses, fringe benefits, medical and dental benefits, life insurance
and…disability insurance.”99 Punitive damages can be awarded where acts of
discrimination in breach of human rights legislation constitute a separate actionable wrong
in a wrongful dismissal case.100 It seems wrongful dismissal complaints under a labour
statute include human rights considerations more than those claimed in courts perhaps
because the arbitrator or investigator assigned has more contact with the complainant, more
access to evidence and the facts, and more flexibility in considering human rights. 101
With regards to chronic pain disorders, there is one key case that must be mentioned for
wrongful dismissal: Honda Canada.102 This is the most recent SCC decision dealing with
wrongful dismissal and disability and it is the only one dealing with wrongful dismissal of
an individual with a chronic pain disorder. Keays was a long-term employee of Honda with
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CFS. He was on disability leave from October 1996 to December 1998 when he was
required to return following the insurance company’s finding that he could return to work,
contrary to his own physician’s findings.103 He began to struggle with work absences and
so was coached in the first step of Honda’s progressive discipline process, then placed in
Honda’s special program for employees with disabilities as an accommodation for his
disability.104 In this program, Keays was required to validate each absence with a doctor’s
note before returning to work, which was not required for more “mainstream” disabilities
and served to prolong the absences.105 He met with Honda’s medical staff but it was a
negative meeting and so he retained legal counsel. Honda then requested that Keays meet
with an occupational medicine specialist because it did not accept the legitimacy of his
absences.106 When Keays requested clarification as to the purpose of this meeting, Honda
responded that he either meet with the specialist or be fired. Ultimately, he was terminated
for insubordination in failing to meet with the doctor. He discovered that he was fired when
a co-worker phoned him after Honda announced that he had been dismissed. Keays began
an civil action for wrongful dismissal.
At the Ontario Superior Court, Justice McIsaac awarded the unprecedented amount of
$500,000 in punitive damages after a twenty-nine-day trial because he was “not satisfied
that the maximum penalty under the OHRC, $10,000, comes even close to an appropriate
deterrence and denunciation of the outrageous and high-handed conduct of this
defendant.”107 Justice McIsaac delivered a passionate and condemning set of reasons for
this decision, which also included a 15 months’ notice award. The awards were justified
because of the differential discrimination with regards to Keays’ treatment and persons
with “mainstream” disabilities, “stone-walling” from Honda which aggravated his
symptoms, the insensitive manner of his termination that also worsened his condition, and
retaliation for Keays’ retaining legal counsel by dismissal.108 Justice McIsaac did not allow
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the claim for intentional infliction of nervous shock because it was redundant with the
Wallace damages that were awarded for bad faith conduct in dismissal.109 The tort of
discrimination claim was also dismissed because the Court did not have jurisdiction to
create this tort, when it had been denied by the SCC.110 Punitive damages were awarded
because Justice McIssac had “no difficulty in finding that the plaintiff has proved that
Honda committed a litany of acts of discrimination and harassment in relation to his
attempts to resolve his accommodation difficulties. When he began to push them on his
concerns by having his lawyer attempt to advocate for him, they imposed the most drastic
form of harassment possible: they terminated him.”111
Honda appealed this decision as well as alleging bias on the part of the trial judge. 112 The
majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part to reduce the punitive
damages to $100,000 because although Honda’s conduct “was sufficiently outrageous to
warrant an award of punitive damages,” the quantum was not proportionate to punitive
damage awards in other dismissal cases.113 The Ontario Court of Appeal also dismissed the
trial judge’s findings of a corporate conspiracy due to lack of evidence. 114 The dissent,
written by Justice Goudge, would have dismissed the appeal. Justice Goudge justified the
punitive damages because they did not flow from a breach of human rights legislation,
which was barred in Seneca College of Arts and Technology v Bhadauria [Bhadauria], but
rather the discriminatory conduct amounted to an independent actionable wrong:115
[I]n the context of punitive damages, the appellant’s conduct is not
advanced to support a cause of action for breach of the respondent’s human
rights, but as an independent wrong actionable by way of wrongful
dismissal. What matters is that the appellant’s acts of discrimination and
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harassment triggered the respondent’s termination. In fact, the trial judge
found that the appellant’s course of discriminatory conduct culminated in
the most dramatic form of employment harassment, namely the
respondent’s termination. This would give rise to a cause of action for
wrongful dismissal apart altogether from any question of the respondent’s
disobedience. It is in this context that the trial judge found the appellant’s
discriminatory conduct to constitute an independent actionable wrong.116
Justice Goudge deliberately avoided applying human rights legislation because of
Bhadauria. Accommodation and freedom from discrimination for persons with disabilities
are required by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter)117 and by human
rights legislation in each province.118 Yet, these decisions show the court’s confusion with
regards to the incorporation of human rights in other areas of the law, here, employment
and contract law.
The SCC allowed the appeal in part to set aside the Wallace damages and the punitive
damages entirely, leaving only the regular damages award for 15 months’ notice.119 The
recitation of facts was significantly smaller in the SCC decision at only 4 paragraphs with
much less of a focus on the discriminatory conduct of Honda that garnered attention in the
lower court decisions. Instead, the SCC found that “[t]here was no detriment in being part
of the disability program and being treated differently from persons with ‘mainstream
illnesses.’ The differential treatment was meant to accommodate the particular
circumstances of persons with a particular type of disability and to provide a benefit to
them.”120 Although this may have been true initially, the facts provided in the lower courts
indicate that Honda continued to apply this differential treatment even when it was evident
that it was not helpful at all, but actually harmful—meaning that Honda failed to
appropriately accommodate Keays.121 Instead it was adverse effect discrimination: the
standard was not discriminatory on its own but the application resulted in differential
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treatment. Additionally, Honda’s scepticism in regards to Keays’ condition was
discriminatory given both its prior acceptance of the disability and the medical evidence of
his physician that was consistent with no grounds for suspicion. The dissent in the SCC
decision recognized that Honda “acted in a discriminatory manner in subjecting him to the
kind of scrutiny he underwent and, in fact denying him accommodation for his disability.122
However, the SCC went on to preclude any civil remedies for breach of human rights
legislation by requiring that the complainant must seek a remedy as set out in the relevant
human rights scheme,123 which was set out in Bhadauria. However, in denying evidence
of human rights violations to serve as an independent actionable wrong for the purposes of
punitive damages, the Court went beyond Bhadauria. In so doing, the SCC has essentially
forced an ultimatum on employees with disabilities who have been wrongfully dismissed:
they can complain to human rights tribunals of discrimination or they can pursue a
monetary award in an action for wrongful dismissal. As the case progressed, the courts
considered human rights less and demonstrated less concern about the discriminatory
treatment by Honda and less understanding of the disability experienced by Keays—CFS.
Courts cannot hear civil actions based on breach of human rights legislation alone; this is
barred by Bhadauria. Although the OHRC grants jurisdiction to hear human rights claims
when they are attached to an independent cause of action, there is limited consideration of
human rights aspects in wrongful dismissal actions: “[o]nly a handful of wrongful
dismissal judgments issued by the common law courts over the past decade involving a
disability case have even considered the duty to accommodate, and none have applied the
duty in any systematic or consistent fashion.”124 Furthermore, given that human rights
tribunals can determine any question of law or fact before it and can order anything that
will promote compliance with the act, the tribunals have a distinct advantage. Common
law actions of wrongful dismissal demonstrate a lack of consideration of human rights
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concerns for all persons with disabilities. However, for persons with chronic pain disorders,
this may be particularly problematic because they are considered less legitimate and, as
such, blatant discrimination as seen in Honda Canada Inc v Keays is less likely to be
recognized by courts as discriminatory than for other “mainstream disabilities.”125 Without
more consideration of human rights in wrongful dismissal cases for disabilities generally,
this disability hierarchy with respect to legitimacy is maintained with ramifications
demonstrated in other areas of the law.

5.3

Chronic pain disorders in the caselaw

There are several options available for persons with chronic pain disorders; however, only
accommodation can enable individuals to continue to work. Persons with chronic pain
disorders encounter some of the same obstacles to access accommodation across this range
of options: lack of objective medical evidence and dependence on subjective self-reporting;
scrutiny owing to the fluctuation of symptoms and questions of etiology; and, confusing
the medical and legal definitions of disability to deny access to benefits. These issues result
in a hierarchy of disabilities wherein chronic pain disorders fall lower and are thus
considered less legitimate.126 As such, persons with chronic pain disorders can be subject
to differential treatment and potentially discrimination on the basis of their particular
disability, which is clearly unacceptable under human rights principles in Canada. Yet,
only some courts, tribunals, and arbitrators are cognizant of this potential whereas others
are not. Decisions dealing with chronic pain disorders seem to fall into three different
categories: (A) the traditional approach, (B) the human rights approach, and (C) the hybrid
approach. The majority of caselaw falls into the hybrid approach, which is the middle
ground wherein, despite stated human rights objectives by courts and tribunals, there is
instead inconsistent and inadequate application of these human rights principles.
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5.3.1

The traditional approach

The traditional approach, as the name suggests, is the more conventional perspective
wherein a disability can only be proven with objective evidence and a clear medical cause.
This approach is not flexible and, as such, is now outdated with the imposition of human
rights principles that require the duty of accommodation and freedom from discrimination.
It is most evident in the earliest cases dealing with chronic pain disorders. These early cases
often refused to accept subjective medical evidence and the imprecise cause of chronic pain
disorders, which was even more of a problem in the early 1990s because of the complete
lack of medical research regarding chronic pain disorders at that point. Instead, courts were
sceptical and disbelieving as well as dismissive.127 In many early cases, chronic pain
disorders were not accepted as disabilities, either because the credibility of the individual
was destroyed by surveillance evidence128 (which is inherently limited for invisible
disabilities) or because the courts made findings regarding the medical etiology that barred
recovery.129
When reading these earlier cases, the blatant discrimination and dismissive attitude of the
courts is shocking and obviously inappropriate. However, these cases took place in the
early days of accommodation, before the current approach to accommodation was set out
by the SCC in 1999 in British Columbia (Public Service Employees Relations Commission)
v BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance) (Meiorin).130 This does not excuse this attitude, but it can
help to explain it. Unfortunately, echoes of this dismissive and discriminatory attitude still
exists today. For example, the traditional approach is also evident in the US and EU
wherein persons with chronic pain disorders cannot qualify as disabled in order to access
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rights and benefits often due to the lack of objective evidence and fluctuating symptoms,
all of which detract from the credibility of the claim.
Canada is not exempt from the traditional approach either. Canada, with the recognition of
accommodation and disability rights in human rights legislation and the Charter, should
have progressed from this traditional approach, but this is not always the case. Workers’
compensation is one example of the current use of the traditional approach. Here, only the
workers’ compensation schemes in Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia are examined
because of the caselaw available. Even with this limited analysis, it is evident that not all
workers’ compensation schemes are equal. In Alberta and British Columbia, the workers’
compensation boards demonstrated a traditional approach wherein the boards did not
accept subjective evidence, found there was insufficient information to make a decision,
rejected the claim that the compensable injury caused the chronic pain disorder, and
questioned the degree of disability.131 The Ontario Board used the same approach in
dealing with claims of MCS.132
There are of course arguments that could be made regarding the fact that workers’
compensation is a compensatory scheme and that, in order to be considered a compensable
injury, strict requirements must be met. However, given the differential treatment both
among different boards and different chronic pain disorders, this argument must be
rejected. Obviously it is possible to compensate for chronic pain disorders despite the
obstacles of subjective evidence and indirect causation because the Ontario board does so
when dealing with CFS and FM. MCS may be more problematic because the initial
compensable injury can be more difficult to prove both in the sense that it was actually an
injury and that it caused the MCS. The compensable injury for CFS and FM is often one
single traumatic event in the form of a viral infection or physical injury. The policies and
definitions of disability are largely similar across the boards of Alberta, British Columbia,
and Ontario. Yet, chronic pain disorders are treated differently by the different boards.
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Thus, the adverse treatment by the Alberta and British Columbia boards is discriminatory
because it is neither necessary nor justified as demonstrated by the more flexible approach
demonstrated by the Ontario board.
Although the application of the traditional approach in workers’ compensation schemes is
problematic, the use of this approach in higher level caselaw is far more concerning. The
differential treatment evident at workers’ compensation boards can result in discrimination,
but the reasoning given rarely demonstrates a dismissive attitude. Rather, there is a sense
of frustration with the limited objective evidence and the strict evidential requirements to
obtain compensation. Although workers’ compensation boards often deny the claims in
ways that can result in discrimination, they do not necessarily do so in a discriminatory
fashion.
Unfortunately, we can ascertain remnants of the discriminatory attitudes of early caselaw
in current high level caselaw. One of the worst offenders is, of course, Honda Canada in
which the SCC failed to consider the accommodation duty and dismissed the claim for
what was obviously discrimination—the requirement of a doctor’s note to validate
absences for Keays’ “non-mainstream” disability when others did not have suffer this
requirement. Wrongful dismissal judgments by courts dealing with disability typically
decline to consider human rights principles such as the duty of accommodation.133 This
failing in Honda Canada is particularly problematic given that it is not only the most recent
wrongful dismissal case dealing with disability from the SCC, but also one of the most
recent SCC cases dealing with disability. Here, the highest level of court in Canada denied
that there was discrimination, when it was undoubtedly there, at a time when the nuances
and importance of human rights principles, in particular the duty of accommodation, has
been made clear by the same court nine years earlier, starting with Meiorin. Honda Canada
may actually be a sign of progress in the wrong direction: stepping back from the inclusive
vision set out in Meiorin to limit the effect of accommodation and human rights principles.
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Perhaps this limiting attempt is merely with regards to “non-mainstream” disabilities such
as chronic pain disorders or perhaps there will be ramifications for disabilities generally.
Another significant case is Brewer v Fraser Milner Casgrain LPP (Brewer), in particular
the decisions by the Alberta Human Rights Commission and the Alberta Court of Appeal,
both of which doubted her disability because the doctor did not definitively diagnose her
with

MCS—despite

reporting

impairment

and

making

recommendations

for

impairment.134 These decisions demonstrate a complete lack of consideration of human
rights principles that results in the courts failing to identify discrimination and to justify
discrimination because of the basis of the disability. Thus, the courts in Brewer and Honda
Canada are not merely allowing discrimination but participating in it by applying
differential treatment because of the disability. This means that the traditional approach is
outdated and discriminatory, according to our current understanding of human rights
principles. Having said that, the traditional approach seems to be far less common now,
aside from these few exceptions, perhaps because of the current emphasis on human rights
principles. Hopefully, these cases are not signs of regression in our approach to human
rights principles and are instead, merely remnants of the former approach. Having said that,
the current emphasis on human rights does not mean that the human rights approach is the
main method.

5.3.2

The human rights approach

The human rights approach is how the law is supposed to be: open, flexible, and inclusive
to balance the rights of all parties as much as possible, as long as sufficient medical
evidence is provided. This is not an approach that accepts all claims of disability at face
value but it is also not one that denies claims because of the inherent limitations of the
medical proof, namely the lack of objective evidence for chronic pain disorders. With a
few exceptions, it is almost exclusively arbitrations that demonstrate a human rights
approach, which is likely due to the expertise of the arbitrators and the frequency with
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which they deal with disabilities and chronic pain disorders.135 Arbitrators also have
relative freedom in their decision making, both in what to consider and which remedies to
order. Surprisingly, human rights tribunals do not demonstrate this human rights approach.
This is partially due to the fact that there are not that many tribunal decisions, which may
be because these cases are dealt with at the arbitration level or perhaps they are dropped
when the person becomes too disabled to continue with the claim. The tribunal decisions
that deal with these cases do not provide strong reasoning or much analysis of the facts or
issues, regardless of whether there is recognition of the unique challenges of chronic pain
disorders.136 Instead, most tribunal decisions seem to fall into the hybrid approach because
the tribunals claim to apply human rights principles but fail to do so consistently or fail to
engage with the issues by only providing limited reasoning.
There are three significant arbitration decisions dealing with chronic pain disorders. First,
in a 2010 Ontario labour arbitration, Re City of Toronto and CUPE, Local 79 (C08-058938), the arbitrator did not accept surveillance evidence as proof that the grievor was able
to work and instead found that the “fact that the grievor is able to engage in certain activities
of daily living is not evidence from which one may conclude that she is able to function in
employment.”137 This finding was particularly significant for the grievor’s CFS and FM
because of the invisible fluctuation of symptoms, meaning that surveillance was irrelevant
to proof of disability. Second, in Toronto District School Board v OSSTF, District 12 in
2011,138 Arbitrator Paula Knopf demonstrated a particularly nuanced and sensitive
understanding of the facts and the grievor’s MCS. Arbitrator Knopf understood the
evidential limitations of MCS and accepted the subjective medical evidence to allow the
grievance in part. It was only allowed in part because, although the employer did not satisfy
the duty of accommodation and was disrespectful, the grievor was not cooperative and it
was likely that accommodation would not have possible. The arbitrator was able to balance
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the rights and needs of both the employer and employee, while dealing with MCS, which
is arguably the most controversial and misunderstood of chronic pain disorders. Third, in
2014, in Re Joseph Brant Memorial Hospital and ONA, arbitrator Bendel set out rules to
determine what subjective evidence is acceptable.139 Acceptance of subjective evidence
hinges on credibility both of the witnesses that provide corroborating evidence and of the
individual with a chronic pain disorder. This decision was followed the next year in Re
Ontario (Treasury Board Secretariat) v AMAPCEO (Union)140 in which the tribunal also
accepted subjective evidence of a chronic pain disorder for a disability claim.
These are all Ontario arbitrations, which may be due to a higher volume of arbitrations
dealing with chronic pain disorders or perhaps a greater application of the human rights
approach by Ontario arbitrators. Additionally, these are all relatively recent decisions,
which suggests that there may currently be progress with regards to chronic pain disorders.
Most importantly, however, these decisions all deal with unionized workplaces. It has long
been recognized that unions typically enable better access to human rights and that seems
to be the case for chronic pain disorders. Having said that, these three factors—unions,
arbitrations, and Ontario—in no way guarantee a human rights approach because the
majority of LTD decisions applied the hybrid approach and failed to fully engage with the
issues. Only these few Ontario arbitrations demonstrate the ideal approach to dealing with
chronic pain disorders and can be considered proof that it is possible to accept chronic pain
disorders as disabilities. Both the traditional and hybrid approaches seem to anticipate fraud
and deception where there is no objective evidence. These arbitrators demonstrated how to
accept subjective evidence while reducing the potential for fraud by requiring credibility
and possibly corroboration where appropriate. However, given that these decisions only
occurred in arbitrations dealing with unionized workplaces in Ontario within the last six
years and have not been cited more than a few times each, the potential reach of these
decisions is markedly limited.
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Some lower court decisions have also demonstrated the human rights approach, but,
disturbingly, they have been overturned by higher courts. Arguably, the vehement decision
of Justice McIsaac of the Ontario Superior Court in Honda Canada recognized many of
the vulnerabilities of persons with chronic pain disorders and thus the discrimination in this
case, as well as the employer’s failure to satisfy the duty of accommodation. 141 However,
the SCC, despite upholding compensation for wrongful dismissal, refused to find
discrimination and reduced punitive damages to nothing. Although this may be due to the
trial judge’s controversial language, the failure to find discrimination is incomprehensible
at best because of the clearly discriminatory conduct by the employer as agreed upon in
the facts. Similarly, in Brewer, the Alberta Queen’s Bench demonstrated a nuanced
understanding of the employee’s MCS to distinguish between an impairment and
diagnosis, but the Alberta Court of Appeal overturned the decision with the traditional
approach to find that the employer’s denial of the disability without a definitive diagnosis
was not discriminatory.142 The fact that these decisions that demonstrate the human rights
approach were overturned is highly concerning. It can be taken as clear evidence that courts
not only fail to apply human rights principles adequately, but also actively work against
such an approach. Thus, this failing of courts is not out of confusion or misunderstanding,
but can only be a deliberate action. Presumably courts have acted in this way for the same
reasons that courts initially denied chronic pain disorders in the early 1990s: fear of abuse
and fraud.
Only one court decision that was not overturned employed the human rights approach:
Eddie v UNUM Life Insurance Co of America.143 Here the employee proved total disability
to receive benefits under an LTD policy with subjective evidence of FM. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s decision to accept the subjective
evidence because it was verified and supported by other witnesses and their credibility and
the employee’s credibility were not doubted.144 Furthermore, the court recognized “[i]f the
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insurer were correct that disability payments can only be triggered when a claimant is able
to pinpoint the precise cause of disability, then situations could arise in which a claimant
is clearly disabled by some kind of sickness, but is not eligible for benefits because the
exact nature of the sickness cannot be determined.”145 This case was decided in 1999,
which suggests that it is likely a fluke more than a sign of progress. Although the human
rights approach is what the law now requires, the majority of caselaw falls into the hybrid
approach.

5.3.3

The hybrid approach

The majority of caselaw seems to fall somewhere in the middle between the traditional and
human rights approaches. In this hybrid approach, courts and tribunals apply human rights
principles and recognize the unique challenges of chronic pain disorders but in an
inconsistent and undeveloped manner. Instead, the courts and tribunals provide lip service
to human rights principles while applying a watered down approach. Workers’
compensation in Ontario for CFS and FM demonstrate this hybrid approach because, by
adhering to the WSIB Chronic Pain Disability Operational Policy,146 the Board is able to
accept subjective evidence and causation where it is credible and proven that the workplace
injury made a significant contribution to the development of the chronic pain disorder,
respectively.147 Surrounding circumstances are also considered to support claims of
causation and injury. However, these decisions do not take a particularly nuanced approach
nor do they adequately consider human rights principles as they are hindered by problems
of unclear etiology and establishing the degree of disability.
Many LTD decisions fall into this middle ground, regardless of whether the claimant
receives benefits because the courts fail to engage with human rights considerations and to
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recognize the evidentiary issues inherent to chronic pain disorders.148 Instead, the courts
inconsistently recognize the vulnerabilities of chronic pain disorders. In order to assess
subjective medical evidence for proof of disability and proof of mental distress for general
and aggravated damages, the credibility of the claimant is key. However, the way in which
the credibility is considered suggests that there is an “ideal” plaintiff for LTD claims and
that many persons with chronic pain disorder do not fit it. This is obviously hugely
problematic, not merely in the practical sense that persons with chronic pain disorders
struggle more to obtain LTD, but also with regards to the clear discrimination against these
persons that this demonstrates. For example, in Lumsden v The Government of Manitoba,
the Alberta Queen’s Bench stated, “[a]dd to this the plaintiff’s problems in organizing his
thoughts and recollecting events, and a personality that was reportedly difficult at times,
one can understand why the plaintiff’s claim was the cause of concern and further
information was sought. This was especially so given the lack of clinical findings by
several of the specialists the plaintiff saw.”149 This describes a typical person with a chronic
pain disorder. In effect, this means that the behaviour of a typical individual with a chronic
pain disorder—due largely to symptoms of the disability—justifies discrimination in the
form of scrutiny. As such, we can see the lingering influence of the traditional approach,
wherein scrutiny and discrimination is validated because of fear of abuse and deception.
Persons with chronic pain disorders may be more successful in claims for LTD benefits if
they base their claim on more well-established disabilities, such as mental illness. If a
person with a chronic pain disorder claimed LTD benefits because of depression, then the
issues of medical evidence and fluctuating symptoms may be sidestepped entirely. Persons
with chronic pain disorders may fit better into the “ideal” plaintiff for mental illness claims
than for physical disabilities. Although this is helpful to know in practice, this is
unacceptable. Chronic pain disorders have been recognized as disabilities and, as such,
should be sufficient to make a claim for LTD benefits. The fact that chronic pain disorders
are not sufficient is discriminatory.

148

See e.g. Garriok, supra note 20; Gerber, supra note 19; Lumsden v The Government of Manitoba, 2007
MBQB 277 [Lumsden]; Fidler, supra note 4.
149
Lumsden, ibid at para 103.

140

Other court decisions also fall into this hybrid approach, notably Hydro-Québec v Syndicat
des employés-e-s de techniques professionnelles et de bureau d’Hydro Québec, section
local 2000 (SCFP-FTQ) (Hydro-Québec) and the dissents in Honda Canada. Justice
Goudge wrote the dissent for the Ontario Court of Appeal in Honda Canada.150 Although
he did not assess the accommodation duty, Justice Goudge recognized the employer’s
conduct as discriminatory and found that it gave rise to an independent cause of action in
support of punitive damages. Thus, he recognized some of the vulnerabilities of the
employee with CFS as well as allowing a breach of the OHRC (the discrimination) to
support a claim for punitive damages. In doing so, he applied human rights principles
against discrimination with limitations from Bhaduaria, but failed to assess
accommodation. The dissent at the SCC was written by Justices LeBel and Fish, who
similarly recognized the discrimination in this case as well as the denial of accommodation
by the employer.151 However, neither of these dissents applied a comprehensive human
rights analysis by avoiding assessing accommodation and thus they fall into the hybrid
approach for this deficiency.
Similarly, in Hydro-Québec, the SCC engaged with some aspects of accommodation and
human rights but ultimately failed to provide meaningful reasoning or precedents for
subsequent cases. Furthermore, both Honda Canada and Hydro-Québec failed to address
the unique challenges of accommodating complex disabilities—chronic pain disorders and
mental illness. Given that these are the only two recent SCC decisions that deal with “nonmainstream” disabilities in the workplace, this is a disappointing shortcoming that
demonstrates a failing of the SCC to properly consider human rights principles. Again, the
SCC reneged on the inclusive vision it set out in Meiorin to ultimately limit and narrow the
accommodation duty and human rights principles.
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5.3.4

Is this progress or have we stalled?

Despite the fact that caselaw in the hybrid approach marks progress from the traditional
approach that does not mean that it is adequate. It is undoubtedly inadequate because it
fails to amount to what is set out by human rights principles: open, flexible, and adaptable
application of the law to recognize and support people’s diverse capabilities and needs.
Instead, indirect forms of discrimination are evident from employers, insurers, and, most
problematically, courts. Having said that, there is the small hope that the human rights
approach seen in recent arbitrations will influence other caselaw to shift the proportion of
caselaw in the hybrid approach to the human rights approach. Clearly there are hindrances
to the acceptance of chronic pain disorders as legitimate disabilities—lack of objective
evidence and fluctuation of symptoms—but a flexible and adaptive approach will
undoubtedly provide more access for persons with chronic pain disorders to their human
rights. Regardless of whether persons with chronic pain disorders do receive
accommodation, respect and consideration by courts and tribunals is required by human
rights principles and the duty of accommodation. Unfortunately, there are more indications
that courts are moving in the opposite direction to limit the effects of human rights
principles out of fear of abuse and deception. Instead, scrutiny and discrimination are
accepted as legitimate because of the nature of chronic pain disorders. Obviously, this
results in differential treatment of persons with chronic pain disorders merely because of
the limitations of medical evidence. Thus, a hierarchy of disabilities is apparent.

5.4

Conclusion

Persons with chronic pain disorders face unique challenges, in particular the lack of
objective medical evidence, fluctuating symptoms, and unknown etiology. These
challenges obstruct access to human rights and the benefits of accommodation. They also
hinder other options that may be available including LTD benefits, workers’ compensation,
human rights claims for discrimination, and civil actions for wrongful dismissal. Some
courts, tribunals, and arbitrators recognize these limitations and the resulting
discriminatory situation due to the differential treatment of persons with chronic pain
disorders compared to persons with other disabilities. A few recent arbitration decisions
show some promise by applying a flexible and open approach that recognizes the unique
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vulnerabilities of persons with chronic pain disorders and accepts subjective medical
evidence where the individual is credible. However, there is no indication that this
approach will influence courts, tribunals, or other arbitrators. In fact, the most recent SCC
cases fail in this regard and demonstrate movement in the opposite direction to limit the
effects of human rights principles. Persons with chronic pain disorders are also less likely
to succeed in the few options available after accommodation fails: LTD benefits, workers’
compensation, discrimination claims, and wrongful dismissal actions.
Besides accommodation, LTD benefits are likely the most helpful source of financial aid
because the individual can receive monetary help while remaining employed. However,
LTD can be quite a process, particularly if the insurer, who administers the policy, disputes
entitlement. Most LTD disputes come out of unionized workplaces wherein the claim
rapidly progresses to an arbitration, which is essentially the last chance for the employee.
The claim escalates so rapidly because of the frequent absenteeism problems and unclear
and misunderstood nature of chronic pain disorders. Technically, objective medical
evidence is not usually required by LTD policies, but it does provide the strongest evidence
against the insurer’s denial. In the case of chronic pain disorders, usually only subjective
medical evidence can be produced. The insurer balks at this subjective proof as well as
doubting the degree of disability alleged to decline that there is total disability, which is
required at the two-year mark. As a result, the individual is often forced to return to work
before he or she is recovered or to medically retire.
The individual can also dispute the denial of LTD benefits by the insurer. First, the
individual must prove disability, but this is complicated by surveillance evidence that
displays activity and cannot show an invisible disability, and the lack of objective medical
evidence. The individual can also claim aggravated damages where there was
psychological distress due to the denial. In fact, courts seem to recognize greater
vulnerability to stress for persons with chronic pain disorders and are thus more willing to
award aggravated damages. Punitive damages are far more unlikely, not just because it is
a more exceptional form of damages, but also because courts seem to justify the scrutiny
and discrimination that supports the claim for breach of the duty of good faith (the
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independent actionable wrong for punitive damages) because of the lack of objective
evidence. As such, many of these LTD decisions fail to fully engage with the issues.
Workers’ compensation can also be claimed by persons with chronic pain disorders where
the disorder has evolved from a compensable work injury. However, there are three
problems with proof: (1) the time delay in claiming the chronic pain disorder due to the
time developing it and potentially problems with diagnosis; (2) proving the degree of
disability which is hampered by the lack of objective medical evidence; and, (3) proving
causation or material contribution of the compensable injury to the development of the
chronic pain disorder. Where the worker has a positive work history prior to the accident,
no pre-existing condition to confuse the claim, and a lot of supporting medical evidence,
the claim is much stronger. Ontario’s Chronic Pain Disability Operational Policy permits
the board to accept subjective evidence for claims for CFS and FM. Alberta and British
Columbia generally decline to accept subjective evidence and instead deny the claim on
the grounds that the information is insufficient and that the disability is due to outside and
unrelated conditions. Claims for MCS are problematic across all three boards, likely due
to greater lack of a clear and direct link to a compensable injury, which may not even be
an injury at all. Workers’ compensation can be helpful to provide monetary funds but the
board cannot order accommodation or reinstatement.
After dismissal, the individual can make a claim for discrimination at the human rights
commission or pursue a common law cause of action of wrongful dismissal at court. In
order to prove discrimination at the human rights tribunal, the individual must prove: (1)
there is a disability that the employer knew or ought to have known about; (2) the individual
suffered some adverse effect on employment; and, (3) the disability was a factor in the
adverse treatment. Once again, there is a problem with medical proof. Although tribunals
do recognize some discrimination, often the analysis is lacking and only limited reasoning
is provided. Instead, the tribunals fail to engage with the issues. Wrongful dismissal claims
are even less promising. Individuals who are dismissed from a non-unionized workplace
can pursue a wrongful dismissal claim, but this cannot result in specific performance of the
contract, only monetary damages. The most significant case of wrongful dismissal and
disability is Honda Canada. Although the lower courts recognized discrimination, the SCC
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found none and failed to recognize that Honda did not accommodate the employee. Instead,
the court did not consider human rights principles despite ample opportunity and need.
This is especially problematic for chronic pain disorders because the lack of legitimacy
means that blatant discrimination, as in Honda Canada, is less likely to be recognized.
With the discussion of the various caselaw surrounding chronic pain disorders in the
workplace, the efficacy of the law in these cases is assessed. Most caselaw falls into the
hybrid approach, which is a middle ground between the traditional and human rights
approaches. The traditional approach only accepts disability when it is proven with
objective evidence and a clear medical cause. It was evident in early caselaw from the
1990s dealing with chronic pain disorders wherein the courts were dismissive and
ultimately discriminatory. The Alberta and British Columbia workers’ compensation
schemes also demonstrate this traditional approach. Far more problematic, however, is the
use of the traditional approach in high level caselaw such as in Honda Canada. Here, the
SCC seems to have regressed to instead limit application of accommodation and human
rights principles. The SCC did not merely allow discrimination but participated in it by
applying differential treatment (i.e. declining to find discrimination, when it was obvious)
because of the nature of the disability.
The human rights approach is the opposite of the traditional approach to be open, flexible,
inclusive, and adaptable, as per human rights principles. Unfortunately, only a few recent
Ontario arbitrations have demonstrated this approach to accept subjective evidence where
the individual is credible and to recognize the unique challenges of chronic pain disorders.
These arbitrations demonstrate how other decision-makers can accept subjective evidence
while reducing the potential for fraud by assessing credibility and requiring corroboration,
where appropriate. It is possible that these arbitrations are signs of progress, but they are
far more likely to be flukes, particularly given that they were limited to recent arbitrations
in Ontario for unionized workplaces. Recent court decisions that demonstrated a human
rights approach were overturned by higher courts. In this decisions, it is apparent, that
overturning these decisions was not due to confusion, but was instead deliberate to limit
the application of human rights principles.
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The hybrid approach is the most common by far. Here, courts and tribunals essentially pay
lip service to human rights principles by applying an attenuated approach that is
inconsistent and inadequate. Instead, indirect discrimination can be found. In LTD
decisions, it is clear that there is an ideal plaintiff for the claim, but it is the opposite of a
typical person with a chronic pain disorder. Rather, the typical behaviour of a person with
a chronic pain disorder justifies the scrutiny and discrimination. Hydro-Québec is an
example of the court applying the hybrid approach. Here, the SCC reneged on the inclusive
vision set out in Meiorin to limit and narrow the accommodation duty with unclear
reasoning.
When considering the variety of caselaw surrounding chronic pain disorders in the
workplace, it seems as though we are regressing, rather than progressing in our approach.
Caselaw that directly assesses accommodation of persons with chronic pain disorders falls
short of reaching the inclusive vision set out by human rights principles. For the most part,
caselaw that is not directly examining accommodation does not discuss accommodation at
all. Persons with chronic pain disorders face barriers to accessing accommodation that
place them at a lower tier on the hierarchy of disability. Not only are chronic pain disorders
considered less legitimate but persons with these disabilities are also less likely to receive
accommodation and so less likely to remain in the workforce. This means that persons with
chronic pain disorders are then less likely to recover from their disability because of the
value of work in these kinds of chronic illnesses. Only a few arbitrations adequately applied
human rights principles, whereas the majority of caselaw either failed to engage with the
issues or seemed to narrow the application of human rights principles. The most limiting
caselaw is from the courts, including the SCC. Cases that have demonstrated a more human
rights approach have been overturned. Thus, the evidence is stacking up that courts and
arbitrators are moving in opposite directions, with courts likely exercising more influence
with regards to chronic pain disorders.
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Chapter 6

6

Conclusion

Disability is a complex concept. Chronic pain disorders are complex disabilities. That
leaves us with a doubly complex reality. The social model separates impairment from
disability wherein impairment is the functional limitation and disability exists external to
the individual. Disability results from the interaction between the functional limitation and
the environment so it differs for every person.1 The duty of accommodation seeks to
alleviate disability by changing the social environment. Thus, accommodation flows from
the social model. Accommodation is the most beneficial tool for persons with disabilities
because it can enable them to continue working, which offers opportunities for
independence, self-sufficiency, and participation. Disability affects almost everybody; it is
“part of the human condition.”2 Chronic pain has been recognized as a disability in
Canada.3 However, persons with chronic pain disorders have less access to the benefits of
human rights, and accommodation in particular, than persons with “mainstream”
disabilities.

6.1
Why are chronic pain disorders different from other
disabilities?
Chronic pain disorders present a unique challenge to accommodation because the
experience of chronic pain disorders differs from that of disability due to several factors,
including fluctuating symptoms. This means that the needs of persons with chronic pain
disorders are constantly changing. As such, chronic pain disorders warrant a separate
consideration with regards to the efficacy of accommodation. This separate consideration
yields key challenges in dealing with chronic pain disorders. First and foremost, chronic
pain disorders suffer from a lack of medical legitimacy. There is a lack of consensus in the
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medical community regarding the existence, diagnosis, etiology, and prognosis of chronic
pain disorders. Not only does this mean that the medical evidence is regularly disputed
among the medical experts, but it is also consistently conflicting. Thus, it is difficult to
prove the existence of disability and the degree of disability.
Second, chronic pain disorders have an unclear etiology, which means that they cannot be
easily slotted into the categories of disability—physical or psychological. Instead, there is
frequent disagreement regarding the nature of the disability when it cannot be proved either
way as the medical field has not definitively determined the cause. This forms an
administrative problem because it is unclear whether the disability claim should be made
under a physical or psychological category. If made in the wrong category, depending on
the particular procedure, this may result in dismissal of the claim. For example, claiming
either a physical or psychological disability for workers’ compensation is a significant
distinction with regards to proof, causation, and compensation. With regards to
accommodation, the employer may not understand why a physical accommodation is
requested for a psychological disability, and vice versa. Additionally, chronic pain
disorders may have insufficient proof as either physical or psychological. It may not qualify
as physical because there is no organic source or injury whereas it may not qualify as
psychological because of the physical symptoms. There is a high co-occurrence of mental
illness with chronic pain disorders so it may be easier to make a disability claim under the
mental illness. Although, unfortunately, mental illnesses are the most stigmatized of
disabilities.4
Third, many of the symptoms of chronic pain disorders are chronic and fluctuating. This
makes it very difficult to accommodate because the individual’s needs change
unpredictably. As a result, the most common accommodation for chronic pain disorders is
a leave of absence, but this does not actually help the individual to work, merely to maintain
employment if he or she is eventually able to return. Absenteeism is a significant problem
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for accommodation because the employer cannot and should not maintain employment
indefinitely but the employee should have the opportunity to return to work to provide
motivation for improvement. The fluctuation of symptoms also interferes with proof
because the individual may be symptom-free one day and completely disabled the next.
Surveillance evidence and evidence from others may depict these “good” days to discredit
the individual’s claim.
Fourth, the symptoms of chronic pain disorders are invisible, meaning that there is no
physical or external evidence of the disability that can be perceived by others.
Consequently, the employer and co-workers may doubt that the individual is disabled. All
of the above leads to the fifth challenge of chronic pain disorders: the high level of scrutiny
experienced by persons with chronic pain disorders. Each of the other factors contribute to
discrediting the individual with a chronic pain disorder and to an overall disbelief in both
the disorder and the individual’s experience. This disbelief can lead to scrutinizing each
aspect of the disability claim and eventually discrimination because of the unfair and
disproportionate scrutiny or the resulting behaviour from that scrutiny. Thus, chronic pain
disorders present unique challenges as a disability.

6.2
Foundations for understanding disability and
accommodation
Disability is a difficult concept to define; courts and legislatures have struggled to do so
since the advent of human rights. Chapter 2 provides a more thorough history of the theory
of disability that shows that we have come a long way. The current theoretical approach to
disability is CDT, which employs the social model as its main mechanism. Through this
model, disability is understood as the social interaction between the functional limitation
and the environment whereas impairment is the functional limitation. Although the social
model is perhaps an oversimplified understanding of disability, its benefits and influence
are immeasurable. The social model enables the possibility of substantive equality, wherein
each person has what he or she needs to participate in society and thus achieve full
citizenship. This is in opposition to the prior approach: the biomedical model. The
biomedical model sees disability as an anomaly that needs to be cured or eliminated within
each individual. The biomedical model is a far more traditional approach wherein disability
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is a purely medical phenomenon, which can only be proven through objective medical
evidence. Unfortunately, the biomedical model still has some influence on the law
evidenced by the reliance on medical evidence as proof of disability. This is obviously
problematic for disabilities that not only struggle with medical legitimacy, but cannot be
proven through objective medical evidence, such as chronic pain disorders. This lack of
medical legitimacy and evidence is, in fact, the major recurring problem in dealing with
chronic pain disorders, in accommodation and other legal avenues for persons with these
disabilities. If the social model is applied to the duty of accommodation, then two proofs
are required: proof of impairment and proof of disability. Proof of impairment likely
requires medical evidence whereas disability is proved by evidence that impairment
impedes functioning in the workplace. Accordingly, proof of disability does not need to be
medical in nature, but can be proved through subjective self-reporting.
The modern iteration of the accommodation duty was articulated in British Columbia
(Public Service Employee Relations Commission) v BCGSEU (Meiorin Grievance)
(Meiorin).5 Meiorin set out a vision of an inclusive workplace where “human rights
legislation would be interpreted liberally and purposively, to achieve its substantive
equality.”6 With this vision, the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed not only individual
accommodation but also institutional wherein the goal is to eliminate systemic
discrimination by changing the standards on more than an individual basis.7 This goal
accords with the guarantees in the United Nations’ Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD): “rights to accessibility, access to justice, independent living and
community inclusion, education, employment, and an adequate standard of living.”8
Chapter 3 provides a more in-depth account of the accommodation duty in Canada. Ideal
accommodation is inclusive and flexible with the goals of participation for all persons, with
and without disabilities, and removal of systemic discrimination and barriers. Arguably,
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Canada falls short of this ideal for most disabilities because of its focus on individualized
accommodations. Persons with chronic pain disorders, however, seem to be even farther
from this ideal than “mainstream” disabilities because of the greater difficulty receiving
any accommodations, let along individualized ones. As a result, persons with chronic pain
disorders have less access to human rights and accommodation. Not only are there practical
problems with accommodating chronic pain disorders revolving around the fluctuating
symptoms and chronic absenteeism, but there is also a resistance to accepting chronic pain
disorders as legitimate disabilities.

6.3
How does the law fall short for chronic pain
disorders?
There are two major problems with the accommodation of chronic pain disorders in
Canada: absenteeism and medical legitimacy, which are discussed in Chapter 4. With
regards to absenteeism, it can serve as grounds for termination but only where the
absenteeism is excessive and the employee cannot provide proof of an ability to return to
work. This justification stands regardless of the framework with which absenteeism is
considered. The employment contract could be considered frustrated because the employee
is not completing work, but this approach diminishes human rights in practice. Considering
attendance at work a bona fide occupational requirement results in a more human rights
principled approach. However, not all absenteeism will amount to undue hardship; only
excessive absenteeism constitutes undue hardship.
There is no clear standard for what is excessive absenteeism, which is problematic for
chronic pain disorders that have a long recovery rate, if at all. In fact, one of the problems
with accommodating persons with chronic pain disorders is that it is unclear whether or
not they can be accommodated, even after providing various accommodations including
leaves of absence. Thus, the employee with a chronic pain disorder could be terminated
after excessive absenteeism and the lack of proof of ability to return, rather than proof that
he or she could not return to work. It seems that absenteeism is considered excessive after
2-7 years, but whether that is continuous absenteeism or inconsistent absenteeism is
unclear. Thus, accommodation may fail in the face of absenteeism to reach its goal “to
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ensure that an employee who is able to work can do so.”9 Absenteeism is a very common
problem for chronic pain disorders that undoubtedly results in more people with chronic
pain disorders excluded from the workplace. There is no easy fix for this problem. Courts,
tribunals, and arbitrators need to be sensitive to the issues and closely consider the facts,
but otherwise, in order to balance the rights of employee and employer, sometimes, the
employee with a chronic pain disorder must be terminated.
The more problematic and potentially discriminatory problem is the medical evidence
issues. With regards to accommodation, several problems may arise: accommodation may
not be requested because of lack of understanding; discriminatory levels of scrutiny and
investigation may be applied; and, the employer, court, tribunal, or arbitrator may not
accept proof of disability or proof of the degree of disability. With regards to proving the
medical legitimacy of the disability, there are two problems: (1) providing accommodation
for impairment without a definitive diagnosis, both (a) accepting subjective evidence and
(b) accepting impairment without a diagnosis, and (2) accepting and accommodating the
disability without determination of the etiology. Arbitrators have proven far superior in
dealing with these issues by accepting that chronic pain disorders cannot be proven with
objective evidence and thus accepting subjective evidence where the employee and other
witnesses are credible.10
By failing to accept subjective evidence, the employer and decision-maker may be
discriminating against the employee on the basis of the limitations of the disability.
Additionally, requiring a definitive diagnosis of the condition is not necessary. The duty of
accommodation should be invoked when there is proof of impairment; the specific nature
of the disability does not need to be proved. Instead, “a distinction should be drawn
between the question of whether a disability exists and the question of whether medical
science has a label for it or has determined its cause.”11 This distinction is where the law
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and medicine should diverge, but instead the law relies too much on the medical field for
proof of disability, when the proof is not necessary to invoke the duty of accommodation.
Human rights principles require an adaptive and flexible approach—the inconsistent
recognition of the limitations of medical evidence for chronic pain disorders demonstrated
by courts and tribunals does not follow this human rights approach. However, recent
arbitrations demonstrate some potential for progress. Having said that, Canada as a whole
demonstrates a more human rights approach than that of the US and the EU, which have a
high threshold to qualify as disabled that essentially acts as a gatekeeper for access to rights.
Indeed, the problems with medical evidence are even more of a hindrance as persons with
chronic pain disorders struggle just to be recognized as disabled in the EU and the US, let
alone realize their rights.
A lack of objective medical evidence also hinders claims for chronic pain disorders outside
of accommodation, such as long-term disability (LTD) claims, workers’ compensation,
human rights claims for discrimination, and common law actions for wrongful dismissal
as set out in Chapter 5. The lack of medical legitimacy actually justifies some potentially
discriminatory conduct. On one hand, greater scrutiny by the employer and insurer and the
resulting stress for persons with chronic pain disorders is not perceived as discriminatory
because it is justified: the employer and insurer have reason to doubt the claim. On the
other hand, the greater vulnerability to stress and emotional problems from the
discriminatory conduct is also occasionally recognized, as we can see sometimes when
aggravated damages are awarded for the LTD insurer’s denial of benefits. Thus, the
majority of the caselaw outside of accommodation is inconsistent in recognizing the unique
challenges of chronic pain disorders.
LTD benefits are likely the most common alternative to accommodation because the
individual can remain employed and continue to be paid. However, with regards to chronic
pain disorders, the insurer often denies the claim because of lack of objective medical
evidence. In addition, the fluctuating symptoms are a source of weakness because
surveillance evidence shows “good days” and there is difficulty proving “total disability”
in order to remain on LTD leave at the two-year mark. Workers’ compensation is another
possible source of financial support but there are three problems with proof: (1) the delay
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in time between the initial compensable injury and diagnosis of chronic pain disorders; (2)
proof of the degree of disability; and, (3) establishing causation or material contribution of
the compensable injury to the development of the chronic pain disorder due to the unknown
etiology of these disorders. The Ontario worker’s compensation board has demonstrated a
more flexible approach by recognizing the evidential limitations of chronic pain disorders
to accept subjective proof. The individual can also make a claim of discrimination at the
human rights commission; however, this is not that common, perhaps because the claims
are settled before or the claim is dropped because the condition worsens. Furthermore,
human rights tribunals are inconsistent in recognizing the challenges of chronic pain
disorders and fail to provide adequate reasoning when they do recognize discrimination.
Courts, however, are the least understanding of chronic pain disorders. Wrongful dismissal
cases rarely invoke consideration of human rights principles by courts, which is particularly
problematic for chronic pain disorders because the lack of legitimacy results in even less
recognition of discrimination by courts. Thus, the alternatives to accommodation also
grapple with the issue of medical evidence and, as a result, provide less access to rights for
persons with chronic pain disorders than other disabilities.
Indeed, most of the caselaw demonstrates a hybrid approach, which is more flexible and
open than the traditional approach, but it fails to be consistent or adequate and so falls short
of the human rights approach. Instead, courts using this hybrid approach avow adherence
to human rights principles, but do not follow through in action. In doing so, there are
instances of indirect discrimination perpetuated by courts, tribunals, and arbitrators. This
includes: justifying scrutiny of LTD claimants through their own behaviour that is
symptomatic of chronic pain disorders; insufficiency of chronic pain disorders to make a
disability claim despite being recognized as a disability; and, justifying scrutiny and
discrimination because of the nature of the chronic pain disorders, i.e. the lack of objective
medical evidence. The traditional approach is exemplified by early caselaw dealing with
chronic pain disorders in the late 1980s and 1990s where disabilities were only proven with
objective evidence and a clear medical cause. As such, chronic pain disorders, which lack
both, were dismissed and courts were insensitive at best, discriminatory at worst. However,
some courts still demonstrate aspects of the traditional approach, such as in Honda Canada
Inc v Keays (Honda Canada) where the SCC refused to recognize blatant discrimination
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as such, when the lower courts had.12 Here, the court overturned a more flexible and
progressive decision to return to a traditional approach.13
The human rights approach is the ideal approach as set out by human rights principles,
meaning that it is open, flexible, and inclusive to balance the rights of all the parties. It is
the embodiment of the inclusive vision set out in Meiorin that is best able to achieve
substantive equality. The human rights approach demonstrated in recent Ontario
arbitrations14 balances the need for proof with the limitations of medicine to also balance
the needs of the employee and employer. In doing so, these few arbitrations demonstrate
how subjective medical evidence can be accepted as proof of disability. In fact, the
arbitrators unintentionally apply the social model of disability to accept medical evidence
of impairment and subjective self-reporting of the disability, where the individual is
credible and possibly with corroboration from credible witnesses. However, it is almost
exclusively these few Ontario arbitrations involving unions that demonstrate this approach.
Human rights tribunals fall short of this ideal by inconsistently applying human rights
principles and failing to provide clear or strong reasoning and thus failing to engage with
the issues. The few court decisions that have demonstrated the human rights approach have
been overturned for a narrower application of human rights principles, often in the
traditional approach.

6.4
Change is not on the horizon: the law is failing
persons with chronic pain disorders
With this overview of relevant caselaw, a few points become clear. First, the human rights
approach taken in a few arbitrations demonstrates just how flexible and inclusive the law
should aspire to be. These arbitrations did not all agree with the person with chronic pain
disorders and nor should they. The arbitrators were able to understand the unique
challenges of chronic pain disorders in a sensitive way as well as a principled one.
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Arbitrator Knopf in Toronto District School Board v OSSTF, District 12, in particular,
demonstrated a nuanced, sensitive, and measured approach dealing with a teacher with
MCS. Arbitrator Knopf imparted several wise findings, including:
If the wisdom of science cannot come to a conclusion about what causes the
symptoms of her condition, it cannot be expected that this Arbitrator could
or should do so. Nor is it necessary.
When accommodation measures are possible to achieve and no satisfactory
evidence is given why they were not done, it must be concluded that an
employee’s rights have been violated.
At best these [uncooperative] behaviours make it very difficult for this
employer to be able to manage or avoid problems. At the worse, these
behaviours make observers wonder about the validity of some of her claims.
While it is perfectly valid for a manager to question and investigate an
employee’s reasons for absenting him/herself from work, the tone of
derision and cynicism suggest a lack of genuine concern.15
As such, these arbitrations demonstrate the approach that should be taken to dealing with
chronic pain disorders. They are complex disorders so the analysis is proportionately
complex.
Second, courts seem to be heading in the opposite direction with a few significant cases
reversing progressive decisions to return to a rigid method akin to the traditional approach,
in particular Honda Canada and Brewer v Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP.16 Given that these
are higher court decisions by the SCC and Alberta Court of Appeal respectively, this return
to the traditional approach seems to be of far greater influence than the few progressive
arbitrations. This is not a return in the sense that the approach to chronic pain disorders has
changed, rather the approach to chronic pain disorders may be diverging from the progress
of accommodation for disabilities generally to instead regress to the traditional approach
that was initially applied for all disabilities. Thus, should this regression continue, chronic
pain disorders will receive far less access to accommodation and human rights principles.
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Third, the vast majority of decisions employ the hybrid approach, but this unprincipled,
inconsistent, and inadequate approach obviously falls short of the ideal. As such, regardless
of whether the approach to chronic pain disorders is returning to the traditional approach,
persons with chronic pain disorders currently experience less access to accommodation and
human rights principles. Additionally, given that arbitrators have demonstrated the most
principled approach, it is likely that there is a difference in access between unionized and
non-unionized employees with chronic pain disorders. This is in keeping with the trend for
all persons with disabilities: unions advance employees’ access to rights.
Fourth, chronic pain disorders fall lower on a hierarchy of disabilities not only in terms of
legitimacy, but also in terms of their rights across all disability claims. This is due almost
entirely to legitimacy problems in the medical field. The influence of the biomedical model
is clearly displayed by the law’s inappropriate dependence on the medical field to define
disability with regards to chronic pain disorders. The social model has been adopted by
Canada and the ratified CRPD. Thus, in continuing to use the biomedical model, Canada
is not meeting what is set out by the CRPD. Furthermore, only proof of impairment is
actually necessary to invoke the duty of accommodation. Proof of impairment is really only
proof that the individual has some functional limitation; the diagnosis is largely irrelevant
to accommodation.
Dealing with chronic pain disorders in the workplace is a relatively new area of law.
Accommodation and human rights have rapidly progressed in the last twenty years, yet the
rights of “non-mainstream” disabilities have trailed behind. As such, for these “nonmainstream” disabilities, including chronic pain disorders, the law is deficient. It has failed
to protect persons with chronic pain disorders from discrimination, as we can see from the
discrimination permitted and perpetrated by courts and tribunals. The law relies on the
medical field when medicine is lacking, so the law then propagates this lack. The law may
be regressing to a narrower and potentially discriminatory approach out of fear of deceit
and abuse. This backwards movement is obviously problematic, but worse, it is not even
necessary. A few arbitrations have demonstrated how to provide access to rights and
respect the individual while still requiring proof. Thus, the law is failing persons with
chronic pain disorders.
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